



Review of the Basic Services Fund, South Sudan

James Morton
Rob Denny

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Triple Line Consulting Ltd
3 Princeton Court
55 Felsham Rd
LONDON SW15 1AZ, UK
Tel: +44-20-8788-4666
Fax: +44-20-3072-2030
www.tripleline.com
3L@tripleline.com

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent, and should not be attributed to, DFID.

Abbreviations

BoQ	Bill of Quantities
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
BSF	Basic Services Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CHW	Community Health Worker
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDO	Joint Donor Office (in Juba)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDTF-S	Multi-Donor Trust Fund – South
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene And Sanitation Transformation
PHCC	Primary Health Care Centre
PHCU	Primary Health Care Unit
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RRP	Rapid Recovery Programme
RRP	Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme
S	South
SC	Steering Committee
SRF	Sudan Recovery Fund
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States

Executive Summary

1. DFID's Basic Services Fund (BSF) for South Sudan was launched in October 2005, at the first meeting of the Steering Committee led by the Government of South Sudan (GOSS). A total of £15.6 million of funding has been awarded, through competitive selection, to 14 NGOs. Four are working in education, eight in health and seven in water and sanitation. Cross-sectoral proposals were encouraged but only one NGO is working across all three sectors. There are BSF interventions in between two and five counties in eight of South Sudan's 10 states. BSF's two-year life has been extended and it will now finish in December 2008. This report presents the findings of an independent review which took place in January 2008.

2. Starting just 10 months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan, BSF falls squarely in the middle ground between relief and development, that recovery phase after conflict, when the needs are very great but government capacity to meet them is very weak. BSF specifically sought a transitional approach that would integrate rapid service delivery with capacity building. If successful, this approach will have important lessons not just for recovery in Sudan but in all post-emergency situations.

3. The review concentrated on three aspects of BSF: Expanded access to basic services; Increased GOSS capacity to direct service delivery through non-state service providers; and BSF performance as a recovery funding mechanism.

Expanded Access to Basic Services

4. BSF supports basic services in three ways: building schools, clinics and boreholes; training teachers, medical staff and GOSS staff; and, mainly in the health sector, supporting day to day operations by providing medical staff, running costs and drugs.

5. It is expected that BSF NGOs will complete 18 primary schools, 47 clinics, 220 water points and over 1,000 latrines. 800 teachers will be trained and services have been supported in 47 medical facilities. BSF's targets will be largely met. However, a substantial proportion of the work remains to be completed in the 2008 dry season, so there is still some risk of a shortfall.

6. Using GOSS standards - 320 pupils per school, 15,000 people per clinic etc – BSF will benefit a significant proportion of the population, especially in health where coverage would reach 700,000. 320 pupils per school seems achievable. In health and water supply, field data on actual beneficiaries may be very different and should be sought. That said, BSF has, for a relatively small fund, made a real contribution to the need: e.g. 4% of the Joint Assessment Mission targets for schools by 2007.

7. The review found two major causes for concern: affordability and sustainability. Construction costs have been high and there is a need to review standards and construction methods to find more affordable solutions. There are no clear exit strategies and neither GOSS nor the communities will be ready to take over the facilities supported by BSF. A severe shortage of

qualified staff is one key factor, and this will take many years to overcome. BSF's training effort can only be a small start. GOSS budgets for basic services are also far short of what is needed. The review recommends an urgent review to ensure that the end of BSF does not result in a rapid loss of service.

Increased GOSS Capacity to Direct Service Delivery

8. In the Steering Committee, BSF has established a GOSS-led institution to manage the selection and oversight of NGO service-providers. However, the Project Memorandum envisaged a lesson-learning organisation that would contribute to GOSS' capacity to form policy and to direct service implementation. The review found that BSF has the potential to do this, but that it has not, so far, sought to realise it. The review makes a number of recommendations on how this might be done: to draw on BSF experience to support policy formation on standards and strategic policy issues; and to enable the Steering Committee to hold service providers to account.

9. State Governments are responsible for basic service delivery and BSF's relations with them have been crucial. Some NGOs have supported State Government capacity and the review saw scope to expand this.

BSF Performance as a Recovery Funding Mechanism

10. The review found that BSF has demonstrated that it is not impossible to integrate rapid service delivery with capacity building. It has delivered services as rapidly as any programme and, especially if its lesson-learning potential can be realised, it will make an important contribution to GOSS' capacity. The reviewers recommend that this BSF experience should be used to draft and disseminate a policy paper setting out how an integrated approach to service delivery and capacity building in the recovery phase can work.

