



Review of the Basic Services Fund, South Sudan

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Contents

Executive Summary	i
1 Introduction	10
1.1 BSF Logframe and objectives	10
1.2 Progress to Date	11
1.3 Approach to the Review	12
1.4 Structure of the Report	13
2 Education	13
2.1 Progress and Forecast Completion	14
2.2 BSF Impact in Education	15
2.3 Beneficiary Participation in the BSF Education Programme.....	16
2.4 GOSS Participation in BSF's Education Programme	17
2.5 Efficiency of BSF Interventions in Education	17
3 Water and Sanitation	18
3.1 Progress and Forecast Completion in Water and Sanitation.....	18
3.2 BSF Impact in Water and Sanitation.....	20
3.3 Beneficiary Participation in BSF WatSan Projects.....	21
3.4 GOSS Participation in BSF WatSan Projects	22
3.5 Efficiency of BSF Water and Sanitation Projects	22
4 Health	22
4.1 Impact of BSF Health Interventions	23
4.2 BSF Health Targets.....	25
4.3 User Participation in BSF Health Interventions	25
4.4 GOSS Participation in BSF Health Interventions	25
4.5 GOSS Capacity to Plan, Monitor and Coordinate BSF Interventions	26
5. Gender in the BSF Programme	27
6. Monitoring and Evaluation and Lessons Learned	28
7. The BSF Mechanism	30
7.1 The Implementing Partners.....	30
7.2 The Steering Committee.....	32
7.3 The Secretariat	33
7.4 Project Selection	36
7.5 DFID and JDO Relations	38
7.6 Relations with GOSS Service Ministries.....	38
7.7 The BSF Website and Public Communications	39
7.8 BSF Handover and Exit	40
7.9 BSF in Comparison with other Funding Mechanisms.....	40

7.9.1	The Multi Donor Trust Fund	41
7.9.2	The Common Humanitarian Fund	41
7.9.3	The Sudan Recovery Fund	42
7.9.4	Conclusion	43
8.	Strategic Issues	47
8.1	Sustainability and Exit	47
8.1.1	Sustainability of BSF Interventions in Education	47
8.1.2	Sustainability of BSF WatSan Projects	48
8.1.3	Sustainability of BSF Interventions in Health	48
8.1.4	Principles for a Successful BSF Exit Strategy	49
8.2	Capacity and Ownership	51
8.3	Value for Money	51
8.4	Gender	52
8.5	Aid Architecture Post BSF	52
9.	Logframe Review.....	54
9.1	Assessment against the Logical Framework	54
9.2	Proposed Logical Framework Revision	55
10.	Conclusions and Recommendations.....	56

Tables

Table 1	BSF Funding Rounds.....	12
Table 2	The BSF Programme in Summary	12
Table 3	BSF Phase 1 Training: Education	14
Table 4	Phase 1 Contribution to Need in Education.....	15
Table 5	BSF Phase 1 Training: Water and Sanitation	19
Table 6	BSF Health Capacity Related to JAM Targets	23
Table 7	BSF Health Facilities as % of All Facilities	23
Table 8	BSF Secretariat Key Deliverables.....	35

Figures

Figure 1	BSF PHCUs Offering Basic Package Elements - %.....	24
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Annexes

- 1 Gender in the BSF Programme (word file attached)**
- 2 PRISM Report Format August 2009 (excel file attached)**
- 3 Proposed Logframe Revision (word and excel file attached)**
- 4 Annual Review Terms of Reference (word file attached)**

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent, and should not be attributed to, DFID.

Abbreviations

BMB	BMB Mott MacDonald
BoQ	Bill of Quantities
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
BSF	Basic Services Fund
CBTF	Capacity Building Trust Fund
CHD	County Health Department
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CHW	Community Health Worker
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
EPI	Extended Programme of Immunisation
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDO	Joint Donor Office (in Juba)
LF	Logframe
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF-S	Multi-Donor Trust Fund – South
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MOH	Ministry of Health
MWRI	Water Resources and Irrigation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene And Sanitation Transformation
PHCC	Primary Health Care Centre
PHCU	Primary Health Care Unit
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
QR	Quarterly Report
RRP	Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme
RWSS	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
S	South
SC	Steering Committee
SRF	Sudan Recovery Fund
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation

Executive Summary

1. The Basic Services Fund (BSF) for South Sudan was launched in October 2005. Since then £39 million has been awarded, through competitive selection, to 26 lead NGOs providing basic services: £19 million to primary health, £10 million to primary education and £9 million to water and sanitation. There are BSF interventions in between two and five counties in all of South Sudan's 10 states. BSF's initial two-year life has been extended three times and it will now finish in August 2010 (projects end June 2010).
2. BSF was initially funded by DFID. On 1 January 2009, Norway and the Netherlands joined DFID in funding a second phase. Canada joined on 15 March 2009.
3. Starting just 10 months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan, BSF specifically sought a transitional approach that would integrate rapid service delivery with capacity building.
4. This report presents the findings of an independent annual review which took place in August 2009. It follows an earlier review in January 2008. The report addresses four aspects of BSF's work: Impact, Sustainability, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Programme Management. With barely 10 months to the end of funding, the review pays particular attention to the sustainability of BSF's work and possible exit strategies. An independent gender consultant joined the review team.

BSF Impact

5. BSF will make a significant contribution to southern Sudan's needs in basic services: between 5 and 10% of GOSS targets. It has supported basic services in three ways: 1) Building schools, clinics and boreholes; 2) Training teachers, medical staff and GOSS staff; and, 3) Mainly in the health sector, supporting day to day operations by providing medical staff, running costs and drugs.
6. By June 2009, BSF's Phase 1 targets had largely been met. NGOs had completed 17 primary schools (target 21), 36 PHCC/PHCUs (47), 220 water points (239) and over 1,200 latrines (783). Some 800 teachers had been trained and services had been supported in over 60 primary health care facilities. Some progress had been made on the large Phase 2 programme but there remained a lot to complete in the next dry season, from October 2009 onwards. By June 2010, a further 23 schools, nine health facilities and 143 boreholes have to be built.
7. Using GOSS standards – 50 pupils per class, 15,000 people per clinic and 500 people per waterpoint – BSF will reach a significant proportion of the population, especially in health where 1.3 million are estimated to gain access to a BSF facility: some 16% of the population. In education, up to 130,000 pupils will benefit from new classrooms and better trained teachers. Over 220,000 are expected to use BSF water and sanitation facilities. These figures have not been field checked. Effective access to BSF facilities, i.e. the number of actual users, may be considerably lower: especially that for water supplies. Some data is beginning to be collected on effective access – for example the encouraging fact that daily average consultations at BSF clinics have risen to 29 – but more needs to be done.

8. BSF Lessons Learned studies have found the quality of the education service to vary widely. In water supply, a significant proportion of the boreholes provide water that is only fit for washing and construction. The quality of the health service has not yet been checked, but efforts to promote better hygiene seem to have made limited progress. There is a need to address such quality issues across all sectors.

9. In line with GOSS policy, BSF NGOs have invested a lot in community mobilisation: Parent Teachers Associations, Water Point Committees and Village Health Committees. The results seem disappointing, with little sense of community ownership or willingness to make a real contribution to the service's upkeep. In the post-conflict period, a legacy of dependency and a sense of entitlement have to be overcome.

10. BSF has supported capacity building for 300 state Government staff. The low number and average days trained per official below five indicate that this has not been part of a strategic effort to build capacity. Many NGOs have established good working relationships with the concerned state ministries, especially where there is a group of BSF partners with a long-term presence in the state.

11. GOSS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is very supportive of BSF, especially the Director of Foreign Aid Relations, who chairs the BSF Steering Committee. The BSF Secretariat has kept the GOSS central sector ministries informed and they are members of the Steering Committee. However, this has not created a sense of ownership and all three ministries expressed some dissatisfaction with their involvement. Nor has BSF provided them significant capacity building support. There is a clear need for BSF to take its engagement beyond the formalities of written reports and Steering Committee attendance.

The Sustainability of BSF Interventions

12. BSF implementing partners have prepared exit strategies to transfer the services supported to Government by June 2010. Neither the NGOs nor state Government officials believe these strategies are realistic. Few local government structures are in place. State Government budgets are highly unpredictable and, it would seem, contested between line ministries and ministries of finance. A payroll revision exercise which Government is implementing across all sectors is creating resentment and un-intended consequences. State Governments lack capable staff in management and policy grades. Finally, the fiscal position means that GOSS capacity to fund the services is uncertain.

13. BSF costs are in line with other programmes, in some cases significantly better. However, they remain well above what is likely to be affordable for GOSS in the near or medium term: £20 per waterpoint user, £312 per primary school student place, etc. More appropriate standards, low-cost technologies, better value for money, and economies of scale all need to be explored to bring unit costs down to a level which is affordable, and hence sustainable. This issue, and the next, seems to apply to all programmes currently working in southern Sudan, not just BSF.

14. Construction quality is another sustainability concern. BSF Lessons Learned studies in education and water supply identify poor construction management and supervision and the technical quality of the work as key issues. Badly built infrastructure will be less durable.

Gender

15. BSF was not set up to have a specific gender focus, and few NGO proposals have had that focus either. Nevertheless, BSF has made significant contributions to women's well being, especially through the health programme's work on antenatal care and training Traditional Birth Attendants. Women are also important beneficiaries from the water supply programmes. Girls' enrolment at BSF schools is only fractionally higher than the south Sudan average of 36%.

16. BSF has trained 75 women for every 100 men. In health the balance was in fractionally favour of women, but much fewer women teachers were trained, probably reflecting women's lack of the necessary qualifications. NGOs have ensured women are included in community committees but they still seem unlikely to be given a real voice. At the government level, the GOSS Ministry of Gender is a member of the BSF Steering Committee but they have rarely attended. BSF could do more about gender and a new funding mechanism should look at gender at the outset. The expectations in relation to gender should be clarified at design stage. Gender, although contracted separately by DFID, has been integrated into this report. Section 5 and Annex 1 are specifically focused on gender.

Monitoring and Evaluation

17. The BSF monitoring and evaluation system has been significantly improved in the last year. It is recognised to be stronger than any other programme. It is starting to generate real data on outputs and beneficiary numbers, as opposed to guideline estimates. There is some risk over data overload and it is important that next step is taken soon: analysing the results to give the Steering Committee and others useable management indicators and to generate lessons learned about basic services.

18. BSF has commissioned two important lessons learned studies, on education and water supply. These have identified key issues and improved understanding. In health an innovative peer review exercise has helped NGO implementers and GOSS officials to compare notes and identify best practice. The value of both these approaches is clear. The results have been presented in open workshops. The scope to work with GOSS sector ministries using the material to develop policy should be investigated.

Programme Management

19. BSF has been described as the "*most efficient, accessible and user-friendly [fund], delivering tangible dividends*". This good reputation is emphasised by a developing consensus that BSF should be allocated larger funds and given the lead in social service delivery.

20. BSF allocates funds to NGOs through calls for proposals. Winning proposals are selected by a GOSS Steering Committee. The calls set out core principles and GOSS policy, but they set no priorities between sectors, or between capital investment and operations. To that extent, the programme is shaped by what the NGOs propose. Population data is uncertain and current services have not yet been mapped in a way that allows underserved areas to be clearly identified. Equity been the 10 states has been the SC's guiding principle in allocating funds.

21. The Implementing Partners - BSF's non-government implementing partners have met most of their delivery targets and the reviewers saw many examples of dedicated and effective work in the field. As a group they are providing a good service. However, BSF has had to monitor NGO performance more closely and support their capacities much more than expected. Three of 14 Phase 1 implementers were particularly slow and many are behind with their financial accounting. Construction is not a core NGO skill and BSF Lessons Learned studies identify this as a significant weakness. BSF grants have been for short periods, 15 to 24 months. This has made it difficult for the NGOs to move out of 'emergency mode'. Staff contracts have to be kept short and investments in better facilities cannot be made. As a result staff turnover is still high.

22. International NGOs continue to dominate. Only three national NGOs won grants in BSF Round 3. BSF encourages INGOs to take local partners and many do. However, the Round 3 requirement that concept notes and proposals be submitted to the Netherlands and uncertainty about BSF willingness to pay advances may have been barriers to national participation.

23. The high cost of BSF work has been noted. NGO budgets need to be analysed more closely. BSF has not followed up on the last review's recommendation that all construction proposals should be supported by Bills of Quantities, a recommendation repeated in a Lessons Learned study. Overhead costs should also be more clearly justified and Calls for Proposals should put more emphasis on value for money.

24. The Steering Committee - The SC is chaired by the Director Aid Cooperation from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, with members from the three sector ministries - Education, Health and Water - and from Ministry of Gender. NGO's and donors are also represented. Apart from the award of grants at each funding round, its work is limited to reviewing BSF reports and broader policy discussions. The reviewers recommend that the SC mandate be revised to give stronger oversight: directing implementation and calling service providers to account. At present implementation issues, even those relating to non-performance and budget changes, are decided by the Secretariat; although the SC is kept informed.

25. The Secretariat - The BSF Secretariat, staffed under contract by BMB Mott MacDonald, has made good progress since the last review. Monitoring and Evaluation, Lessons Learned and Finance functions are markedly stronger and some serious implementation issues have been effectively dealt with. A much larger funding round - £21 million and 24 new grant agreements - has been managed expeditiously and effectively.

A BSF website has been established and is proving a valuable resource with between 100 and 300 page-views a day.

Of 15 Key Deliverables under the BMB Terms of Reference, the reviewers assess 10 as achieved or substantially achieved. There remains work to do getting the NGOs to complete their accounts and reconciling all projects by August 2010 will be a challenge. Little progress has been made defining an exit strategy, but that involves issues outside BMB's control. The one clear weakness has been in building the SC and line ministry capacity in 'key sector and service delivery issues', and in supporting the incorporation into policy of BSF lessons learned. Insufficient resources were allocated to this part of the work.

DFID and the JDO both attend Steering Committee meetings at different times. The reviewers believe it important to make it clear who formally represents the donor group with GOSS.

26. Project Selection – In Round 3 BSF sought "*proposals for interventions in primary education, primary health and water & sanitation*". It had already been decided to extend eight Phase 1 health grants. The resulting allocation gave greater weight to health and to capacity building than earlier rounds: a positive trend given earlier concerns about a 'building bias'. The terms of the call, and the policy behind it, do not seem to have been discussed in detail with the SC or with the line ministries. Proposal evaluation was done at BMB's premises in the Netherlands and only one member of GOSS staff was involved. The call guidelines gave no encouragement to reduced cost proposals. Overall, the reviewers feel an opportunity was missed to involve GOSS more and to give a more strategic direction to the call. However, time pressure may have been a factor.

25. Relations with GOSS Service Ministries – BSF has not succeeded in creating a sense of real ownership in the GOSS service ministries. Most communications are formal and structured around the quarterly SC meetings. This is not enough. BSF must take the initiative in building a stronger relationship based on has been described as '*foot-in-the-door contact*', with more frequent informal briefings. More specific recommendations are made below.

BSF Compared with Other Funding Mechanisms

26. BSF is one of five pooled funding mechanisms working in south Sudan. GOSS and the donor group have agreed to reorient this aid architecture "*to reflect the strengths and comparative advantages of different .. instruments*" and provide a more coherent structure. BSF is given an important role in this new structure, with a lead in social service delivery and the employment of NGOs. Background papers suggest that \$70 million be transferred to BSF from remaining MDTF pledges. This is a clear endorsement of BSF's achievements and the widely expressed view that it has worked more efficiently and effectively than other funds.

27. BSF is no different in structure or principle from the other funds. All of them contract non-state actors to provide the required services. Almost all have Steering Committees chaired by GOSS and supported by a Secretariat. The key difference concerns the structure of the Secretariat.