11. As with many other programmes, the BSF has been a short programme and it has followed an 'NGO proposes, funder disposes' model. This has resulted in a supply-led programme, defined by the interests and capacities of the individual NGOs. A key lesson is that a more strategic, directed and demand-led model is needed for basic service delivery through non-state service providers; one which helps both GOSS and NGOs to make the transition from 'relief to development' and ensures professional management, efficiency and accountability. Longer-planning horizons – three to five years – will be essential.

1. Introduction

This report presents the findings of a review of the Basic Services Fund (BSF) for South Sudan. The Terms of Reference are given in Annex 1. The review was carried out in January 2008 by two independent consultants; one with experience in the management of large development programmes, the other with a background working with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Only two weeks were allowed for the field work. With a great deal of material to absorb on a large, complex programme, the reviewers' findings and conclusions can only be indicative.

The team would like to thank the Steering Committee, BSF's NGO partners and many others for being generous with their time and patient with the discussion. They are particularly grateful to the BSF Secretariat Team Leader and her staff for making it so easy to complete a very tight programme

1.1 BSF in Outline

BSF's Project Memorandum sets out the fund's objectives:

*"The purpose of the fund is to contribute to **improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in South Sudan**. The fund will also seek to contribute to:*

- a. Improved **capacity** of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery;*
- b. Improved **accountability** between non-state service providers and the GOSS, and between service providers and their clients;*
- c. The development of **common standards** and shared approaches for service delivery; and*
- d. **Piloting** of service delivery mechanisms for larger scale GOSS led programmes."*

Started in 2005, BSF was planned to last two years. It is overseen by a Steering Committee (SC), representing relevant Government of South Sudan (GOSS) ministries and other stakeholders. It is implemented by non-state service providers (i.e. NGOs), which were expected to have experience of working in S. Sudan and the capacity to respond quickly and effectively. The fund sought robust proposals for water and sanitation, education or health interventions. Proposals with cross-sectoral synergies were encouraged.

BSF was designed to bridge a gap between the run-down of relief/humanitarian programmes, on the signature of the CPA, and the subsequent mobilisation of major development programmes, in particular the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). It falls squarely in what has come to be recognised as a 'middle ground' between relief and development. This middle ground presents special challenges:

- Where relief requires rapid responses to short term needs, development depends on a strategic approach towards long-term goals.
- Where relief agencies operate largely independent of government, development agencies must work with government and build its capacity.
- The CPA depends on the people of South Sudan getting a tangible and rapid peace dividend, in the form of improved services. This is not compatible with the developmental goal of building government capacity, which will take time.

It could be suggested that these challenges are best handled in twin tracks: delivering the peace dividend as rapidly as possible along a relief-track, paralleled by a slower development-track working to build capacities. This is implicit in current arrangements, with the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), Rapid Recovery Programme (RRP) and others on the relief track, and the MDTF on the development track. The proposal that there should be a Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) indicates that some see a continued need for a second, faster track to run alongside the development process and deliver services more quickly.

The BSF Objectives indicate a different approach, one which seeks to integrate, on a single-track, the transition from relief to development: delivering a measurable improvement in basic services, as a contribution to the peace dividend, at the same time as developing government's capacity to direct and manage those services. Once BSF ends, this integrated approach is to be handed over to government and to development funds such as the MDTF.

The extent to which BSF has succeeded in overcoming the challenges of the middle ground will be a key focus of the review. If BSF has found an integrated approach to the transition between relief and development, it will have important lessons for the wider discussion about how best to manage recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict states.

The BSF programme has been defined by the proposals put forward by NGOs. Three types of activity are being supported:

- Construction: of new schools, clinics and water supplies.
- Training: of health and education staff and of community groups.
- Operations: funding salaries, running costs, material supplies etc.

The first two of these activities will make a long-term contribution to government of S. Sudan's ability to provide services. In other words, they are about development more than relief. The opposite is true for BSF's support to operations, which is helping to maintain services at the current level, or even expand them temporarily, but will add nothing to government's ability to provide them in the future.

This distinction highlights the fact that the development questions of sustainability, affordability and long-term capacity cannot be ignored. However long the period of relief or recovery support, the question of the transition to the development stage will sooner or later have to be faced. This is another reason for thinking that BSF's more integrated approach may be important.