Unlike MDTF and SRF, the BSF Secretariat is contracted to a commercial consultancy company: BMB Mott MacDonald. This has the following advantages:

- All aspects of the programme's work are integrated in the Secretariat: grant allocation, contracting, financial management, monitoring and evaluation and capacity building. The contrast is MDTF, where procurement, audit and monitoring are contracted separately and SRF where a separate Management Agent deals with finance.
- The consultant staffing the Secretariat is under contract to provide clearly specified services, key deliverables and named staff. Both the Steering Committee and the donor can hold BMB accountable for all aspects of BSF operations and, if necessary, require that staff be changed.
- DFID, the lead donor, to whom BMB is contracted, has long experience of employing managing agents of this kind. Its procedures are rigorous and compliant with EC directives, but they are well established and well understood by experienced firms such as BMB. Contractual and procedural issues can be resolved without delay and the basics of financial management etc work smoothly.
- Pre-funding: DFID consultancy contracts are let through competitive international. DFID pays no advances to consulting firms, which means that implementers carry all the cost of financing their work. For the donor taxpayer this is more efficient than MDTF and SRF, which are fully pre-funded by the donors and hold large funds on account until they are spent.
- Overhead Cost: The BSF Secretariat costs 10% of the funds committed to implementing partners. A tentative analysis of data from the SRF website seems to indicate a total overhead charge of more than 15% for that funding mechanism.¹

28. BSF's 'light touch' engagement with GOSS, in a less positive light its lack of government ownership, is seen as setting it apart from the other funds. As discussed above, there is a clear need for BSF to address this issue. However, there is nothing in principle to say that a fund supported by a contracted Secretariat cannot be fully owned by Government. It is also not clear that other funds have established a truly strong relationship with the key sector ministries. As with BSF, links to the Ministry of Finance seem to dominate.

29. The reviewers recommend a revision of the BSF Steering Committee mandate to provide greater focus on direction and delivery. The same would seem to apply for the MDTF Oversight Committee/SRF Steering Committee. All the committees face potential conflicts of interest in that they include representatives of implementing organisations as members, in one case as a co-Chair: managing agents, technical secretariats, Participating UN Organisations and NGOS. To be effective, an oversight committee needs to be able to hold all its implementing agents to account, as forcefully as may be needed. This is not possible in a large open forum which includes those agents in the membership. There is also

a conflict in those agents being present when decisions on fund allocation are made.

Strategic Issues

30. The review identifies five strategic issues: Sustainability and Exit; Capacity and Ownership; Value for Money; Gender; and Aid Architectures Post BSF.

31. Sustainability and Exit – BSF funding ends in June 2010. Few, if any of the services will be sustainable thereafter. The situation is most serious in health. There is no feasible exit strategy in place. Such a strategy would need to be long-term and based on clear commitments at the highest level:

- Between GOSS and the states: to ensure that funds are available.
- Between state ministries of finance and the line ministries: to ensure that budgeted costs are funded as planned.
- Between donors, GOSS and the states: to ensure donor support over a long-enough period for Government to prepare itself for the handover.

32. Capacity and Ownership – BSF must do more to establish GOSS ownership and build capacity in the period up to June 2010.

33. Value for Money – Basic service costs in southern Sudan are high. GOSS is unlikely to be able to afford, or sustain, them for several years. Some savings may be possible from lowering standards to allow low cost construction techniques to be used. However, the reviewers believe there is also an urgent need to investigate the scope for cost reductions through greater efficiency and reduced overhead costs. This could be done through a BSF Lessons Learned study.

34. Aid Architecture Post BSF – From its beginning, BSF was designed to integrate service delivery and capacity building. The reviewers argue that this is still the correct approach, and the right basis for the multi-year exit strategy described above. Such a strategy would have the following principles which need to be reflected in the aid architecture:

- Unambiguous GOSS ownership
- A realistic time horizon
- A firm exit strategy supported by the clear commitments from key stakeholders described above
- Planned, and resourced, development of government capacities to:
 - plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery by non-state actors
 - hold service providers accountable
- Clear Government plans and commissioning procedures which ensure that service provider proposals follow those plans.

This more strategic Basic Services Programme could be structured in one of three ways: with the existing Steering Committee working to a stronger mandate and sectoral sub-committees to ensure ownership and alignment with sector ministries; as three separate sectoral BSFs, working to Steering Committees representing GOSS ministries and their State

Government Counterparts; or, as dedicated State BSFs working to state level Steering Committees. The second option, sectoral Steering Committees bridging central and state Government's seems most likely to be able to deliver the two GOSS commitments which are required for a workable exit strategy.

35. This larger, longer term BSF will require implementing partners to scale-up their operations. Longer contracts will help NGOs to do this, but there will also be a need to widen the pool of service providers and to use different contracting models for some purposes. Public service capacity building and construction are not core NGO skills. Tendered contracts with commercial firms may be needed to implement effective programmes in these areas. Building national implementing capacity should also be a priority.

36. To let a new contract for the BSF Secretariat in time for June 2010 should be possible but it would require all parties make a decision to proceed almost immediately. The alternative is to transfer the next stage of BSF to one of the other established funds, most probably SRF. How to do this, while retaining the key strengths of the BSF model, would need to be explored.

Conclusions and Recommendations

37. There are four principal conclusions:

A. BSF has significantly improved access to basic services in southern Sudan, by between 5 and 10% overall. It has piloted an efficient and speedy mechanism for commissioning and managing non-state service providers.

B. BSF has made a useful, but local, contribution to building state Government capacities. It has done less to build capacity centrally and failed to create a sense of ownership in the key line ministries. Despite that, it would offer a good base for a more strategic programme to build Government capacity to manage non-state service providers and hold them accountable.

C. Current exit strategies for donor-supported basic services are not feasible. A strategic, long-term approach is needed. BSF may offer the best base for such an approach.

D. Basic service interventions in southern Sudan have turned out more expensive than forecast. They are unlikely to be affordable, or sustainable, for many years. Greater focus on value for money is needed at all levels.

38. The review makes: A) strategic recommendations relating to a potential 'BSF'. Some strategic decisions in relation to these are applicable immediately; however the implications are longer term (post June 2010). B) More immediate recommendations are for the period up to June 2010.

A) Strategic Recommendations

- That GOSS, its donor partners and state Governments start early discussions on the shape of a tri-partite compact for Basic Service Provision, setting out a timescale for donor support; a GOSS

commitment to steadily increased funding for operating budgets; and, State government commitment to ring-fence those budgets for a phased take-over of basic services.

- That GOSS and its donor partners agree, as immediately as may be possible management arrangements, for a new BSF that will ensure:
 - A structure that aligns management arrangements with the concerned GOSS ministries and ensures their ownership.
 - The necessary technical and administrative resources to implement the Basic Services Compact effectively.
 - The Managing Agent/Secretariat is held accountable for the key deliverables required to implement the programme.
 - Governance arrangements which guarantee GOSS ownership, strategic direction and robust accountability for delivery and value for money.
 - That the programme is able to draw on the widest possible pool of implementation capabilities and technical skills.
 - Overhead costs are fully justified in terms of services delivered.
- That GOSS and its donor partners commission, as soon as possible, work to prepare a detailed Basic Services Programme design and set in process any procurement and other procedures that may be required. This should include a review of the extent to which it is appropriate to integrate gender (and other cross-cutting issues) more clearly within the design of the programme and the selection of NGOs.

B) Recommendations for the Short-Term

- That the BSF Steering Committee instruct the Secretariat to:
 - Draw up capacity building plans for the basic service line ministries.
 - Implement liaison arrangements and regular briefings for line ministries.
 - Work with MoEST to complete the handover of Phase 1 schools.
 - Investigate the short-term secondment to BSF of line ministry staff.
 - Take steps to engage with the Ministry of Gender.
 - Assess the need to extend water quality testing to all BSF boreholes.
- That the Steering Committee's mandate and structure be revised to provide stronger strategic direction and oversight.
- That BSF commission priority lessons-learned studies some or all of: community participation; cost reduction; gender in basic service delivery; water supply technologies; health and hygiene promotion; and, community contributions at health facilities.
- That the Secretariat M&E unit should: analyse monitoring data to prepare an overview for the SC and the line ministries; analyse the extent of BSF services to southern Sudanese women; and, draw up

plans to improve estimates of beneficiaries from and the operational status of BSF facilities.

- That BSF should further develop its website to be a public information resource, not just an information repository, and consider preparing accessible public information bulletins, ideally in national languages as well as English.

1 Introduction

This report presents the findings of an Annual Review (AR) of the Basic Services Fund (BSF) for South Sudan. The review, which was carried out in August 2009, followed DFID's standard PRISM procedures. The review team included a Development Economist/Team Leader, a Governance Consultant and a Gender Specialist (working under a separate direct contract with DFID)². With two weeks for the review of a large, complex programme, the reviewers' findings and conclusions can only be indicative.

The team would like to thank the Steering Committee, BSF's NGO partners and many others for being generous with their time and patient with the discussion. They are particularly grateful to the BSF Secretariat Team Leader and her staff for making it so easy to complete a very tight programme.

1.1 BSF Logframe and objectives

BSF's 2005 Project Memorandum sets out the fund's objectives³:

*"The purpose of the fund is to contribute to **improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in South Sudan**. The fund will also seek to contribute to:*

- a. Improved **capacity** of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery;*
- b. Improved **accountability** between non-state service providers and the GOSS, and between service providers and their clients;*
- c. The development of **common standards** and shared approaches for service delivery; and*
- d. **Piloting** of service delivery mechanisms for larger scale GOSS led programmes."*

The Annual Review is required to assess BSF outcomes against the log-frame. Various revisions have been suggested but they have not been approved and the original log-frame stands, as follows:

Goal - Education, health, and water-sanitation services for all people in South Sudan.

Purpose - Improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in target areas of South Sudan.

Outputs –

1. Steering Committee (SC) established and functioning smoothly and effectively, acting as a bridge to the MDTF.
2. A body of appropriate and successful projects which support scaling-up non-state provision of basic services developed, completed and documented.
3. Project approaches and impacts monitored and evaluated with particular emphasis on lessons learning and dissemination within the GoSS.

The AR also takes account of the adjustments to the Goal, Purpose and Outputs presented in the Phase II Project Memorandum, December 2008: in particular the distinction drawn between infrastructure and service delivery; the emphasis on lesson learning; and, the importance of identifying a *“Smooth transition to post-2011 financing and related support to BSF funded projects.”*

BSF is overseen by a Steering Committee (SC), representing concerned Government of South Sudan (GOSS) ministries and other stakeholders. The SC is supported by a secretariat staffed by BMB-Mott MacDonald (BMB), an international consulting firm appointed through competitive tender. BMB also manages BSF funds on behalf and the donors.

The BSF programme is implemented by non-state service providers (i.e. NGOs). These are appointed through competitive Calls for Proposals to provide basic services in South Sudan. The Secretariat manages the Calls for Proposals but evaluation and final award is the responsibility of the Steering Committee. The Calls for Proposals set out the programme objectives and core principles and they require bids to meet Government policies and standards.

BSF supports three classes of activity:

1. Construction of schools, clinics and water supplies.
2. Training of health and education staff and of community groups.
3. Operations through funding salaries, running costs, material supplies etc.

Over the three funding rounds, 50% will be spent on health, 27% on education, and 23% on water and sanitation. The balance was more even in the first round: 39% on health and 20% on each of the other sectors. BSF is now working in all 10 South Sudan states but some have received more support than others. A concentration of health NGOs working in Upper Nile State is an example.

1.2 Progress to Date

BSF was launched in 28 October 2005. Table 1 summarises the three rounds of Calls for Proposals. Initial BSF grants have been quite short: the majority for just 18 months, the most recent for just 15 months. However, after extensions, some grants have run for as much as 52 months. The BSF Secretariat, originally contracted for two years, has also been extended two times.

Table 2 summarises the BSF programme, showing the budgets by sector and the target levels of beneficiaries.

Table 1 BSF Funding Rounds

Round	NGOs	Funding	Period	Donors
1	6	£8.2 mil	Feb 06 to Dec 08	DFID
2	8	£8.4 mil	Jan 07 to Dec 08	DFID
3 Health Extensions	8	£5.9 mil	Jan 09 to Jun 10	DFID, Netherlands, Norway
3a	11	£11.7 mil	Jan 09 to Jun 10	DFID, Netherlands, Norway
3b	5	£3.9 mil	Apr 09 to Jun 10	Canada
Total	30	£38.1 mil		

Notes:

1. Round 3 Health Extensions were for 8 primary health programmes from Rounds 1 & 2.
2. The total not including the cost of the BSF Secretariat: £3.8 million, 9% of the overall total.

One Phase 1 NGO has yet to finish its work and a number have not yet completed a handover to Government. Phase 2 NGOs started work in January or March 2009 but a lot remains to be completed in the coming dry season.

Table 2 The BSF Programme in Summary

	NGOs Working	Principal Services	Target Beneficiaries	Budget £ Million
Education	13	40 primary schools built 2,290 teachers trained	16,000 114,500	10.3
Health	16	15 PHCC built 50 PHCU built Services supported @ 28 PHCC 61 PHCU	1.3 million	19.3
Water	36	421 waterpoints	210,500	9.0
Sanitation	6	2,438 latrines built Hygiene/sanitation training	12,190	
Capacity Building	Cross-cutting	Training for: - state/local govt. staff - beneficiary communities		

Note: Beneficiary numbers calculated from standard factors. The quality of these estimates and the need for impact assessment are discussed in the relevant sections below.

1.3 Approach to the Review

The review team arrived in Juba on 15th August 2009. They spent 10½ days in South Sudan, four of them in the field. During that time they met Mr Moses Mabiore Deu, Director Aid Coordination, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) and Chairman of the BSF Steering Committee,

and officials in the GOSS Ministries of Finance (MoFEP), Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI), and Education, Science and Technology (MoEST). Senior staff of DFID, UNDP, SRF and JDO were also interviewed.

The team visited the field operations of six NGOs implementing BSF programmes and interviewed representatives of the NGO Forum and the NGO Health Forum. During the field visits team members met officials of the State Ministries of Health and Education in Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria, as well as the Commissioners and County Health Directorate staff in three Upper Nile and two E. Equatoria counties.

The review draws on range of BSF reports, as well as programme monitoring and accounting data and some external documents. It ended with a meeting of the BSF Steering Committee, at which the team presented their preliminary findings and sought the Committee's comments and corrections.

1.4 Structure of the Report

The next three sections of the report look at the impact and sustainability of BSF's work in education, health and water and sanitation. Section 5 reviews the gender dimensions of the programme and Section 6 the Monitoring and Evaluation function. The independent Gender consultant's full report is at Annex 1. How BSF has worked as a pooled funding mechanism, and how it compares with other funds working in S. Sudan, is analysed in Section 7.

The last three sections present an overview of the reviews' findings. Section 8 considers four key strategic issues:

- Sustainability and exit
- Capacity and ownership
- Value for money
- Aid architecture post BSF.

Section 9 briefly summarises BSF performance against the logical framework. (This is supported by the standard DFID PRISM report format, shown at Annex 2.) It also presents a review of how BSF log-frame might be amended to take account of changes since it was drafted in 2005. (A draft logframe, in the new DFID format is presented at Annex 3.)

Conclusions and Recommendations are presented in Section 10. The Annual Review Terms of Reference are given in Annex 4.

2 Education

Educational attainment in South Sudan reflects educational provision, which has been held back by the civil war, despite the notable tradition of volunteer teachers. Girls' education remains differentially lower than boys'. In this context, BSF is supporting the following interventions in education:

- Construction of 40 primary schools, mostly of eight classrooms, plus offices, boreholes and latrines at school sites.

- Supply of classroom furniture, textbooks and teaching materials.
- Fast track and other training to some 2,290 teachers.
- Non-formal education, community sensitisation etc.
- Capacity building for state and county education departments, including support to Teacher Resource or County Education Centres.
- Research, advocacy and support to policy formation.
- Girls' enrolment running at 38% (slightly ahead of the South Sudan average of 36%).

110 schools, not including the 40 newly built ones, have had service support of various kinds: teacher training, equipment, teaching materials etc.

2.1 Progress and Forecast Completion

By end June 2009, the Phase 1 programme was 85% complete: 17 schools out of a planned 21. The SC had agreed to drop one school, for an NGO which had under-budgeted. Another NGO had still not completed three of nine schools, despite spending its full budget. It is completing the work at its own expense. Of the Phase 2 programme of 23 new schools, one was complete prior to the 2009 wet season. There will be a heavy programme for the one dry season before BSF ends. This will need careful management.

Table 3 summarises the training provided in Phase 1. The total of 1,752 trainees was ahead of the planned 1,522.

Table 3 BSF Phase 1 Training: Education

Trainees	Female Participants	Male Participants	Total	Av. Days Trained
Head Teachers	2	72	74	9
Teachers	170	925	1,095	23
State Govt Staff	24	149	173	4
PTAs	39	176	215	5
Community Leaders	42	138	180	12
NGO Staff	0	15	15	2
Total	277	1,475	1,752	-

BSF partners' plans for Phase 2 training are not yet complete but following gives an outline:⁴

<u>Planned Course</u>	<u>Participants</u>
Head Teachers	453
Teachers	1,290
Teachers – subject workshops	276
PTAs	3,112
Local Government staff	396

The majority of Phase 1 courses were quite short, even for teacher training. Apart from teachers, the number of participants was also small. The Phase 2 programme shows larger numbers in key areas, Head

Teachers and Local Government staff in particular. It is not clear whether the intensity of the training is also to be increased. The very large number of PTA trainees is enough for 300 schools. The reason for this is not explained.