1.2 Progress to Date

BSF was launched at the first meeting of the Steering Committee, on 28 October 2005. Skills for Sudan and an international facilitator were recruited to help the Committee to select six NGO service providers: AMREF, CARITAS, CCM, MEDAIR, OXFAM and SCF-US. In January 2006 DFID issued two-year accountable grant contracts to the NGOs, for a total of just under £8 million. In August 2006, BMB Mott MacDonald, an international consulting company, were awarded a contract to provide Secretariat and Technical Services to the Steering Committee, and also to act as the BSF Managing Agent. In this capacity, they issued new contracts to the six NGOs, replacing their accountable grants with DFID.

The new Secretariat organised a second round of service-provider contracts. Through a transparent and competitive process, the SC selected eight new NGOs: GOAL, HASS, IRC, MERLIN, OVCI, SCF-UK, TEARFUND and World Relief. In January 2007, they were issued with 18-month contracts, which totalled £7.6 million and brought the BSF total to £15.6 million. Table 1 summarises the programme proposals by sectors.

Table 1: BSF Proposals in Summary

	NGOs Working	Principal Services	Estimated Beneficiaries
Education	4	20 primary schools built 800 teachers trained	4,480
Health	8	14 health centres built 32 health posts built Medical staff and supplies Training	1 million
Water	7	227 boreholes installed	227,000
Sanitation	6	795 latrines built Hygiene & sanitation training	7,950

Despite the encouragement to cross sectoral proposals, only one NGO is working across all three sectors. Three others cover water/sanitation as well as health, but mainly to assure a water supply at their health facilities. 10 of the 14 NGOs are working in just one sector.

Most NGOs have made slower progress than expected. At end September 2007, with 70 to 80% of their time gone, only two of the first round NGOs had disbursed more than 40% of their budget. For the second round, half

the time had gone but four NGOs had spent less than 20%, two of them less than 10%. BSF was intended to finish by early 2008, but a programme extension to September has been agreed in principle. The BMB Mott Macdonald contract will be extended to December 2008, to allow time to close the programme.

Even with the extension, a large proportion of the work remains to be completed in the few months of the 2008 dry season. The BSF Secretariat is following progress closely and believes that this will be done. There is however a significant risk that there will still be a shortfall by September.

1.3 Approach to the Review

The review team mobilised on 7th January 2008 and arrived in Juba on 9th January, after arranging their travel permits and interviewing two NGOs in Nairobi. They spent 12 days in Juba, six of them in the field. During that time they:

- Visited the field operations of seven of the 14 NGOs, covering five states; using a checklist to structure their discussions with NGOs, programme beneficiaries and other stakeholders.
- Interviewed four other NGOs.
- Met officials of State and Local Governments in E. Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Warrap and Upper Nile.
- Met officials of the GOSS Ministries of Education, Health and Water Resources and the Local Government Board.
- Met senior staff of the UNDP and the JDO.
- Reviewed a range of BSF reports, monitoring and accounting data, as well as a body of other literature on other aid programmes in S. Sudan.

The review opened with a meeting of the BSF Steering Committee, at which the team presented their programme and sought the Committee's guidance on priorities. At the end, the reviewers presented their preliminary findings to the Committee and, separately, to a forum of BSF NGOs and to a meeting of DFID and Joint Donor Office (JDO) staff. In all these meetings, the team actively sought comments on and corrections to their findings.

1.4 Structure of the Report

The findings of the review are presented as follows:

- Section 2 Delivery: what BSF has achieved in basic service provision.
- Section 3 Ownership and participation: how BSF projects have worked with and involved their stakeholders.
- Section 4 Strategic issues arising from BSF's work.
- Section 5 Capacity: what BSF has contributed to GOSS capacity to manage service delivery.
- Section 6 Funding mechanisms: how BSF has performed as a funding mechanism in comparison with other aid instruments in S. Sudan.
- Section 7 BSF Logical Framework: A review and suggested revisions.
- Section 8 Conclusions and recommendations.

2. Delivery

This section principally addresses the first BSF objective, the extent to which the programme has contributed to ***“improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in South Sudan.”*** It looks at each sector in turn: Education, Health, and Water and Sanitation.

2.1 Education

BSF is supporting the following interventions in education:

- Construction of 20 primary schools of eight classrooms, plus offices and latrines.
- Supply of classroom furniture.
- Construction of borehole water supplies at school sites.
- Support to Teacher Resource or County Education Centres.
- Fast track/phase training to some 800 teachers.
- Non-formal education, community sensitisation etc.
- Capacity building for state and county education departments.
- Supply of textbooks, teaching materials.
- Research, advocacy and support to policy formation.

2.1.1 Progress and Forecast Completion

Table 2 summarises progress to end 2007, and the expected final outcome (forecast), of the BSF school building programme.