Overall, BSF training seems some way short of a strategic effort to address South Sudan's key capacity needs: upgrading for poorly qualified teachers; converting teachers with Arabic qualifications to English; and, building the capacities of state and local government staff.

2.2 BSF Impact in Education

Table 4 compares the BSF contribution to South Sudan's requirement in primary education, as estimated by the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and more recent targets set by GOSS. It assumes that BSF will meet its Phase 2 targets. By June 2010, on these figures, BSF will have made a solid contribution. An investment of £10 million will have met some 8% of the overall need.

Table 4 Phase 1 Contribution to Need in Education

	JAM Requirement	GOSS Target 2011	BSF Forecast	BSF as % of GOSS Target
Primary Schools	360	500	40	8.0%
Trained Teachers	2,500	13,000	2,290	17.6%

Note: Trained teachers are 'Existing Teachers'. GOSS also aims to recruit 15,000 new teachers. The level of training is not specified.

It is difficult to derive a clear estimate of the number of beneficiaries under the BSF education programme. Some Phase 1 NGOs report 40 beneficiaries per classroom built, others seem to show much larger numbers⁵. On the GOSS standard of 50 students per classroom, i.e. 400 per eight-room school, and 50 students per teacher trained, a broad estimate might be that 130,000 primary school students will benefit from BSF by the end of the programme: 114,000 from the teacher training and 16,000 from the new classrooms built. This may be compared with the GOSS target primary school enrolment of 1.76 million children.

GOSS continues to face a strategic challenge in education: managing the transition from a tradition of community/volunteer education to something more formal. In the northern states, a parallel challenge is the change from an Arabic curriculum to a new one based on English; and helping large numbers of teachers trained in Arabic to convert. Apart from the cost of a larger teaching establishment, there are difficult issues over who is qualified to join the payroll, and possibly who should be taken off it. BSF impact will depend on GOSS' capacity to staff the schools that have been built, and employ the teachers who have been trained.

A BSF Lessons Learned study (August 2008) emphasises that true impact will depend on the number of contact hours delivered and the quality of the teaching. For BSF to have an impact, a planned handover with at least a year's lead-in will be needed. After that there should be 'Aftercare', to support inspection and output monitoring and build a lasting

relationship. BSF exit strategies do not make provision for this level of support.⁶

Accurate figures are needed on the utilisation of BSF schools, and the employment and retention rate for teachers trained by BSF. It is known that three Phase 1 schools are not in full operation. None of the Phase 1 schools has yet been formally handed over to the local education departments.

Until better data is available, any assessment of BSF impact must be tentative. That said, there is strong demand for education in South Sudan and a cadre of teachers to provide it. With those essentials in place, there is good reason to believe that the BSF's investment in the sector will be of value. In 2009, a BSF Benchmarking Study reviewed 23 schools which had been supported under the programme: nine through construction or rehabilitation, the remainder through training. The average enrolment was over 600 per school, although there was a wide range. The smallest school had barely 130 students, the largest over 1,300. This shows the importance of assessing the real need when choosing schools to support.

BSF's education programme had a large construction element. However, shortage of learning spaces has never been the critical constraint on educational outcomes in South Sudan. One State Minister of Education reported to this review that attendance at the state's 394 schools, the majority in semi-permanent buildings, had increased by 11,000 in a year: nearly equal to the total classroom capacity funded by BSF. To him it is logical to be flexible over school design; low cost options are not ruled out.

2.3 Beneficiary Participation in the BSF Education Programme

MoEST guidelines set the principle that: *"the vast resource in parents and communities ... can be harnessed and used to support the development of education"*. The Education Act 2008 sets out clear responsibilities for the primary School Management Committee, as the governing body, and the PTA, including the obligation to mobilise community resources to support the school.

BSF NGOs are working to build community capacities to meet these obligations. In January 2008, reviewers found that community participation was limited and no strong sense of ownership seemed to be developing. In this review, the team did not have time to investigate this point further in the education. However, discussions with community committees in the other sectors seemed to indicate that the idea of community-driven development is not yet widely supported or even welcome. The emphasis tends to be on the community's entitlement to a Peace Dividend.

A concerted effort is likely to be needed to make government policies effective: to decide what communities can reasonably be asked to pay, and persuade them to do so. It is not clear that BSF's implementing partners have realised the extent of the effort required. A Lessons-learned study might help to find better ways to tackle this issue.

2.4 GOSS Participation in BSF's Education Programme

The BSF Lessons Learned study identified a 'major concern' about GOSS participation in BSF's programme and the limited involvement of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. MoEST had not always attended SC meetings and not all ministry staff were well briefed on BSF activities. The study suggested that BSF needed to do more to build a working relationship with the Ministry. Formal, written communications and SC meetings were not enough. *"There should be ongoing foot-in-the-door contact, and more regular, informal briefings and discussions. MoEST staff should participate in BSF Secretariat monitoring visits, and should be encouraged to share knowledge more consistently, particularly in the key area of contracting."* It was pointed out that a member of the BSF Secretariat staff was nominated to lead on government relations but that much of his time seemed to be dedicated to M&E. (This post has since been removed.)

Following discussions with MoEST staff and a review of BSF reporting, SC minutes etc, the current reviewers would wholly endorse these conclusions, which echo recommendations made in the January 2008 review. These issues are discussed further in Section 7, The BSF Funding Mechanism.

BSF partners in education generally have good relations with the Ministries of Education in the states where they are working. This is most noticeable where a local CSO is a member of the implementing consortium, such as the Roman Catholic Diocese in Torit, or has a established track record, such as HASS in Central Equatoria; but a number of NGOs have worked to build their relationship with state and local authorities.

The Lessons Learned study makes the important point that greater engagement with state authorities in drafting concept notes and proposals might have helped to avoid later problems over questions of site selection and project design.

2.5 Efficiency of BSF Interventions in Education

BSF schools have cost between US\$20,000 and US\$30,000 a classroom, more if NGO overheads are included. This is comparable with the costs of a number of other NGOs working in South Sudan and substantially below the US\$37,500 per classroom quoted in the latest round of MDTF procurements. However, it has been estimated that in order to pay for all the schools needed in South Sudan at the BSF unit cost, it will take 20 years. For this reason the Lessons Learned study recommends a twin-track approach to school design: permanent structures in towns and low cost designs in the rural areas.

There seems to be a general view that BSF costs, similar to those of other organisations, are reasonable for construction in S. Sudan. The reviewers believe this should be checked. Construction is not a core competence for many BSF partners, and there continues to be a lack of basic cost control techniques: the use of Bills of Quantities and supervision by qualified clerks of work/quantity surveyors. Construction of small numbers, sub-contracted in different ways by several different NGOs, is

likely to incur significant diseconomies of scale, if only in procuring expensive bulk materials such as cement. The quality of the building work, and hence the durability of the facilities, is a question that has received little attention. The Lessons Learned study makes a number of similar points.

Currently, skilled labour is lacking in S. Sudan and key materials have to be transported from Kenya or Uganda. These costs are likely to fall sharply as transport and other services develop. There is a clear case, which now seems to be accepted by GOSS, for making greater use of low-cost designs and techniques until that happens. This need not mean a return to grass-roofed, daub and wattle structures. A great deal of work has been done internationally on rammed-earth and other techniques for building durable structures of a good standard in remote areas.

The Lessons Learned study noted that Phase 1 implementing partners led by a national NGO, or with a strong Southern Sudanese involvement, made more progress at lower cost than INGOs which did not have a good local base.

3 Water and Sanitation

BSF is supporting the following interventions in the water and sanitation sector, at a total cost (spent and committed to June 2010) of £9,023,512:

- Construction of 362 borehole waterpoints equipped with handpumps
- Rehabilitation of 115 borehole/hand pump water points
- Construction of a small number of alternative water schemes
- Support to the formation of waterpoint management committees
- Training of pump mechanics
- Training and awareness raising in hygiene and sanitation
- Capacity building for state and county water departments.

3.1 Progress and Forecast Completion in Water and Sanitation

In water, at the end June 2009, the Phase 1 programme was substantially complete and the overall situation was as follows:

Phase 1 Achievements

220 Drinking water schemes - Target 239
800 Beneficiaries per scheme (reported)

Phase 2 targets

258 Schemes (115 rehabilitated)
500 Beneficiaries per scheme (estimated)

Total

478 Schemes = 14% of JAM target
5% of GOSS target

GOSS has substantially revised the JAM targets for water supply. The new targets are for 6,500 new and 3,650 rehabilitated boreholes. The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation's (MWRI) guideline was for 15

litres per capita per day for not more than 500 persons per safe water point, within not more than 1.5km. Ministry staff advise they are considering a lower guideline of 250 persons per waterpoint.

In sanitation, BSF exceeded the Phase 1 targets by over 50%. The June 2009 situation was as follows:

Phase 1 Achievements

1,203 Pit Latrines - Target 783
5 Beneficiaries per latrine (estimated)

Phase 2 targets

1,467 Pit Latrines
5 Beneficiaries per latrine (estimated)

Total

2,670 Latrines = 59% of GOSS target

A proportion of the borehole waterpoints and the latrines was sited at a BSF school or health facility. The number of users for these public facilities may be higher than the standard figures. On the other hand, there is an element of double counting since these users are already included in the school/clinic beneficiary figures.

Training, awareness raising and motivation are key components of the water and sanitation programme. The importance of this was highlighted by OXFAM research showing how poor hygiene contaminates water which is pure when drawn from the well. Table 5 summarises BSF Phase 1 training and capacity building in water and sanitation.

Table 5 BSF Phase 1 Training: Water and Sanitation

Trainees	Female Participants	Male Participants	Total	Days Trained
Community Leaders	63	292	355	3
Hygiene/Sanitation	8	36	44	3
Water Committees	384	385	769	4
Public H & S	230	123	353	3
Pump Mechanics	49	112	161	10
School Hygiene Clubs	254	300	554	7
Health Motivators	217	93	310	4
Water Quality	29	58	87	2
State Govt Staff	6	58	64	2
NGO Staff	21	89	110	2
Total	1,261	1,546	2,697	

The following is an outline of Phase 2 training plans:⁷

<u>Planned Course</u>	<u>Participants</u>
State Govt Staff	34
Pump Mechanics	151
Water Committees	1,263
Hygiene/HIV awareness	6,110
School Hygiene Clubs	520
Village Health Motivators	800

3.2 BSF Impact in Water and Sanitation

BSF impact in water and sanitation depends on three factors: 1. the sustainability of the waterpoints and latrines provided; 2. the number of users per facility; and, 3. the extent to which the users adopt better hygiene practices. To date no effort has been made to estimate these factors accurately. The remainder of this section looks at the available evidence.

In water supply, BSF Phase 1 implementing partners have reported 800 beneficiaries per borehole. As far as the reviewers could ascertain, these figures are based on the population of each waterpoint's catchment area, not on actual numbers of users. There are three reasons for thinking the estimates are too high. First, the standard India Mark II hand pump is rated to produce between 600 and 900 litres per hour, continuous pumping. Allowing for change-over, rest etc an average of 500 litres an hour is optimistic. At the GOSS standard of 15 litres a person, that rate could only supply 266 persons in a full eight-hour day.

Secondly, an unknown proportion of the boreholes are not functioning. The Review heard of two boreholes out of five that were inoperational in Eastern Equatoria, although the water management committees expressed confidence in their ability to repair them. Recently BSF monitoring in Central Equatoria found 4 out of 10 boreholes inoperational: barely 18 months after commissioning.

Lastly, a significant proportion of the wells do not have drinkable water. Of 47 OXFAM boreholes, 22 had water that *"is not fit for human consumption (having adverse health effects), based on values for nitrite, copper, manganese and/or fluoride exceeding maximum allowable WHO guidelines; this corresponds to 47% of the sampled boreholes."* A further 14 boreholes had water that is saline or otherwise objectionable.⁸ OXFAM has installed pumps on these wells, because the communities wished to use them for non-drinking uses. They have taken steps to ensure that both the authorities and the community understand that the water is not safe to drink. There still may be some risk here, but the specialist consultant has advised that these mitigation steps are sufficient. OXFAM has paid close attention to water quality. The same tests were not done for many other boreholes. There is a case for having all the BSF wells tested as soon as possible.

It should be a simple matter to collect accurate data on the number of BSF wells that are currently working and providing potable water. And it would only take a day's observation to gain a preliminary estimate of the number of users at each waterpoint. This should be done immediately.

Until that data is available, it is not possible to make an effective assessment of the programme's impact.

Firm data on the utilisation of BSF latrines is also lacking. BSF originally estimated 10 beneficiaries per latrine. That number has been reduced to five, which seems reasonable for a private household facility, low for the latrines installed at schools and clinics. The fact that the installation of latrines has been substantially demand-led gives confidence in the beneficiary numbers. Where some NGOs have found little interest in the programme, others, notably Medair, have beaten their targets by a factor of ten. This presumably reflects genuine interest on the part of the target users. Nevertheless, the reviewers observed at least one school latrine which was not in use.

NGOs working in the water and sanitation sector are making considerable efforts to raise awareness of hygiene and sanitation issues and to promote better individual and household cleanliness. The same is true for most NGOs working in health. It is not yet possible to assess the impact of this work on attitudes and practices, still less the impact on health outcomes. A preliminary conclusion seems to be that it will be a slow task. A GOAL survey showed zero per cent of households "*who wash their hands at three critical times or more ...*",⁹ despite quite intensive Hygiene and Sanitation promotion efforts.

Changes in hygiene practises are likely to take longer than the 18-month span of the typical BSF project. Most NGOs are following standard approaches, drawing on the PHAST model which is well known in East Africa. It may be that deeper research is needed into how attitudes, and the realities of daily life, affect hygiene and sanitation practices in Southern Sudan.

3.3 Beneficiary Participation in BSF WatSan Projects

Government expects that: "*User communities shall be mobilised and trained to gradually take over full responsibility for management and financing the operation and maintenance of RWSS schemes.*"¹⁰ BSF NGOs have taken different approaches to supporting this policy. At one extreme, OXFAM has supported the establishment of a Payam-level Village Waterpoint Management Committee overseeing all waterpoints in the Payam. The committee is supported by large numbers of Village Health Motivators (34 per payam) and pump mechanics. A BSF-funded Assistant Public Health Promoter assists the committee and effectively heads this structure. All the community participants are paid an incentive in the form of salt and soap. OXFAM were unable to tell the review team how well these structures had lasted in the Payams where it is no longer working. This approach seems more like a substitute for a rural water department than a mechanism for community ownership. OXFAM suggested two possible exit strategies: to Government or to a registered CBO.

Other NGOs have established committees for individual waterpoints, but there is no evidence that these have started to take independent decisions about the management and financing the facility's operation. The reviewers observed one borehole that was not working, but the committee

appeared to have no plan to fetch spares and arrange its repair. Some NGOs require a minimum 25% women's participation in these committees, and there is some incomplete evidence to show that the success of the committees is higher where women are well represented.

The conclusion is similar to that in education: that a considerably more focussed effort will be needed to make a reality of community ownership of rural water supply schemes. There is scope for a lessons-learned study to take this issue forward.

3.4 GOSS Participation in BSF WatSan Projects

BSF NGOs have liaised closely with the authorities at the state and local level and consulted over the allocation of projects between counties. This has included SSRRC and the Ministry of Infrastructure, as well as the Rural Water Department. However, MWRI advise that less than half of all counties have an Assistant Commissioner for Water. It will be difficult to build a strong working relationship with local authorities until they are fully staffed. At the GOSS level, MWRI staff have attended the Steering Committee regularly. However, as with the other sector ministries, they would like to be more closely involved. There is a particular interest in the technical aspects of the work. Latrine designs in different soils was an example given.

3.5 Efficiency of BSF Water and Sanitation Projects

In January 2008, the average BSF waterpoint cost £5,728. For Phase 2, costs of £10,000 and even higher are being quoted, even before NGO overheads are added. At 500 beneficiaries per waterpoint the cost per beneficiary will be £20. The scope to reduce these costs should be reviewed.

A BSF Lessons Learned study identified significant weaknesses in the way borehole construction has been managed: *"Not a single grant recipient employed a fulltime drilling supervisor, and half of the grant recipients could not produce borehole completion reports."* Many NGOs did not test the water quality, and handpumps have been installed even when the water quality was potentially or, even deleterious to health. Direct drilling costs of up to US \$ 15,500 per borehole are not justified and better contract procedures are required.

It is understood that all the BSF boreholes have been drilled with rotary rigs, to depths of up to 80 metres. Some wells yield more than 10 times the maximum achievable yield for the standard India Mark 2 hand pump. There are cheaper techniques suitable for hand pumps, such as percussion-rigs drilling narrow-bore wells and hand-dug wells lined with concrete rings. These possibilities should be investigated, at least for the sedimentary geology that forms a large part of Southern Sudan.

4 Health

GOSS policy is set out in the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS). The target is 50% access to PHC services by 2011. Current estimates are

that coverage is 40%¹¹, mostly provided by the 119 NGOs working in the sector.¹²

Women are particularly hit by the current situation, especially the lack of trained midwives and insufficient linkage with TBAs. South Sudan's maternal mortality rate of 2,054/100,000 is among the world's highest, and only 26% of women giving birth receive antenatal care from skilled personnel¹³.

Front-line health personnel in South Sudan's 1,256¹⁴ primary health facilities are supported by policy-development work from the GOSS Ministry of Health in Juba. However, there is a "missing middle" in the health system most clearly evident in the non-existence of many County Health Departments (CHDs): staff are simply not in post.

4.1 Impact of BSF Health Interventions

The benchmark for health sector interventions remains the Joint Assessment Mission targets set out in 2005, which envisaged a total of 1,040 health facilities. BSF-supported units deliver 8.6% of this total:

Table 6 BSF Health Capacity Related to JAM Targets

Type of facility	BSF currently in service ¹⁵	Total Needed by 2011 ¹⁶	Percentage met by BSF
PHCC	28	240	11.7%
PHCU	61	800	7.6%
Total PHCC/Us	89	1040	8.6%

The number of operational health units in South Sudan is now, according to MOH figures (which may be over-optimistic), ahead of the JAM targets. For this reason, BSF clinics may comprise only 7.1% of health units currently functioning:


Table 7 BSF Health Facilities as % of All Facilities

State	BSF PHCU	BSF PHCC	BSF Total	State PHCU	State PHCC	State Total	BSF as % of State
Warrap	7	1	8	115	93	208	3.8
W Eq	10	2	12	153	33	186	6.5
W-BEG	0	0	0	46	23	69	0.0
Unity	0	0	0	53	22	75	0.0
U Nile	25	9	34	73	35	108	31.5
E Eq	7	9	16	123	21	144	11.1
Jonglei	?	1	1	98	30	128	0.8
N-BEG	3	1	4	21	n/a	21	n/a
Lakes	0	0	0	53	22	75	0.0
C Eq	9	5	14	197	45	242	5.8
TOTAL	61	28	89	932	324	1256	7.1%

Population data is not available at the Payam level, which makes a direct estimate impossible of the coverage of BSF health facilities impossible.

The best available estimate is from the GOSS standard figure of 15,000 per PHCC or PHCU.¹⁷ On this basis the population served is 1,335,000, or 16% of South Sudan’s total of 8.2 million.

Figure 1 BSF PHCUs Offering Basic Package Elements - %



The 2008 Peer Review analysed the range of services available at each of 56 BSF facilities. Figure 1 graphs the results. On average, only 46% of BPHS was being delivered at the PHCUs surveyed, and 51% at PHCCs. Only curative care was offered at all the facilities. Provision of child and maternal health services was much lower, hit by different factors:

- EPI: a fridge was not available in most facilities, so vaccines could not be administered. However, the rate of EPI outreach was higher – over 70%.
- Growth monitoring: with few possibilities for referral of stunted children, there was no incentive to conduct it.
- Assisted normal delivery: most women opted to give birth at home.
- Sterilisation: equipment not available in most facilities.

These results may simply mean that the BPHS is, as one interviewee described it, “aspirational”: beyond what is currently affordable. Nevertheless, there is a perceptible bias against the services most required by women, for child and reproductive health, reducing BSF impact on high maternal and child mortality.

The average number of consultations in BSF facilities is increasing. In facilities supported since Phase 1, the 2007 daily average was 13 consultations per facility per day, rising to 24 per day in 2008 and 29 per day in 2009 (first 6 months). Assuming a population served of 15,000 – but without allowing for repeat visits - this implies 0.6 outpatient consultations per year, which is ahead of the JAM target for South Sudan of 0.51¹⁸.

In terms of unit costs, figures from the Secretariat give a figure for US\$16.2 per year per beneficiary for health projects started in phase one (which includes construction costs) and a figure of US\$11.3 for phase one health projects extended into phase two (thus excluding construction costs). This latter figure might appear competitive and relatively efficient, within sight of the JAM estimate of US\$7 per person per year for the recurrent costs of delivering primary health care. Unfortunately, it is likely to err on the low side because:

- i) It assumes catchment numbers of 15,000 per PHCU and 50,000 per PHCC, which (as above) implies double-counting of beneficiary numbers.
- ii) It does not cover the full cost of the health services delivered, because it does not include any contribution from the Ministry of Health.

A more accurate figure for the cost per beneficiary – excluding double counting and construction costs, but including MOH contributions – is likely to be roughly double the JAM estimate, even allowing for inflation.

4.2 BSF Health Targets

In Phase 1 there was an emphasis on construction/rehabilitation. BSF built or rehabilitated 43 primary health facilities (14 PHCC and 29 PHCU), and supported services at 22 more (7 PHCC and 15 PHCU). In Phase 2 the balance is more even. It is planned to build only two more PHCC and seven PHCU while supporting services at 40 facilities (9 PHCC and 31 PHCC). Little of the planned Phase 2 construction/rehabilitation has yet been completed, but there is reasonable expectation that most targets will be met during the course of the coming dry season.

4.3 User Participation in BSF Health Interventions

The community is the owner of most PHCC/U facilities (56%), with 33% owned by the Government and the rest (11%) by churches. Village or Boma Health Committees have been formed in most of the BSF health facilities, as required by the BPHS. However, BSF monitoring visits have found that many Committees are unaware of their role, which they usually see as limited to the maintenance of the physical structure of the health facility and to some extent community health education.

“The King of the Shilluk used to instruct his people to clear grass off the roads. Now some say they will not do it without Food for Work.”

County health official describing a culture of dependency in South Sudan

One form of user participation that is generally not required in BSF-facilities is payment for drugs or services required. This is in line with the GOSS MOH no-fees policy. However, small fees are charged in some MOH clinics supported by BSF: to run generators, to pay for minor repairs, stationary etc. MOH budgets for this kind of cost are greatly inadequate. This is not necessarily done without official knowledge, even though it is against GOSS policy. The reviewers were shown a letter from one Community Health Committee to the State ministry requesting permission to raise the fee from SDG 2 to SDG 5 per consultation. The Director of Primary Health, who was present at the meeting, said that he had no problem with this.

4.4 GOSS Participation in BSF Health Interventions

At the central level, GOSS ownership of BSF health interventions is low. The Ministry of Health is an intermittent participant at Steering Committee meetings. Ministry of Health staff commented that real ownership would only come with substantive MOH involvement in the design of BSF proposals. The Ministry prefers the MDTF model, which gives it much closer operational control.

Relationships are closer in the states. State Ministries of Health have five contacts with BSF projects:

1. information-sharing: BSF project staff regularly report back to the Ministry on current activities and plans, share statistics, and provide input into epidemiological surveillance.
2. Routine inspection visits of health facilities. In most cases, Ministry personnel (State or County) used the NGO vehicles to conduct these visits, because CHDs usually lack their own transport.
3. Capacity-building by BSF project personnel in areas such as HMIS, computer skills, drug management systems etc.
4. Deployment of MOH personnel in some BSF-supported clinics. However, most of these MOH personnel are posted in major towns such as Juba and Malakal that are relatively attractive postings.
5. Drug supply. On average 29% of the drugs in BSF clinics are supplied by the MOH. However, many clinics receive no drugs from MOH, where others receive as much as 80%. Delivery to the health facility is a problem in rural areas, where State ministries lack transport.

Collaboration in the counties and payams is only possible where there are MOH personnel in place; which is only in a minority of cases.

4.5 GOSS Capacity to Plan, Monitor and Coordinate BSF Interventions

Round 3 health proposals demonstrated local participation in project design by referring to meetings with community authorities and State MOH staff. Proposals were therefore in line with MOH plans: but that is very different from saying that the spending priorities in the projects were the same as those of the MOH. Collaboration with State MOHs and CHDs is also promoted by the requirement in the new BSF quarterly monitoring forms to record such contacts. But there are many problems, and much depends on the quantity and quality of CHD staff in place. One NGO reported: "Much time was spent going back and forth between County and State authorities simply to determine with whom we should sign an MoU, to whom reports should be sent, and with whom activities should be planned." A more positive experience was recorded by one of the NGOs working in Upper Nile who conducted peer workshops for CHD staff from 3 different states. As the MOH is able to staff up at State level – and the nine-fold increase¹⁹ in State level MOH budgets between 2008 and 2009 has helped – MOH capacity to oversee BSF interventions should grow.

Some BSF NGOs have already signed MOUs State MOHs and local administrators. However, these MOUs are mostly a clarification of existing roles and responsibilities, with a record of the intention that the state MOH should build up the relevant CHD and take existing staff on to the payroll – but there is no attached plan, timetable or commitment of resources. It would be premature to take such MOUs as evidence of firm engagement by GOSS to take over the facilities.

5. Gender in the BSF Programme

The independent Gender Consultant's report is at Annex 1. This section presents a summary of her findings.

The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005 gives women fully equal rights:

- (1) Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person with men.
- (2) Women shall have the right to equal pay for equal work and other related benefits with men.
- (3) Women shall have the right to participate equally with men in public life.
- (4) All levels of government in Southern Sudan shall:
 - (a) promote women participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least twenty-five per cent as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created by history, customs and traditions;
 - (b) enact laws to combat harmful customs and traditions which undermine the dignity and status of women; and
 - (c) provide maternity and child care and medical care for pregnant and lactating women.
- (5) Women shall have the right to own property and share in the estate of their deceased husbands together with any surviving legal heirs of the deceased.

However, culture and history mean that women's rights are far from equal in practice. Girls' enrolment is still well below boys, and their drop out rates are higher. As a result women's literacy rates are low, below 40% and they are very under represented in qualified professions. Violence against women is widespread and in some areas a systematic part of ethnic violence. Mortality in childbirth is high.

BSF Core Principles require that projects should address inequalities and be inclusive of women and other vulnerable groups. Beyond that it has not had a specific gender focus or remit in terms of a requirement that NGOs work on particular gender issues²⁰. Apart from S. Sudan's very low rate of girls' enrolment, gender is not mentioned in either of the two project memoranda. Relatively few NGO responses to call to proposals have had that kind of specific focus either. This does not mean that BSF has not contributed to women's well being, and the improved M&E system now presents some gender disaggregated data.

BSF's most important contribution has been through the health programme. 60% of BSF supported clinics provide antenatal care, and over 20% assisted normal delivery. Nutrition and other mother and child services are offered at many clinics and a high proportion of the day-to-day curative consultations are for children. In Phase 1, 494 Midwives and Traditional Birth Attendants were trained, the largest single group of technical trainees. As the ones who carry the largest responsibility for fetching water, women are likely to have been the principal beneficiaries

from the water supply programmes. In education, girls' enrolment at BSF schools is 38%, fractionally higher than the south Sudan average of 36%.

BSF's Phase 1 training programme as a whole was been relatively well balanced: with 75 women trained for every 100 men. In health, the balance was in fractionally favour of women²¹. There was, however, a large imbalance in education. Only 170 women teachers were trained against 925 men. This probably reflects the lack of women with the necessary starting qualifications.

NGOs have sought to include women in the PTAs, water point and health committees and succeeded at the formal level. In the field, it is evident that women are still reluctant to speak up in mixed fora and are unlikely to be given a real voice. At the government level, the GOSS Ministry of Gender is a member of the BSF Steering Committee but they have rarely attended.

There is a clear case for BSF to do more about gender. Immediate steps might include:

- Commissioning a lessons learnt paper by BMB on BSF experience to date (see Recommendations in section 10). It would also be useful to analyse available gender disaggregated data in more detail to understand better how well BSF is reaching women.
- Investigating ways to actively promote girls education;
- Further strengthening the Mother and Child side of the health programme;
- Reviewing how to given women more effective voice, perhaps through the establishment of separate women's committees; and,
- Seeking to engage the Ministry of Gender.

A more radical approach would be to seek ways to address the cultural and structural features of gender discrimination in south Sudan, but that may be beyond the scope of BSF.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation and Lessons Learned

The January 2008 BSF Review reported that "*BSF M&E needs development. The focus must move from project inputs to outputs and outcomes.*" There was a need to address more strategic lesson learning aspects such as the development of common standards and the piloting of service delivery mechanisms.

The BSF Secretariat has made a clear effort to respond to these criticisms. A new monitoring format has been introduced with indicators for: staffing, GOSS contributions to staff and running costs, school enrolment, health consultations, and community participation. This is an important step forward. The last quarterly report from BSF shows an improvement since the findings in January 2008 as to the extent of data which is disaggregated by gender²². What has not yet been done is to collate and analyse these results to provide an overview of the BSF programme and develop conclusions about its impact and efficiency. Such an analysis

would identify which BSF facilities are delivering a high level of service, and which are not; and show how girls' primary school enrolment varies across different BSF partners and different parts of the country. These are just two examples of the issues that need to be investigated. Had it been available, this kind of analysis would have given significantly more depth to this Annual Review.

The monitoring formats are complex and could be made simpler. The reviewers encountered cases of "monitoring fatigue" expressed by BSF NGO staff. They need to see the value of the data they are asked to collect. Analysis, interpretation and the development of lessons-learned is the way to show that value and make the monitoring useful to BSF managers, in particular to the Steering Committee, and to NGO partners.

A second important advance has been the commissioning of Lessons-Learned studies in education and in water supply. There has also been a more detailed benchmarking exercise for some primary education projects. The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 above, has drawn on many points from these studies, which have been presented at workshops with BSF's NGO partners and stakeholders in GOSS and state Governments. In health, BSF has followed a different approach to lesson-learning. Instead of a technical study, it has supported a Peer Review process in which the different NGOs working in the sector, together with representatives of GOSS and state Governments, have looked at each other's work. BSF intends to take this work forward, with the support of a Health Adviser in the Secretariat, and to extend the approach to the other basic service sectors.

BSF has not directly commissioned any baseline or impact surveys. However, some of its implementing partners have carried out this kind of work, in some cases funded by other donors. In health, multi-indicator surveys by Medair and GOAL are important examples. These are the only attempts to measure BSF outcomes that the reviewers saw. It may not be feasible, or affordable, for BSF to extend this approach to all its work. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile bringing collating any surveys that have been done to develop a broader picture.

CIDA, as one of the BSF funding partners, required BSF to commission a Strategic Environment Assessment. This concluded that "the negative environmental impacts of the BSF will not be significant." BSF interventions are small-scale and in areas of sparse population. Diesel generators powering NGO offices and accommodation – even in Juba town – is perhaps BSF's most significant impact, one which will only be mitigated when there is a more reliable public supply.

BSF has made considerable progress in M&E and lessons-learning. The next step will be to take the lessons forward into new policy recommendations. This is an area where BSF should be working closely with the GOSS ministries. In Phase 2, the BSF Secretariat has nominated technical advisers in Education, Health and Capacity Building on BMB's contract. At June 2009, a large proportion of their time remained unused: 100% in the case of health and capacity building. It is recommended that BSF, in collaboration with the relevant GOSS ministries, prepare a Lessons-Learned/Capacity Building work programme to use this resource

to maximum effect in the nine months to June 2010. The programme should focus on enabling the GOSS ministries to develop and implement the policy lessons that have come out of BSF's work.

The BSF secretariat has not actively engaged with the wider aid architecture in southern Sudan to promote the development of systems and a sustainable exit. The Head of Secretariat does attend different sector coordination groups, but not the Budget Sector Working Groups. Nor does the Secretariat have the capacity to participate more actively. Similarly, BSF has not been involved in broader discussions about the balance between relief and recovery or aid architectures. Nevertheless, it has had an important indirect influence on this discussion: through its demonstration of what a fairly straightforward model can achieve; through its structured approach to M&E; and, most recently, through its Lessons Learned studies (see section 7.9 for a comparison of BSF and other funding mechanisms).