Table 2: Progress with School Building

NGO	Schools			Classrooms	
	Planned	Built	Forecast	Planned	Forecast
Caritas	4	1	2	32	16
HASS	7	0	7	56	56
SC-UK	9	0	9	72	54
Total	20	1	18	160	126

Although only one school had been completed at the time of the review, six of the seven HASS schools are already under construction and one of the SC-UK schools. Contracts either have been, or are about to be let for the remainder. On that basis, the programme is expected to be completed as forecast unless there are major difficulties during the current dry season.

Due to cost overruns, the Caritas programme has had to be reduced by two schools. SC-UK reports they may have to cut the school size from eight classrooms to six. (No account is taken of the proposed BSF cost extension which may restore some of these reductions).

BSF Quarterly reports only record progress with construction and disbursement. Apart from teacher training (see Table 3), the range of other

activities is so varied that the review team did not have time to analyse progress.

Table 3: Progress with Teacher Training

NGO	TT Courses			Teachers Trained	
	Planned	Done	Forecast	Planned	Forecast
World Relief	10	6	10	400	400
Caritas	3	3	3	120	144
SC-UK	1	0	1	50	50
Total	14	9	14	570	594

2.1.2 Education in South Sudan

To assess BSF impact, the review team sought to understand something of how the education sector in S. Sudan is developing.

Education did not stop in S. Sudan during the long years of war. Many areas maintained at least the first four years' of primary education, through a combination of community contributions, volunteer teaching and some external support. In Equatoria, this was strengthened by links to the Ugandan education system, where many Sudanese pupils moved on to complete their education. Much of Equatoria followed the Ugandan curriculum.

Community schools were either 'under the tree' or in shelters built from traditional materials, with pole-benches for the pupils. Volunteer teaching was encouraged by the SPLM, which accepted that teachers would not normally be conscripted. In many areas the volunteer system continues. Travelling through Equatoria, it is striking how many grass-roofed schools are still in active use.

The community/volunteer tradition of education is something S. Sudan can take pride in. However, managing the transition to a more formal system is one of the biggest challenges Government faces. There is a widespread, even universal expectation that in education the peace dividend will take the form of salaries for the volunteer teachers and schools built and maintained by Government. If these expectations are not managed with care, there is a risk that the volunteer tradition will be destroyed long before Government is able to replace it.

Few volunteer teachers have qualifications beyond primary school. However, Government has set the pay scale at levels intended for fully qualified teachers. Given the budget constraint, the result is that in one county visited there are 257 teachers but only 84 have been given government posts. To support a transition, teachers are being offered fast-track training of three months. This is intended to help them reach a level from which they can build their qualifications through further in-service training. It is not,

however, certain that Government will be able to afford to pay all the fast-track trained teachers at the proposed levels. There have already been significant problems over teachers' pay.

For BSF, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from this:

- **Utilisation:** In Equatoria, at least, there is confidence that the schools built by BSF will be used immediately. In one urban community, Torit, it is likely that class sizes will exceed the BSF target of 40. Rural communities reported attendance between 210 to 250 pupils, and a class size of 25 to 30, but this should expand with growing stability and development. Further north, things are less certain, especially in pastoralist areas where mobility and the demands of managing large herds make it difficult for children to attend school regularly. Nevertheless SC-UK reports school enrolments between 207 and 465 from more northerly areas.
- **Sustainability:** In most cases, BSF has paid cash for any community contribution to the new buildings, even for labour. In discussion, communities were reluctant to make a commitment to maintain a large school built out of imported materials. It is too big a step up from building a grass shelter, nor is it what they expect from their peace dividend. BSF NGOs have made provision for forming and training PTAs and School Management Committees, but so far they have not carried out the training. GOSS policy on school maintenance may not yet be clear, but it will be important that BSF training gives a clear and useable message on this point.
- **Design:** BSF has worked to the standard GOSS design of eight classrooms, office block, latrines and, in one case, teacher accommodation; all are built as permanent, non-traditional structures. There are a number of difficulties with this. Most NGOs have substantially underestimated the cost. Communities are hesitant about taking responsibility for maintenance. Many schools are only teaching to P4 or 5, not P8.
- **Teacher Training:** Training carried out by BSF is in line with GOSS' Fast-Track model and NGOs have made efforts to ensure that the State Ministries of Education will accept the training certificates issued by their courses. The long term value of the training will depend on how successful GOSS is in resolving issues over pay and establishing a clear structure for in-service training over a number of years. Without this there is a risk that the teachers will drift away.