7. The BSF Mechanism

The following sections review how each part of the BSF mechanism has worked: the implementing partners, the selection process, the secretariat and the Steering Committee. Section 7.8 looks at how BSF has handled the question of handover in line with its two Programme Memoranda. A last section draws some comparisons with the operations of the other Pooled Funds working in S. Sudan.

7.1 The Implementing Partners

BSF's implementing partners are strongly supportive. They emphasise the ease of access and the positive support provided by the Secretariat.

When BSF started, many NGOs were still managing their S. Sudan operations from Nairobi and this was reflected in management difficulties and staff turnover. In August 2009, 21 of the 24 BSF NGOs have a base in Juba, two in the field and one in Khartoum. This has shortened lines of communication. However, NGO staff turnover is still a problem. This is not necessarily the implementing partners' fault. With the exception of MDTF, none of the funds offer solid, multi-annual agreements (12 - 18 months is still the norm). The result is short-term contracts, and unaccompanied status, which can only encourage the persistence of an "emergency mindset".

BSF has suffered from this as much as any. The programme itself has never had a guaranteed life of more than 30 months and the majority of its grant agreements have been for 18 months or less. The fact that some NGOs are now on their third or fourth extension, for a final total of four years, emphasises how much more efficient things might have been with a firm, four-year commitment at the outset.

BSF was established on the presumption that NGO experience pre-CPA meant that they would be the best-qualified to deliver basic services in S. Sudan, at least in the recovery phase. As described in Sections 2, 3 and 4, BSF implementing partners have met most of their delivery targets. In

the field, the reviewers saw many examples of dedicated and effective work. The initial BSF presumption seems well-justified.

Nevertheless, BSF NGOs have not all performed well. Three have been particularly slow to deliver; and one has still not completed its Phase 1 commitment. Others either had their budget cut for non-performance or overran their budget. Lessons learned studies have found that not all NGOs have managed their construction programmes well or dealt effectively with technical issues. Financial management has also been an issue. No Phase 1 NGO was ready on time to deliver a complete asset register. Similarly, four out of 14 Phase 1 audit reports are still outstanding. The BSF Secretariat has had to provide more support than expected to encourage NGOs overcome these issues.

BSF calls for proposals encourage cross-sectoral projects. However, with limited exceptions, the installation of boreholes and latrines at schools or at clinics has been the only cross-sectoral part of the programme. This reflects the fact that most NGOs focus on one sector. Specialist sectoral skills are part of their strength. But it does mean that they are not well equipped to act as integrated rural development organisations. Government is also organised by sector through the ministries of education, health or watsan. At this stage, a more integrated rural development approach may not be practical. The lack of an explicit gender focus to date, and the remit of BSF to address gender can now be reviewed together with the GOSS, SC and donors.

Only three of the Round 3 BSF grantees are Sudanese NGOs (HARD, AMA and the Diocese of Rumbek). Although non-qualifying local NGOs were not interviewed in the course of this review, it is likely that some are deterred by the need to pay costs up-front and seek reimbursement later from the Fund. BSF calls for proposal encourage INGOs to bring in local partners. In Phase 2, eleven out of 24 have done so: with 16 local partners overall.²³ In some cases the international NGOs have to supply cash advances to their national partners. Some international and local NGOs have long-established partnerships pre-dating BSF. In other cases the local partner seems to be working more as a sub-contractor. The reviewers did not have time to investigate this further.

The high unit costs of BSF infrastructure and the high costs per beneficiary of some services has been noted. BSF has not analysed this to see whether this indicates that NGO implementation is relatively costly. MDTF's inability to attract competitive bids from larger commercial firms suggests that there are no simple answers to this question. Nevertheless, it is one that urgently needs to be explored. There are likely to be significant diseconomies of scale using several different NGOs to provide essentially the same service: whether it is building schools or staffing and operating clinics.

BSF NGOs are allowed to charge a 7% Administrative Cost fee. However, they charge other overhead costs as well, under such headings as "technical support", "logistics officers in Uganda", etc. These can be substantial.²⁴ For example, some charge 10% of the cost of operating their Juba office. Support personnel are an important overhead element. One BSF partner's expenditure report shows 10% of the total human

resource cost went to 'Country Office Support Staff' and 55% to administrative and advisory staff overall.²⁵ A more detailed analysis might identify scope for savings, but it must be recognised that high overhead costs are inevitable when work is divided among as many as 24 relatively small projects, implemented by 40 different organisations; as is the case in BSF Phase 2 when all consortium partners are counted in.

7.2 The Steering Committee

The BSF Steering Committee (SC) is chaired by the Director Aid Cooperation, MoFEP. Other members include the Ministries of Health, Education, Science and Technology, and Water Resources and Irrigation, plus four other GOSS entities. NGOs and donor representatives are present as observers. The Committee's Terms of Reference are focussed on the setting of priorities for funding and the selection of proposals to meet those priorities.

As discussed in Section 2.4, there is a case for giving the SC a stronger oversight role, in line with the BSF objective of "*Improved accountability between non-state service providers and the GOSS, ...*" The January 2008 review recommended that the SC's mandate be revised to this effect, but this was not done. The 2009 review team raised this point with the BSF Secretariat Team Leader. Her response is that the Steering Committee is a high-level policy body and that it should not be burdened with day-to-day implementation issues.

The reviewers would not agree. An effective oversight committee must have enough understanding to assess a programme's work for efficiency, value for money and impact, and it must review information needed for that assessment. It is precisely through dealing with such issues that GOSS staff will acquire the capacity to '*plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery*' by non-state service providers which is one of BSF's principal objectives.

It is certainly true, however, that the SC is not currently well structured to perform an oversight function. A wide range of observers and other non-members commonly attend; and meetings focus on policy discussions; making it more of a forum for GOSS/donor discussions on strategy than an oversight committee for BSF. It is common for non-members to dominate the core GOSS membership in numbers, and also, sometimes, in discussion. Nevertheless, there is a clear need for a body to play the oversight role, whether it is the SC itself or perhaps an operational sub-committee.

The Steering Committee has benefitted from the continuity and commitment of Mr Moses Mabior Deu, Director of Foreign Aid Coordination, MoFEP, who has held the Chair of BSF since its foundation. Meetings are now held in a rented meeting room suited to its status as a high-level forum. Attendance at the Steering Committee has stabilised and even increased over the last year, despite some lapses of attendance by sectoral ministries, especially the Ministry of Health. The July 2009 session was the best-attended ever, with 25 participants (both members and observers).

Steering Committee minutes are now posted on the BSF website. This is excellent for transparency but it again underlines that the current role is more about policy and exchange of views than it is about taking more sensitive decisions on implementation. The minutes show lively discussion, but they appear to gloss over real debate in places. The need to provide cost extensions to all Phase One health NGOs is an example. What the minutes do not show is any record of NGOs being called to account for their performance. For example, August 2008 meeting notes that one NGO had reduced its planned PHCUs from 7 to 5, with the agreement of the Secretariat but without any justification.

7.3 The Secretariat

Since the last review in January 2008, the BSF Secretariat has made good progress. As discussed in Section 6, the M&E function is stronger. This section looks at two other aspects of the Secretariat's work before presenting a summary assessment against the deliverables laid down in BMB's Terms of Reference to act as BSF Secretariat – Phase 2.

In Phase 1, the Secretariat had a series of Finance Administrators, supported by a Project Controller based in Holland. In Phase 2 the section has been strengthened by the appointment of a full time Finance Manager. This has clearly made a difference. However, the volume of work has also increased substantially; a much larger volume of Phase 2 work is combined with the extra effort needed to complete the close down of Phase 1.

The latter is proving slow. Phase 1 asset registers were submitted very late and some are still outstanding. So are 4 out of 14 final audits. If this were to happen with Phase 2, there would be serious difficulties managing the close-down in two months from the end of the NGO grant agreements.

NGOs feel that the new Finance Manager has improved the financial management systems. Two workshops were held with NGO finance managers earlier this year to explain the reporting requirements and to detail a new monthly reporting cycle. This should help their cashflow and also BSF's expenditure forecasting. However, this does not appear to be happening yet. Out of 20 Phase 2 grants started on 1 January 2009, just seven NGOs had submitted an invoice in time to get paid in April (i.e. at the end of Quarter 1). This included the eight Phase 1 extensions, who must have had all their systems in place. Even at the end of Quarter 2, two NGOs appeared not to have submitted any invoice, after six months of operation.²⁶

BSF has not developed a management accountancy function: one which can track physical progress against expenditure, and analyse unit costs and other key parameters. It can be argued that this is an excessive level of management for an NGO programme, but it will be difficult to hold NGOs properly to account without it.

At the time of the 2008 review, significant cases of NGO underperformance were becoming apparent and the Secretariat was applying pressure to have them resolved. Since that time, three serious instances have been dealt with. One INGO appointed contractors who failed to complete three schools, although the money was spent. A no-

cost project extension has been agreed for the NGO to complete the work at its own expense. Another was late in implementation and had high staff turnover. It was only when the Secretariat wrote to the international Director that the rate of implementation picked up. In a third case, Secretariat monitoring found an NGO was both slow and unprofessional in its work. It had unilaterally reduced the number of payams where it worked from three to two. A letter of concern has been sent to the NGO, copied to the Chair of the SC. It is too early to know if the project can be salvaged.

The Secretariat has managed these issues. The reviewers feel the SC should have been more involved. It might be more appropriate for formal correspondence to be signed by the Chairman in the SC's name, and only after consultation with GOSS members of the committee. So far the Secretariat has not taken the more drastic measure of cancelling a contract with an NGO – although we were told that, with hindsight, it would have been better in at least one case if they had. Such a decision would naturally be referred up to the SC. The dilemma would be how to preserve whatever services the NGO was still delivering: terminate the contract and the service users might be left with no loaf instead of half a loaf.

Table 8 summarises the Secretariat's key deliverables, as laid down in BMB's Terms of Reference and a brief assessment of what has been achieved.

Table 8 BSF Secretariat Key Deliverables

Deliverable	Assessment
A. Concerning the BSF Fund	
1. Fund established and well known to key actors	Achieved in full
2. Calls for proposals dealt with in a timely and organised fashion	Achieved in full. Large Rd 3 commissioning completed on tight deadline.
3. An exit strategy is finalised, including links with key funds in the region such as MDTF/SRF	Little progress. BSF has largely delegated exit strategies to the NGO partners. Clear guidance from GOSS/donors also lacking.
4. Lessons learned documented and disseminated.	Good progress. More to do.
5. Mid Term Review undertaken	Done
B. Concerning the Steering Committee	
6. SC meets regularly in an organised, timely & efficient manner.	Achieved
7. SC members, particular GOSS staff, are trained in key sector and service delivery issues.	Only informally. No separate budget allocated. Staff time allocated but unused.
8. Members are supported to incorporate lessons from the BSF into overall planning and technical approach to services in the South.	Only informally. Lessons have been communicated but no 'support' has been given. Again no separate budget allocated.
9. SC is supported to monitor and evaluate BSF projects.	The Secretariat monitors effectively but the SC needs to be more closely involved in monitoring and decisions taken.
C. Concerning arrangements with grant recipients	
10. Effective & regular communication with grant applicants/ recipients.	Achieved in full. A key strength.
11. Estimates of funds needed for proposals prepared for each quarter.	Progress being made, at cost of considerable support to grant recipients.
12. Funds disbursed to NGOs in a timely and efficient manner.	Achieved.
13. Accounts of grants provided to NGOs are audited and managed efficiently.	Work to do. NGO audits etc incomplete. Weak NGO contract management/cost control.
14. All projects reconciled by 31/8/10.	Will be a challenge.
15. BMB, and the SC, ensure all projects are relevant and include local communities in the planning and design of projects.	Largely achieved. Project selection takes account of relevance and equity. Community involvement limited.

Note that gender was not mentioned in any of the above deliverables. Number 15 could have been expanded to include this if the SC and the donors thought at the time that gender was crucial.

It is a matter of judgement, whether or not the Secretariat, and BMB, could have achieved more in the ruling circumstances of S. Sudan. It is almost universally acknowledged: a) that BSF is the most accessible pooled fund mechanism in the country (with the significant caveat from national NGOs previously noted), and the easiest to deal with; b) that it

has delivered more rapidly and effectively than others; and, c) that its monitoring and evaluation work is better than any other. If it has not made the progress hoped for in capacity building and in developing an exit strategy, it has given as much attention to these issues as most other funds. It is also fair to say that policy guidance on the question of exit has shifted more than once, and the short timescales were never realistic.

7.4 Project Selection

Following the confirmation of the DFID extension and the entry of Norway, Canada and the Netherlands as Fund donors, a new call for proposals was issued in late 2008. This new Call was publicised through:

- The NGO Forum
- The BSF website (<http://www.bsf-south-sudan.org>)
- Adverts in local media (Gurtong, Juba Post, Radio Miraya etc.).

Those interested in applying were told to download the application pack from the website, as part of a two-stage selection process: concept notes followed by full proposals. Both concept notes and proposals had to be submitted in soft and hard copy to the BMB office in Holland.

60 concept notes were received. These were graded by BSF staff on financial/operational capacity, experience in Southern Sudan and the project description. 35 concept notes met the cut-off score, but only four were from Southern Sudanese NGOs. By lowering the score for national NGOs, two more were added to the list, and 37 organisations were invited to submit full proposals.

These were assessed, in Holland, by BMB and Secretariat staff. A representative from the Ministry of Education went to Holland to join in the assessment. The scoring was against:

- Context and problem analysis (10)
- Appropriateness of proposed interventions (20)
- Sustainability (30)
- Organisational capacity and experience (20)
- Cost-effectiveness (20).

The reviewers would make a number of comments about this process:

1. BSF Calls for Proposals set out the programme objectives and core principles. They also list GOSS objectives and the activities it is seeking to implement. Bidders are expected to show linkages to GOSS and local government plans, to make capacity building and learning an integral component and to give priority to underserved areas. Government standards, such as those laid down in the Basic Health Package, should be followed. However, no priorities are set between sectors, or between capital investment, capacity building or operational support.²⁷ To a significant extent, therefore, the BSF programme has been defined by the proposals which NGOs have submitted. The contrast is with a programme where Government specifies its requirements either as outputs; e.g. the number and locations of schools to be built, or the number of teachers trained; or as outcomes such as numbers of pupils taught and patients treated.

2. Having to submit proposals to Holland for evaluation may have discouraged national NGOs, who gave this as one of the reasons why they regard BSF, compared with other Funds, as “the most difficult mechanism to access.”²⁸ It also gave the impression that BMB, not the Steering Committee is running the Secretariat.
3. The SC was consulted in the preparation of the Call, and made the final decisions on which projects to fund. But by involving only one member of GOSS in the proposal assessment, and none in drafting the call or the guidelines or grading the concept notes, a good opportunity to build capacity was missed. Had the process been done in Juba, it would have been possible to involve Steering Committee members, for example by pairing BMB and Ministry personnel in joint selection teams. In the event, the one GOSS official who went to the Netherlands did not attend the SC meeting which reviewed the final selection.
4. The application guidelines gave target costings for items of construction such as PHCUs (US\$400,000) and primary schools (US\$250,000 - US\$300,000). This gave participants no encouragement to compete on price or to propose cheaper options. The guidelines require bidders to show the proportion of management/administrative costs and state that low indirect costs will be preferred. However, no guidance is given on what is to be considered ‘indirect’. As discussed in section 7.1, bidders were allowed to include a maximum of 7% as administrative overhead, but the budgets also include other costs, some of them substantial, that should be considered as indirect.
5. Applicants had to be NGOs (either national or international), legally registered in South Sudan, with an annual turnover of at least £300,000. That financial requirement may have been an impediment for some Southern Sudanese organisations.
6. If the donors felt that gender should be more prominent and mainstreamed within BSF, this policy emphasis was not communicated clearly through the SC and to the Secretariat. There was therefore a missed opportunity in the third Call for Proposals which did not highlight gender as there was no explicit mandate to do so. Gender could have been included as one of several cross-cutting issues which is scored and assessed when making funding decisions. As is the case with other funds such as the DFID funded Civil Society Challenge Fund.

The SC had already set £5.9 million aside for cost-extensions to the Phase one health projects. The Committee allocated the remainder of the Round 3 funding according to the technical evaluation scores. The cost extensions in health increased the proportion going to that sector in Phase 2: to 52%, from 47% in Phase 1. Budgets for “software” or training – with Water User Committees, Village Health Committees, PTAs, CHD staff etc – also increased in Phase 2: from 5% in round 1 and 10% in round 2 to 23% in round 3. Given the increased emphasis on exit strategies this was a change in the right direction.

BSF aims to deliver services in areas that had been historically under-served, especially areas with high numbers of returnees. The SC

Chairman has pointed out that the whole of South Sudan can be said to be under-served. And, in December 2008, SC discussions put more emphasis on “equity”, i.e. that projects should be relatively evenly spread among the 10 states. Although justifiable in a conflict-sensitive situation and in keeping with BSF principles, this does not specifically target under-served areas or returnee populations. The reviewers were informed of one case where schools were constructed to encourage returnee resettlement, although they were subsequently under-used.

Population data is uncertain, in some cases contested, and existing services in S. Sudan have not yet been mapped with enough accuracy to reliably identify under-served areas. That is now changing. A state-level mapping of health services has been prepared and it is understood that a more comprehensive donor/service mapping is being prepared. When this is completed, it will become possible for a BSF successor guide NGOs to under-served areas.

7.5 DFID and JDO Relations

The BSF Steering Committee’s Terms of Reference briefly mention an “*International community representative (non voting)*”. Under this heading, both DFID and JDO staff have attended Steering Committee meetings. DFID attended the three SC meetings held between May and September 2008, when the JDO did not participate. By contrast, the JDO became much more regular in 2009, attending all meetings, whereas DFID missed the three SC meetings prior to that of July 2009.

The reviewers have not identified a clear statement on the role these donor representatives are expected to play; whether for example the JDO representative acts as an alternate for the DFID representative or as a separate entity. It was commented to this review team that the presence of a DFID representative in the sessions made them sharper and more focused on decisions. No such comment was made in relation to JDO participation.

Donor participation is helpful to the focus of the SC. It also helps avoid misunderstanding over the expectations of the two key stakeholders: GOSS and the donors. It is important, therefore, that donor representation should be consistent, so that the SC Chairman knows who his interlocutor is. The involvement of the Netherlands, Norway and CIDA as ‘silent donor’ partners makes this even more important. As noted earlier, SC membership is very open. A separate, smaller forum might allow a closer engagement between the two key stakeholders

7.6 Relations with GOSS Service Ministries

All the GOSS service ministries which the reviewers met expressed a wish for greater involvement in the direction and management of the BSF. In two cases, these views were made quite forcefully, and a level of dissatisfaction was expressed. The representative of the Ministry of Health reiterated the point in the workshop presenting the initial findings of this Review. It is clear, therefore, that BSF has not succeeded in enhancing ownership by the service ministries.

On the other hand, the Secretariat have indicated that the ministries have not taken all the opportunities given to them to participate in BSF. Their

attendance at meetings of the SC has been patchy at best. On occasion the SC Chairman has endorsed the Secretariat's position, expressing his disappointment at the poor attendance by ministry representatives. The line ministries' lack of interest may partly reflect the SC's mandate and structure. At present the committee has only one vital function – to allocate money to projects – and this task only comes round every year or two. The broad membership of non-technical, non-GOSS participants, means it is not a suitable forum for detailed discussion of sectoral policies.

The BSF study on primary education lessons learned suggested that BSF needed to do more to build a working relationship with the MoEST. Formal, written communications and SC meetings are not enough. a relationship. *“There should be ongoing foot-in-the-door contact, and, given that Steering Committee meetings typically occur quarterly, more regular, informal briefings and discussions.”* The reviewers believe these remarks to be equally applicable to MoH and MWRI. The education study also noted that the member of the BSF Secretariat staff nominated to lead on government relations seemed to be dedicated to M&E and relations with state governments. This post has since been removed.

A central conclusion is that it is up to BSF to take the initiative in building a sense of ownership. It is not realistic, or appropriate, to make the ministries responsible for this. They have other demands on their time and BSF needs to demonstrate that it is important to them.

Immediate suggestions include:

- That the mandate and structure of the SC be reviewed.
- That a specific, budgeted plan to support and build the capacities of GOSS service ministries be prepared.
- That each ministry be asked to nominate a BSF liaison officer who will be briefed on all the fund's operations and given a monthly update report on work in the ministry's sector.

The broader strategic question of ownership and, ultimately, handover to GOSS is discussed in Section 8, Strategic Issues, below.

7.7 The BSF Website and Public Communications

The BSF website (<http://www.bsf-south-sudan.org/>) was started in 2008 as a means of better communicating with programme stakeholders. It became a core part of programme communication when the 2008 call for proposals required applicants to download the application pack from the website. The number of daily page-views in 2009 runs in the 100-300 range.

The BSF site compares well with the other multi-donor Funds in South Sudan, although the SRF site is also informative. It makes programme documents available and allows programme partners to download forms and procedures. The structure is kept suitably simple the bandwidth requirements modest. It could be improved, however, by a clean-up to remove multiple versions of the same document, e.g. minutes of the SC meetings, GOSS Health Assembly minutes etc. It would also be good practise to protect documents by only uploading versions in PDF format, not MS Word.

The website is BSF's only channel of public communication. Other efforts might be useful, for example a quarterly bulletin similar to that shown on the SRF website.

7.8 BSF Handover and Exit

The Phase 1 Programme Memorandum expected BSF to support basic service delivery until MDTF programmes became effective. This did not happen and BSF was extended to a second phase. The Phase 2 Memorandum describes BSF as a bridge to the newly established Sudan Recovery Fund.

The reviewers understand that there were no substantive discussions with MDTF about a Phase 1 handover. Given that MDTF has still not succeeded in launching substantial programmes in either health or education, there would have been little point. The question of how BSF might now handover to SRF has not yet been discussed.

Since its establishment in 2005, the longest period for which BSF has had confirmed funding under a single management arrangement is the current 20 months from January 2009 to August 2010. Decisions about whether or not to extend the programme have been made late. On at least one occasion a decision not to extend was announced and then changed. The result has been that NGO implementing partners, and other stakeholders, have never had certainty about what was to happen after the current funding round ended.

The reviewers' impression is that most parties have hoped that if BSF was not extended, another funding window would become available, through CHF, SRF or another source. It is important that all the key stakeholders – the Secretariat, the SC and the Donor group – address this issue in a more timely manner for the end of BSF Phase 2. Which means it must be addressed now. Ways to do this are discussed in Chapter 8.

7.9 BSF in Comparison with other Funding Mechanisms

BSF is one of five pooled funding mechanisms supporting recovery and development in South Sudan. The others are the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), the Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF), the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), and the Capacity Building Trust Fund.

Following on a Comprehensive Portfolio Review of the MDTF, and taking account of Government's much weaker fiscal position, GOSS and its donor partners have reviewed all five pooled funds. In June 2009, the two sides endorsed a Juba Compact. One of that compact's commitments is to *"reorient the aid architecture to ensure that allocations to pooled funds reflect the strengths and comparative advantages of different partners and instruments."*

A background paper to the Juba Compact reviews what a more coherent aid architecture might look like. BSF is shown as having a comparative advantage in social service delivery, in particular the *"maintenance of a safety net through NGO service delivery at community level."* MDTF is still well behind in its spending and a central proposal of this new architecture is that funds should be transferred to other funding mechanisms for the period 2009 - 2011. An extra allocation of US\$70 million is proposed for

BSF: double the size of its resources to date, to be spent in little over two years.²⁹

Against this background, the remainder of this section reviews the way the different funds have operated. The Capacity Building Trust Fund is not considered.

7.9.1 The Multi Donor Trust Fund

The MDTF has experienced serious delays and the move to a new architecture reflects a recognition that it cannot meet its targets in the time remaining. The following constraints have been identified:³⁰

Effective Oversight

- Lack of clarity regarding oversight, monitoring and implementation roles.
- Inadequate technical oversight and irregular meetings of project coordination meetings.

Communication

- Insufficient coordination between GOSS, donors and MDTF (Secretariat presumably)
- Lack of a clear M&E strategy and reporting mechanisms to ensure project accountability.

Resourcing

- Limited GOSS capacity in project implementation.
- Technical secretariat capacity and delegated responsibility not on site in Juba.
- Contracted agents – procurement, accounts, monitoring, audit – not appropriately resourced.

Project Design and Implementation

- Project preparation with many unknowns leading to underestimates etc.
- Challenges working with NGOs.
- Limited GOSS procurement capacity.

Two things stand out from this: First, management is the critical factor. Almost all of the above points are about straightforward management issues, not any issue of principle or the special requirements of development or recovery. Second, while GOSS ownership in MDTF is seen to be greater than for the other funds, it has experienced the same difficulties over communication between the main stakeholders as BSF.

7.9.2 The Common Humanitarian Fund

The reviewers did not visit CHF. The following summary is drawn from a paper: NGO Perspectives and Recommendations on Pooled Funding Mechanisms in S. Sudan, April 2009.

An earlier evaluation in October 2007 identified weaknesses in the CHF sector leadership provided by UN technical agencies. Monitoring and evaluation was a particular weakness. The April 2009 NGO paper describes improvements, in particular: a stronger role for the

Humanitarian Coordinator and the establishment of an Advisory Group. It reports that CHF provides good gap funding and national NGOs have been able to access it.

Continuing problems include allocation processes that are slow, unpredictable and a '*lack of merit based competition*'. Impact monitoring continues to be weak. (BSF monitoring is specifically mentioned as an example of better practice.) The sector leadership function is still not working well and there is '*apparent confusion between the roles of OCHA, UNDP and UN DRC/HC Office*'. GOSS ownership is still limited, although there is a move to bring government representatives onto the Advisory Group.

7.9.3 The Sudan Recovery Fund

The BSF Phase 2 Programme Memorandum sees BSF as a bridge to maintain services until August 2010, "*while the Sudan Recovery Fund builds up capacity and actively assumes the mandate for basic service delivery.*" The reviewers have, therefore, looked more closely at this fund.

In discussions, the Head of the SRF Secretariat noted the following strengths relative to BSF:

- Transparency of recruited staff, unlike the "black box" of the BMB team on the BSF Secretariat. (This reflects a misunderstanding. As with all DFID tenders, BMB had to submit CVs for all team members and any changes have to be approved by DFID. It is normal DFID practice to consult with government on key appointments.)
- Clear guidelines to NGOs on allowable overhead charges. (The reviewers have checked the guidelines of both funds and see little difference. Both allow a 7% charge for administrative overheads.)
- Better Monitoring and Evaluation.

SRF governance is quite complex. The following is an attempt at a summary. Effectively the structure has two sides: strategy and overall direction on one side and financial management on the other.

Strategy and policy are governed by the following bodies:

- SRF Steering Committee/MDTF Oversight Committee
- GOSS Inter-ministerial Appraisal Committee reviewing project proposals
- SRF Technical Secretariat (staffed through the UN RCSO)

Financially, SRF is managed under the UN's procedures for multi-donor trust funds. The process starts with the appointment of an Administrative Agent (AA), in this case UNDP. The AA acts under the authority of MoUs with eight '*Participating UN Organisations*': UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, UNEP, WFP, UNFPA. It is notable that this means that the Administrative Agent represents these UN organisations, not the donors who fund the SRF³¹.

SRF donors each sign a Standard Administrative Arrangement with the AA, who serves as "the administrative interface between donors and the

Participating UN Organizations". Under this agreement the donor's contributions "will enable the Participating UN Organizations to support the Fund in accordance with the TOR". Although SRF aims to encourage the participation of NGOs and other non-UN organisations, such 'implementing partners' can only do so through one of the UN Participating Organisations.

The SRF Steering Committee is the central decision making body. In line with the agreed Terms of Reference for the Sudan Recovery Fund for Southern Sudan, it decides an Approved Allocation of SRF funds. Like the BSF, the Committee also makes final decisions on which proposed projects will be funded. The SRF Technical Secretariat manages the Call for Proposal process.

Since its establishment in July 2008, SRF has completed one round of Calls for Proposals, committing nearly US\$20 million to projects implemented by 12 NGOs in all ten states: relatively small grants in livelihoods and social services. A coordinator is being appointed to manage a second round of smaller grants to national NGOs and proposals for a larger third round have been prepared.

The Southern Sudan Recovery and Development Fund (SSRDF), a GOSS institution, is the SRF's principal Government partner. SSRDF staff have been seconded to the SRF Technical Secretariat. SRF is also supporting State Level Steering Committees, with the assistance of UN Resident Coordinators Support Office staff in each state.

The April 2009 NGO paper welcomed the institutions of State SCs and also the fact that is accessible to national and international NGOs. However it expresses a number of concerns: shifting priorities and lack of an overall strategy document; a perception that the "fund has stopped disbursing after first allocation due to lack of donor support"³²; unclear division of responsibilities between state authorities and NGO partners; a "major conflict of interest" in the UN Deputy Resident Coordinator's position as Co-Chair of the SC. In conclusion, the NGO paper expressed continuing caution about the UN system's ability to perform, "given past poor performance in other funds such as Global Fund, CHF and RRP". It also made the point that the UN clusters do not align well with the GOSS budget sectors. The same applies to the Participating UN Organisations.

7.9.4 Conclusion

The box records the NGO view of BSF as the most efficient pooled fund currently working in Southern Sudan. The reviewers met almost no one, in government or among donor representatives, who strongly disagreed. The Juba Compact suggestion that substantial additional funds be channelled toward BSF is a clear endorsement of that view.

The NGO Perspective on BSF

This fund is widely seen as the most efficient, accessible and user-friendly, delivering tangible dividends that are monitored through peer/external reviews and on-site visits.

NGO Perspectives on Pooled Funding

Mechanisms S. Sudan, April 2009

However, the BSF Secretariat's own comment, that it only looks good in comparison with the other funds, also has force. It is clearly a matter of urgency that all the pooled funds accelerate their delivery. There is an equally urgent need for greater strategic direction and, as the BSF lessons-learned make clear, for much closer attention to value for money and the technical quality of the work being done.

In trying to analyse what has made it possible for BSF to perform well relative to the other funds, it is important to understand what is common to all of them and what is unique to BSF.

With some exceptions, all funds share the following features:

- They contract non-state actors, either commercial firms or NGOs, to provide public services on behalf of GOSS and its donor partners.
- With the exception of the CHF, they are overseen by a Steering Committee chaired by a representative of GOSS. In the case of MDTF and SRF, a donor-representative acts as Co-Chair; and,
- the Steering Committee is supported by a Technical Secretariat.
- Most funds follow a "supplier proposes, donor disposes" model. In other words, funds are allocated through calls for proposals and the shape of the programme is largely determined by the proposals which are submitted. MDTF is the main exception. Its work programmes are decided by Government, with the assistance of the MDTF Secretariat, and suppliers are asked to bid for fully specified contracts.

The features that make BSF unique are common enough in other parts of the developing world, but not in South Sudan:

- The BSF Secretariat has been contracted to a commercial consulting company, through competitive tender.
- The same company acts as Managing Agent on behalf of the donors, contracting all the service providers and managing the programme's finances.
- Monitoring and evaluation and capacity building functions are an integral part of the Secretariat's functions, and as a consequence, of the Managing Agent's contractual obligations.

The reviewers believe this integration has been a key factor behind BSF's achievements. It contrasts with the MDTF where procurement, monitoring and audit functions were all contracted out separately; and ran into significant problems. A recent paper analysing these arrangements highlights that successful contract arrangements depend on careful, and detailed design and on strong contract specifications.³³ It is much easier to get the design right in the framework of one, integrated contract. And it is much easier to hold one contractor to account and insist on changes if they do not perform. In the worst case, it is also easier to terminate and replace one contractor.

DFID, the lead funder for BSF, has more than 30 years experience of using contracted agents to manage development and recovery programmes which are implemented by NGOs, commercial companies, and even government agencies. One of the most important reasons for BSF's rapid and effective programme implementation has been the fact

that this model is well understood by the donor and by the contracted agent; and the underlying contractual procedures are tried and tested. All DFID procurement is compliant with the European Commission’s stringent rules on public procurement. These are no less rigorous than the World Bank procedures that have proved so difficult for MDTF.

The reviewers have emphasised cost at various points. Although the point needs more analysis there are reasons for suggesting that the contracted Managing Agent model is at least as economical as the principal alternative, the SRF.

Pre-funding: DFID does not pay any advances to contracted implementing agents. From the point of view of the donor taxpayer this is the most efficient way to manage the funds. However, it transfers the finance cost to the managing agent or the implementing agencies, who have to pay for the work and claim reimbursement. They are allowed to charge for that finance cost, but pre-funding can still be a serious barrier to smaller organisations, especially national NGOs. The main advantage, however, is that it avoids tying large sums up in advance payments. The contrast is with MDTF and SRF, where donors deposits large funds in advance.³⁴

Overhead Charges: By August 2010, the BSF Secretariat will have cost just under 10% of the funds granted to NGO implementing partners, including all fees and running costs.³⁵ In August 2009, the SRF website presented the following figures:³⁶

Committed to NGO Implementing Partners	US\$19.55 million	
- Administrative Agent Charge (UNDP)	0.20 m	1.0%
- Managing Agent (UNDP as UN Participating Organisation)	1.37 m	7.0%
- Technical Secretariat (UN Resident Coordinator’s Support Office)	1.54 m	7.9%

Assuming these figures are correct, GOSS and donors may wish to consider whether the UN system costs of 15.9% offer value for money.

The Managing Agent model would also seem to make the BSF Secretariat more directly and specifically accountable for its performance. As far as the reviewers could establish, there are no specific contractual obligations between the donor and the UN, beyond the requirement to apply the funds in accordance with the SRF ToR and the instructions of the SC. This compares with the detailed obligations undertaken by BMB. (See section 7.3).

Each Participating UN Organisation is to follow its own accounting and audit procedures, potentially giving SRF eight separate sets of procedures. There is no requirement to report back or justify detailed expenditures. In this respect both MDTF and BSF procedures seem stronger. MDTF has independent procurement, monitoring and audit agents. (The monitoring agent has played a particularly important role in highlighting difficulties.) BMB has to justify all expenditures, and receives no payment until it does so. DFID has the right to reclaim any money which it considers has not been appropriately spent or accounted for. BMB, and through it the NGO implementing partners, are also obliged to maintain complete asset

registers. The disposal of the assets is for agreement between the donor and GOSS.

Governance is a key issue for all the pooled funds in S. Sudan. All the Steering Committees have complex structures and large memberships representing quite diverse interests. These bodies are suited to discussions of policy and funding allocations. They are much less apt for the oversight and direction of programme implementation. However, there is no other body which holds that responsibility. This has tended to leave the Technical Secretariats with responsibilities and scope for action that are too wide. The finding of the MDTF Comprehensive Portfolio Review that there is a need for "*supplementary, Government-led technical oversight, to ensure that implementation blockages are dealt with expeditiously*" makes the point. The reviewers would add that such oversight is also necessary to hold service providers to account for the value for money and quality of their work.

The NGO Perspectives paper notes a potential conflict of interest in the UN Deputy Resident Coordinator's position as co-Chair of the SRF Steering Committee. There is a much wider conflict in-built into all the steering committees. To be effective, an oversight committee needs to be able to hold all of a fund's agents and implementers to account. Yet the SRF committee/MDTF committee includes the following implementing organisations as members: the Technical Secretariat, the Administrative Agent, the Participating UN Organisations, and the NGOs.

There is a strong case for restructuring the Steering Committee such that the only voting members are from GOSS and the donor partners who have contributed to the fund, with the Head of the Secretariat acting in his or her proper role as Secretary to the Committee.

This would not prevent policies and overall fund allocations being discussed in a separate, more open forum; but it would ensure three things: much greater ownership by GOSS, a focus on oversight and delivery, and, a clear, unambiguous structure of accountability: one without any real or perceived conflicts of interest. The reviewers' recommendations with regard to the BSF Steering Committee (Section 7.2) are intended to move it in this direction, but the issue is common to all funds.

BSF's greatest, and generally acknowledged weaknesses, are a lack of government involvement, and a failure to do more to increase GOSS capacity to manage non-state service provision. These are important concerns but the evidence that the other funds have done better in this respect is mixed. MDTF has a number of advantages: a substantial GOSS contribution; a much larger fund; and, above all, the transfer of implementation responsibilities to GOSS ministries. Despite this, the Comprehensive Portfolio Review still identifies communication and government capacities as constraints. Line ministries may feel, as they perhaps do with BSF, that there is little room left for them in the three-way relationship between MoFEP, the technical secretariats and the donors.

There is no reason why a fund like BSF, which has a single, contracted management agent, cannot be structured to give government greater

ownership and to focus more on building government capacities. Ways that might be done have been suggested earlier, through changing the Steering Committee's mandate and preparing a full capacity building programme. There is also a clear need to increase the proportion of national staff in the BSF Secretariat. SRF has some staff seconded from GOSS, which seems a good approach. Other possibilities, which have been successful in other countries, are to try to recruit qualified staff in the Diaspora, on international terms if necessary, and to recruit interns. The latter would work alongside the Secretariat team, and ultimately to graduate into taking on their roles; or, even better, to transfer into the GOSS service.

8. Strategic Issues

BSF's strategic issues can be summed up under five headings: Sustainability and Exit; Capacity and Ownership; Value for Money; Gender and, Aid Architectures Post-BSF. The discussion is looking forward and it assumes implicitly that BSF will be replaced, in some form or other, after June 2010. The last section looks at what form that might take.

8.1 Sustainability and Exit

This section reviews the sustainability of BSF interventions in each of the three sectors. A last sub-section, Principles for a BSF Exit Strategy, draws out key issues which need to be addressed.

8.1.1 Sustainability of BSF Interventions in Education

The Lessons Learned study states that "*Timely and accurate payment of teachers of salaries is the top concern in making investments in education sustainable, with inspection and teacher management close behind.*" In other words, it is well-motivated teachers delivering high levels of quality contact hours which will justify the BSF investment in the education sector.

It is not possible for the reviewers to assess how closely these conditions are to being met. It is understood that seven out of ten state ministries of education have completed a payroll exercise and a BSF study has reported "*clear and substantial recent progress in the administration of teachers' pay*" in three of the four states visited.³⁷ Nevertheless, the study also reports a formidable list of problems over payment, including the closure of one school for a week every month to allow staff to collect their pay.

The review team met officials of the Upper Nile State Ministry of Education. They stated, quite forcefully, that the transfer of payroll control to the state Ministry of Finance had made the situation worse, not better. The ministries appear to be deadlocked over the issue. Finance's control of operational funds is a further obstacle. Too much should not be read into a brief meeting. However, one conclusion is clear - the sustainability of BSF's work in education is largely outside the control of the individual NGOs implementing the programme. The exit strategy each NGO prepares depends on issues that are decided between GOSS and the

state Ministries of Finance and Education; factors on which the individual NGO can have little or no impact.

For BSF, an urgent action should be to progress the hand over of the Phase 1 schools. It is suggested that the Steering Committee should take direct responsibility for securing the necessary commitments to staff and fund the schools, by nominating a representative of MoEST to lead discussions with the State Ministries. This process should make it clear, fairly rapidly, how easy or difficult it is going to be to ensure the sustainability of BSF investments in education. An immediate analysis of current enrolment and staffing at all Phase 1 schools should be carried out.

8.1.2 Sustainability of BSF WatSan Projects

The sustainability of BSF's work in the water sector will depend on making a reality of GOSS policy on community ownership and management. This will need a focussed and strategic approach and Community Management Committees will need clear guidelines on what their responsibilities are and what they are expected to fund. At the same time, county rural water departments need to be staffed and their responsibilities made clear.

At present, it is understood that all supplies of spares in Southern Sudan come from UNICEF, at no cost to either GOSS or the community. A planned transition to commercial supplies is needed; either at full cost or with an element of subsidy.

As with education, the principal conclusion is that the sustainability of BSF's work, and the shape of any exit strategy, is largely outside the control of the individual NGOs implementing the programme. It is also clear that any such exit strategy will need to look well beyond, the BSF end date of June 2010. The Steering Committee, in particular the MoFEP and MWRI members, is best placed to address the major strategic issues involved and to coordinate discussions with other key stakeholders, the state governments in particular.

8.1.3 Sustainability of BSF Interventions in Health

In 2008, all the Phase 1 interventions in health requested cost extensions. The Steering Committee concluded that it had little option but agree, setting aside £5.9 million for the purpose. The alternative was to see the services stop shortly after the funding ceased. With the situation made worse by a fiscal crisis, there is no reason to think that GOSS will be able to take over the BSF facilities over in June 2010.

NGO implementing partners have drawn up exit strategies which are based on four elements:

1. GOSS capacity to pay staff.
2. County Health Departments conducting supervision.
3. Ministry of Health supplying drugs.
4. Boma (Village) Health Committees overseeing the facilities.

None of these elements can be said to be in place or on track. Unlike Education in most states, the Ministry of Health has yet to complete the payroll cleaning exercise. It is in no position to press the Ministry of Finance for extra money to pay ex-BSF staff, even if the money was available. At present some 21% of staff in BSF-supported clinics are on the MOH payroll. Many of them receive a BSF incentive of 30-50% on top of the MOH salary.³⁸ Their willingness to remain in post without this incentive has not been tested.

UPPER NILE Ministry of Health

The Ministry pays for a significant portion of the staff at BSF clinics. It budgeted to take on over 100 more posts in 2009. However, the GOSS hospital in Malakal cleaned its payroll by transferring a large number of low-grade staff to the State Ministry. This used up the amount allowed for BSF facilities, and more.

DG Health budgets SD £100,000 a month for operating costs. He receives SD £5,000. Without the GOAL generator his office would not be lit.

Secondly, only seven of the 25 County Health Departments where BSF is working have at least 50% of their staff. In only one county, Juba, is the department considered to be functioning. Transport is also lacking. Field visits found State Ministries of Health with just 3 vehicles: one for the Minister, one for the Director-General, and one for everything else. For field inspections, ministry staff mostly depend on BSF NGOs for transport.

Thirdly, a recent study found that only MoH is only supplying 29% of required medical supplies in BSF facilities. Reviewers were also advised that much of what is supplied is not appropriate or incomplete. Supplies are only assured until February 2010, and the Ministry is currently scrambling to plug the gap. Lastly, most Boma or Village Health Committees are weak.

MDTF has now appointed a lead agent in the health sector for four states. However, one of the lead agents told the reviewers there was little hope of progress by 2010. Their inception report had yet to be approved by the Minister of Health; the team leader had left post; and the remaining team lacked technical skills to build capacity in the CHDs.

Outside BSF, a few NGOs have successfully handed facilities over to functioning CHDs (Zoa is an example). However, this was after between four and ten years of support.

8.1.4 Principles for a Successful BSF Exit Strategy

Almost none of the NGOs believe that the exit strategies they have prepared are realistic. Nor do the government officials who would be expected to take the services over. Few local government structures are in place. State government budgets are highly unpredictable, and it seems contested between line ministries and ministries of finance. The payroll cleaning exercise may pay dividends in due course, but it is creating resentment and un-intended consequences. State governments lack capable staff in management and policy grades. Finally, GOSS fiscal capacity to fund the services is uncertain.

Estimates of how long it will take before a handover is possible range from two years to four, or even 10. Capable staff willing to work in remote areas is likely to be the biggest constraint. Developing a cadre of qualified managers and technicians will take time.

With hindsight, it was unrealistic to expect individual BSF NGOs to develop workable exit strategies. A sustainable handover requires firm, long-term commitments that the staff and operating costs of the BSF facility will be met. Such commitments are not within the reach of the NGOs. They are needed at three levels:

- Between GOSS and the states: to ensure that funds are available.
- Between state ministries of finance and the line ministries: to ensure that budgeted costs are funded as planned.
- Between donors, GOSS and the states: to ensure that donors will maintain support over a long-enough period for government to prepare itself for the handover.

Despite the many uncertainties, there is no reason why a broad compact along these lines could not be agreed relatively quickly. Such a compact might set out a planned exit strategy on these terms:

- BSF will support an agreed level of services for the next x years
- GOSS and the states commit that after x years they will have in place 100% of the funds and staff needed to take those services over in place.
- GOSS and the states guarantee budget processes will support that commitment.

A phased agreement, steadily reducing BSF support against an increasing government contribution would help both sides to measure progress. It is worth noting that despite all their difficulties, some state ministries are already funding a proportion of the operating cost at BSF facilities: teachers, medical staff and medicines.

It is recommended, therefore, that any future funding of the basic services sector should be set in a strategic framework, covering three or five years. That framework would be based on a clear tri-partite agreement setting out the commitments made by the donors, through the fund, by GOSS and by the concerned State Government. This longer timescale would allow service provider NGOs to move out of 'emergency' mode, with significant benefits in reduced costs and lower staff turnover. It would encourage all parties to develop more settled working relationships. It would give GOSS and State Governments a reasonable period to build capacity.

There is a key difference between this approach and the MDTF. The latter receives a direct contribution from GOSS, which is pooled with the donor funds and managed by the MDTF, effectively outside GOSS and State Government systems. Asking GOSS to make its contribution in the form of firm commitments to fulfil its own budget allocations is likely to strengthen the existing system and lead to a more successful exit strategy.

8.2 Capacity and Ownership

BSF needs to do more to demonstrate government ownership, and to build GOSS capacity. In some states, its NGO partners have made an important contribution, especially where they have established a joint forum with the state government. However, most capacity building has been short term and unstrategic. At the GOSS level, various NGO fora have established working relationships with government, and individual NGOs have good links with line ministries. BSF itself has not made a significant contribution, although monitoring and lesson-learning efforts are starting to have an impact.

If a more strategic, longer-term BSF were to be possible, provision should be made for planned capacity building efforts at state and at GOSS levels. Ideally such plans would be an integral part of the mutual commitment to a managed exit strategy. This is discussed below.

In the shorter term, BSF should immediately draw up plans to give maximum impact to its capacity-building efforts between now and June 2010. It must actively seek ways to keep the line ministries better informed. Possibilities include inviting procurement and financial staff from the line ministries to a briefing on BSF operating procedures; asking BSF Monitoring Officers to report personally on their findings to the relevant ministry after every monitoring visit; and, separate, ministry-only briefings on the findings of the different lesson learning exercises.

8.3 Value for Money

BSF construction costs have been in line with other programmes and generally below the equivalent unit costs achieved under MDTF tendering. Nevertheless, they are increasingly recognised to be unaffordable at £10,000 per borehole (£20 or even £40 per beneficiary) and £100,000 a school: £250 per student place. Similarly, BSF has made a significant contribution to supporting southern Sudan's basic service operations, but the cost per beneficiary may have been higher than GOSS will be able to support for many years to come³⁹.

There is a growing recognition that some service standards may need to be reduced to make the services more affordable. Low cost school and waterpoint designs, and even a revision of the Basic Package of Health Services, have been suggested. There is also the hope that costs will fall as southern Sudan's transport network improves and other infrastructure develops; an option would be to delay investments until that happens.

Nevertheless, the reviewers believe there may be scope to reduce costs. In common with other funds, BSF has not had a strong focus on value for money. NGO budgets have not been closely analysed and construction management has been weak. The current model, allocating funds in relatively small amounts for short periods seems certain to incur significant diseconomies of scale. The purchase of bulk items such as cement, zinc sheet and medicines by 10 or more different BSF partners is a particular example. Both service provider and managing agent overhead costs are another area that would repay much closer attention. An immediate suggestion is to replace the 7% administration fee with a

reducing scale: the larger the funds managed, the lower the admin charge.

An important lessons-learned exercise for BSF would be a full cost analysis, reviewing among other aspects: unit costs for key inputs, unit costs for key outputs, the make up overhead charges, and, the justification for the continued use of airfreight.

8.4 Gender

BSF programme design did not include gender as a strategic issue. More priority was put on aligning BSF with GOSS structures and systems. The implementation of the BSF programme, accordingly, incorporated gender only as a background theme. There are some indications that this is beginning to change, e.g. in the collection of more sex-disaggregated data. Individual NGOs with longstanding traditions of incorporating gender in their work have also drawn on their own experience. The immediate priority now is to learn from these small-scale initiatives, which is why this evaluation recommends the commissioning of a lessons-learning study on gender. In this way it is hoped that BSF might be able to feed into better gender programming in the future.

8.5 Aid Architecture Post BSF

In current discussions about a more coherent, strategic aid architecture in S. Sudan, BSF is seen as having an important role in the maintenance of a safety net, taking the lead in "*the interim engagement of non-State actors for service delivery.*" A key practical difficulty concerns how such a BSF Two can be structured. That is discussed at the end of this section. First, however, the broader strategic issues are considered.

BSF has always had a double objective: to increase access and to build Government capacity to plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery by non-state actors. The reviewers believe that this joint objective, and the way it integrates delivery with capacity building, is a key BSF strength. It is reflected in the strategic approach to building an exit strategy set out in section 8.1. It is important to note, therefore, that this involves much more than an '*interim engagement*'. What follows assumes that the more strategic approach is adopted, with the following key principles:

- Unambiguous GOSS ownership
- A realistic time horizon
- A firm exit strategy supported by clear commitments from key stakeholders
- Planned, and resourced, development of government capacities to:
 - plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery by non-state actors
 - hold service providers accountable
- BSF's Calls for Proposals are made more specific, requiring NGOs to deliver outputs and outcomes against clear Government plans

If BSF were to become the main funder of NGOs operating in South Sudan, these principles will become particularly important. It would be

inappropriate to manage much larger funds within the current BSF framework. It will be essential to move to unambiguous GOSS ownership and a 'Government plans, Supplier responds' model.

This more strategic BSF could be structured in various ways. The simplest option would be to continue with the current structure but strengthen the Steering Committee mandate and the way the BSF Secretariat works with line ministries. The establishment of sectoral sub-committees in charge of separate, sector-specific Calls for Proposals would immediately improve the focus for those ministries. A more radical version would be to create three sectoral BSFs. This would have considerable advantages. Line ministries would have clear ownership and, at the same time, the Fund Steering Committee could be used as a forum for GOSS and State sector ministries to work together and coordinate policy, budgets and implementation.

A mirror image of that would be to create State level Steering Committees, as SRF has done, or even separate state BSFs. This would put the focus on the level of government which has direct responsibility for basic services. However, it might be considerably more difficult to manage the relationship with the GOSS sector ministries. On balance, it would seem that central structure based on the three basic service sectors will work best.

A key question concerns NGO service providers' capacity to scale up for an enlarged programme. BSF experience has shown that few NGOs have strong implementation capacities on tap. The proposed strategic approach will give NGOs more time to plan and a greater ability to retain good staff. Nevertheless, the support of strong, well-qualified fund secretariats will be essential to any scaling up exercise. It would also be useful to widen the pool of service providers by opening the fund to proposals from commercial firms. Rigorous evaluation will ensure that commercial proposals provide good value for money. Supporting the development of national NGOs will also add to the pool.

Neither construction nor public sector capacity building are core NGO skills. Using other suppliers to provide some of these services will make it easier to scale up. There is a case for suggesting that BSF should reduce its involvement in construction, to concentrate on service delivery and building Government capacity to take the service over. If substantial construction is still needed, BSF should consider letting the work in larger, formally tendered and professionally supervised contracts. Similarly, specialist firms may need to be hired for capacity building. For these reasons a larger, more strategic BSF will need to manage a rather broader range of services:

- the standard NGO grant agreement for the supply of basic services
- formal construction contracts
- professional service contracts

This is perfectly feasible within the DFID Managing Agent arrangement, but the BSF Secretariat will need a somewhat broader range of skills to manage these different services; and donors and the Steering Committee

will need to make clear decisions about the allocation of work and funds between the different categories.

BSF Phase 2 finishes in June 2010, with a close down period to August 2010. The BMB contract has been extended more than once and it cannot be extended again. Whilst it should be possible to complete a new tender process in the nine months available, time is clearly of the essence. Work needs to start almost immediately on issuing a call for Expressions of Interest and drafting Terms of Reference. If DFID is to continue in the lead its must complete its internal procedures to have a Programme Memorandum agreed. If another donor were to take over the lead, it would presumably have similar procedures to complete. Whoever takes the lead, a firm and immediate commitment to proceed would be needed to ensure that the tight timescale is met.

The only alternative to this would be to channel the new BSF through one of the existing pooled fund mechanisms. In Phase 1 it was intended that MDTF would take over from BSF. In Phase 2 that has shifted to SRF. As far as the reviewers could discover there is no plan yet in place for this to happen.

If it is decided that one of the other pooled funds should take BSF over, it is recommended that discussions should be started on how to ensure that the stronger, more strategic framework proposed in the preceding sections can be implemented. Taking SRF as an example, a number of questions would need to be explored:

- Can the SRF Technical Secretariat be given specific ToRs, ideally enforceable by contract, along the lines of the current BSF Secretariat?
- Can the Participating UN Organisations agree to align themselves with the GOSS sectors? The ideal would be to have only one organisation working in each sector.
- How will the Technical Secretariat deliver the same level of support to service providers, the same accountability to GOSS and donors, and the same M&E and lessons-learning services as the BSF Secretariat?
- Who will provide the financial management and contract management services currently provided by the BSF Secretariat?

Whichever route to a BSF extension is chosen, it is urgent that firm decisions are taken early and followed-up with a concentrated effort to plan how a more strategic approach will be implemented.

9. Logframe Review

9.1 Assessment against the Logical Framework

GOAL: To support GOSS in expanding education, health, water and sanitation services to communities recovering from conflict.

BSF has made a significant contribution: between 5% of the overall need in water supply and 8 to 9 % in education and health. (See Sections 2.2, 3.1 and 4.1).

Purpose: To expand coverage, quality and use of education, health, water and sanitation services in southern Sudan and to strengthen GOSS capacity to plan, monitor and coordinate non-state service delivery.

Coverage has expanded significantly, although beneficiary numbers need to be confirmed. (See 2.2, 3.1 and 4.1) There has been less impact on GOSS capacities, largely because of severe gaps in the Government service. (See 2.4/5; 3.4/5; 4.4/5)

Output 1: Expanded provision and utilisation of basic services in under-served areas through establishment of fund providing facilities and training through non-state service providers.

30 projects have been commissioned. Of 14 in Phase 1, all but one are complete. The majority are providing appropriate services which would not exist with BSF support. (See 2.2, 3.1 and 4.1)

Output 2: Improvement in GOSS and State Government planning, monitoring and coordination of basic services. Improved accountability between non-state service providers and GOSS and between service providers and their clients.

BSF Steering Committee is working well and has directed the commissioning of projects worth £30 million. In the main, Government involvement in planning and monitoring remains limited. Service providers report to Government, but they are rarely held accountable. (See 7.2, 7.7, 8.1 & 8.4)

Output 3: Shared approaches and good practice in service delivery strategies, and development and dissemination of lessons learned within GOSS.

The BSF M&E function is stronger than a year ago and it is starting to generate useful lessons. Detailed studies in education and water have strengthened understanding, as has a peer review in health. More work is needed to disseminate these ideas with GOSS. (Section 6)

9.2 Proposed Logical Framework Revision

Annex 3 presents a revised BSF Logical Framework in the new DFID format, together with a technical note setting out the basis for the revisions. The revised LF retains the same Goal and Purpose statements. Baselines and milestones are proposed which draw on the MDGs, the 2008 Census Results and service levels reported by the Joint Assessment Mission.

Three new Outputs are proposed:

1. Stronger primary education services.
2. Stronger primary health services.
3. Water and sanitation services strengthened.

For each Output, indicators are specified in terms of three BSF deliverables: infrastructure built; staff trained; services supported; and, government and community capacities strengthened by training. This allows the milestones and targets to be directly derived from BSF reporting.

10. Conclusions and Recommendations

There are four principal conclusions:

A. Since 2005 BSF has significantly improved access to basic services in southern Sudan. It has piloted an efficient and speedy mechanism for commissioning and managing non-state service providers. Its M&E work is generating important lessons. In these areas commentators suggest it stands significantly ahead of the other pooled funds.

B. The programme has made a useful, but largely local, contribution to building GOSS capacities; especially in states where BSF partners have worked to build a coalition with the state sector ministry. BSF has done less to build capacity centrally and it has failed to create a sense of ownership in the key line ministries. Despite that, it would offer a good base for a more strategic programme to build Government capacity to manage service delivery by non-state actors and to hold service providers accountable.

C. There is an urgent need for a more strategic, long-term approach to supporting and developing basic services, so that they can be handed over successfully, and sustainably, to GOSS and the State Governments. BSF offers a good base, probably the best available, for such an approach.

D. Basic service interventions in southern Sudan have turned out substantially more expensive than forecast. Current approaches are unlikely to be generally affordable for many years. There is an urgent need for a focus on value for money at all levels: better procurement and construction supervision, more efficient use of resources, lower overheads and economies of scale all need to be explored. The technical quality of the work being done and the durability of the facilities built is equally critical.

The review's recommendations fall into two groups: 1. strategic recommendations relating to a potential 'BSF'. Some strategic decisions in relation to these are applicable immediately; however the implications are longer term (post June 2010). 2. More immediate recommendations (up to June 2010).

Strategic Recommendations

- That GOSS, its donor partners and state Governments start early discussions on the shape of a tri-partite compact for Basic Service Provision, setting out:
 1. A time scale and framework for continued, but declining, donor support to basic services and to building government capacities in the sector.
 2. A GOSS commitment to affordable, but increasing, funding for operating budgets in basic education, health and water supply.
 3. State government commitment to ring-fence those budgets to pay for the phased take-over of basic services.
- That GOSS and its donor partners agree, as soon as possible management arrangements, for a new BSF that will ensure:

1. A structure that aligns management arrangements with the concerned GOSS ministries and ensures their ownership.
 2. The necessary technical and administrative resources to implement the Basic Services Compact effectively.
 3. The Managing Agent/Secretariat is held fully accountable for the key deliverables required to implement the programme.
 4. Governance arrangements which guarantee GOSS ownership, strategic direction and robust accountability for delivery and value for money.
 5. That the programme is able to draw on the widest possible pool of implementation capabilities and technical skills.
 6. Overhead costs are fully justified in terms of services delivered.
- That GOSS, and its donor partners, commission, as soon as possible, work to prepare a detailed Basic Services Programme design and set in process any procurement and other procedures that may be required. This should include a review of the extent to which it is appropriate to integrate gender (and other cross-cutting issues) more clearly within the design of the programme and the selection of NGOs.

Recommendations for the Short-Term

The short period available and the pressure of work is recognised, and hence the fact that it may not be possible to implement all these recommendations.

- That the BSF Steering Committee instruct the Secretariat to:
 1. Draw up a 9-month workplan of capacity building for the basic service line ministries, including a programme of lessons-learned briefings to specialist staff.
 2. Implement regular briefings to line ministries by BSF monitoring staff and others and investigate ministry interest in appointing a BSF liaison officer.
 3. Work with MoEST to analyse how best to complete the handover of Phase 1 schools.
 4. Investigate the possibility of short-term secondments to BSF of line ministry staff.
 5. Take steps to engage with the Ministry of Gender.
 6. Assess the need to extend water quality testing to all BSF boreholes which is potentially a health risk.
- That the Steering Committee's mandate and structure be revised to pilot an approach which provides stronger strategic direction, technical oversight and service-provider accountability to GOSS.
- That BSF commission use the remaining months to ensure that data available is analysed in more detail. Recommendations and lessons-learned could be part of these TOR. This would involve studies on (in approximate order of priority):
 1. Proactive approaches to gender in basic service delivery.
 2. The scope for cost reductions in: key inputs and outputs, staff and overhead charges, and other significant expenses such as airfreight.
 3. Community participation in all three sectors, and women's voice in community institutions.

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4. Low cost technologies for water supplies and the supply of hand-pump spares.
 5. The effectiveness of BSF's public health programmes promoting better hygiene and sanitation.
 6. Maintenance and operating costs at basic health facilities and ways to raise community contributions.
- That the Secretariat M&E unit should:
 1. Analyse the facility monitoring forms to prepare an overview of the current situation for the SC and the line ministries.
 2. Analyse the gender disaggregated data to assess the extent to which BSF is reaching southern Sudanese women.
 3. Draw up a simple but rigorous impact assessment plan to gain, at a minimum, accurate estimates of beneficiary numbers and the operational status of all facilities constructed or supported by BSF.
 - That BSF should further develop its website to make it more accessible to the general public. This could be done by updating the style and by preparing accessible public information bulletins, ideally in national languages as well as English.

Endnotes

¹ Administrative Agent (UNDP) 1%; Managing Agent (UNDP etc); 7% and Technical Secretariat (UN RCSO) 7.9%.

² James Morton (Team Leader) and Rob Denny, both contracted by Triple Line Consulting, carried out the mid-term review in January 2008 (MTR report April 2008). This meant that they were able to draw on the previous knowledge and see what had changed since that time.

³ Note that this does not present gender as an objective.

⁴ BSF QR, 31 March 2009

⁵ BSF QR1, 2009, p36. The table shows some inconsistent figures.

⁶ GoSS and DfID's Basic Services Fund: Primary Education Lessons Learned; BSF August 2008

⁷ BSF Quarterly Progress Report to 31 March 2009.

⁸ Lessons Learnt from Borehole Projects in BSF Area, S. Sudan, BSF February 2009.

⁹ Findings of a Multi-Indicator Nutrition, Health, Wash and Mortality Cluster Survey, 2 Counties of Upper Nile State, GOAL S. Sudan, August 2009 – Funded by Govt of Ireland, not BSF.

¹⁰ GOSS Water Policy, November 2007

¹¹ "Rethink on the Use of Aid Mechanisms in Health Sector Early Recovery" by Vergeer, Canavan and Rothmann, January 2009.

¹² Reported at the second GOSS Health Assembly

¹³ Sudan Household Health Survey, 2006.

¹⁴ Report of the Second Government of South Sudan Health Assembly (GOSSHA) held in October 2008.

¹⁵ Figures based on BSF Quarterly Progress Report for second quarter 2009.

¹⁶ Source: GOSS Health Sector Recovery Strategy

¹⁷ PHCCs cover 50,000, as referral centres for the PHCUs. It is assumed that 15,000 have direct access to each PHCC.

¹⁸ JAM Volume III, p. 175.

¹⁹ As reported at GOSSHA 2.

²⁰ Gender appeared in the third round of the Call for Proposals (Phase 2) twice. The BSF core principles were re-stated one of which is to: "Address issues of social inclusion by designing projects and programmes that address inequalities and are inclusive of women, different ethnicities, returnees and refugees, and children".. The 10% weight given to the "Context and problem analysis section" of the full proposals was supposed to respond to 6 questions. One of these was "who are the initiators and who are the potential beneficiaries of the project? If possible disaggregate by gender, age, ethnicity, seasonality etc."

²¹ The last BSF Quarterly Report noted that women in health sector attended marginally more training days than men (12,083 versus 11,916).

²² For example: 1. no. of men trainees and women trainees in both health and education; 2. no. of men training days and women training days in both health and education; 3. no. of girls and boys enrolled in school classrooms constructed under BSF.

²³ BSF Quarterly Report 2, 2009

²⁴ It is possible that some INGOs treat the 7% as a contribution to their headquarters cost.

²⁵ SCF US Phase II Final Financial Report – Draft supplied by BSF Secretariat

²⁶ BSF Quarterly Report 2, 2009, Financial Statement BSF Accountable Grant Contracts – Phase II

²⁷ BSF Application Guidelines for the Third Round

²⁸ Page 8, “NGO perceptions and recommendations on pooled funding mechanisms in South Sudan”, April 2009. Available on BSF website.

²⁹ Aligning the GOSS Pooled Funds and Orienting MDTF Phase 2, MDTF Oversight Committee Technical Group, June 2009

³⁰ OC Technical Working Group, op.cit, Annex 1

³¹ UN is aware of the conflict of interest between UNDP’s role as Administrative Agent as one of the Participating UN organisations. A firewall protocol aims to control this.

³² In April 2009, the time of the NGO paper, SRF held US\$13 million unallocated and total cash of US\$31 million. It is not clear that funds were a barrier to new disbursements. See www.sd.undp.org/SRF-SS.htm

³³ F. Davies, June 2009 – Contracting Out Core Government Functions and Services in S. Sudan

³⁴ The reviewers can find nothing to indicate that the UNDP, as Administrative Agent, or the Participating UN Organisations are required to manage the funds deposited efficiently to benefit the fund, or to refund any interest earned to the donor. The website shows SRF as holding over US\$20 million dollars since January 2008. Just US\$99,000 dollars interest is credited: indicating that most of the funds have been held in non-interest bearing accounts.

³⁵ Data supplied by BMB Mott MacDonald

³⁶ From www.sd.undp.org/SRF-SS.htm, as accessed in August 2009.

³⁷ Benchmarking Exercise for Some BSF-Funded Primary Education Projects, BSF May 2009.

³⁸ The reviewers encountered one case where the ministry is failing to pay the staff, who have to live on their BSF incentive alone.

³⁹ Operational support costs are not separated in BSF accounts to allow clear analysis of this point.