2.1.3 The BSF Contribution Relative to the Need

BSF's contribution to education can be considered against the national requirement and against the population of the individual counties where the programme is working. In both cases the comparison can only be broad as both the data and the underlying assumptions remain to be checked.

At the national level, the targets to be met by end 2007, which were set by the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), give a practical benchmark:

	Requirement	BSF Forecast	BSF Forecast as %
Classrooms	2,900	126	4.3%
Trained Teachers	2,500	594	23.8%

BSF will have made a tangible contribution to the JAM targets for 2007.

However, enrolment rates for girl pupils remain a concern. The current female enrolment of 27% is slightly higher than found by the JAM assessment mission, but will have to be increased further in order to reach its targets.

Table 4 relates the classroom space built by BSF to the populations reported for the counties served by two NGOs, on the simplifying assumption that 16% of the population (i.e. 8 years out of 50) will be of primary school age with a target enrolment of 40%. The figures show how much remains to do.

Table 4: BSF School Capacity Related to Need

NGO	County Population	40% of Primary School Age	Capacity Built by BSF	BSF Capacity as %
Caritas	402,884	25,785	640	2.5
HASS	958,129	61,320	2,240	3.7

Only one NGO has presented equivalent data for teacher training. Using estimates from UNICEF's Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces, World Relief estimates that the teachers it has trained will benefit some 18% of the pupils who are currently enrolled in primary schools in the 10 counties served.

2.1.4 Coordination and Common Standards

Under BSF, four NGO service providers are implementing the BSF education programme in seven different states (23 counties). Each one is offering a different combination of components. Two, Caritas and Save the Children UK, are covering most aspects: from construction to teacher training and support to state and county education authorities. Of the other two, HASS is only building schools while World Relief is concentrating on teacher training, support to Resource Centres and non-formal education.

There are four states and two counties where more than one BSF NGO is working, but there does not seem to have been any coordination between them. Most of the teacher training is to upgrade existing teachers, but there is no exchange of information on their approach to this or to capacity building in local education departments. Most NGOs are installing boreholes,

but one is not, despite one school having access to water 'about 5 kilometres away'.

Many aspects of BSF have been what the reviewers would describe as supply-led. What is provided is determined by what the NGOs have most interest in. This is an inevitable result of the 'NGO proposes, BSF disposes' model which is being followed. The positive side is that it allows the NGOs to play to their strengths. Less happily, some have introduced a wide range of disparate activities drawn from their international interests; in one case over 30 different activities ranging from school building to research, advocacy, and sub-grants for Sudanese NGOs. The reviewers believe this will spread resources and, importantly, management attention too thinly to deliver an effective programme. At least one NGO has recognised this risk and intends to step back from some areas.

Construction, which is the largest single part of the BSF work in education, presents particular problems in S. Sudan. There are few qualified contractors and skilled tradesmen and materials have to be brought in from Kenya or Uganda, over very poor roads. Most NGOs have employed their own engineers but there is a wide range in the techniques used and, in particular, the cost. Table 5 summarises the budgeted cost per school by NGO.

Table 5: Comparative Unit Cost of School Building

	Budget £	Schools Planned	Unit Cost Budget - £	Schools Forecast	Unit Cost Forecast - £
Caritas	321,728	4	80,432	2	160,864
HASS	733,649	7	104,807	7	104,807
SC-UK	477,000	9	53,000	6.75**	70,667

*Note: ** i.e. 9 schools of 6 classrooms instead of 8.*

The Caritas school includes two blocks of teacher accommodation and a chain link fence, which is not the case for the HASS schools. Nevertheless, the wide variation and high costs must be a concern. The JAM allowed US\$13,000 per classroom. The lowest of the BSF figures is for SC-UK. At £11,779 per classroom, or US\$23,000, it is 77% higher than the JAM estimate and none of the estimates include the cost of supervision and other ancillary costs.

Only one NGO, HASS submitted a full bill of quantities (BoQ) with its budget. BSF does not see the sub-contracts or the BoQs from the other NGOs. Given the importance of the cost issue, there is scope for further investigation.

2.2 Health

GOSS policies in health are set out in a comprehensive document entitled the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS). It recognises that staffing and

other constraints mean that ideal standards cannot be met immediately. In line with that recognition, the reviewers saw primary health services being offered in various structures: facilities inherited from the Ministry or another NGO; church facilities; units/centres built under BSF; and huts (tukuls) provided by villages.

Each BSF NGO is providing a different combination of services. Caritas and Merlin are building facilities but intend to hand them over to GOSS to operate; although Merlin is operating health units under other programmes and providing support to Torit hospital under BSF. At the other extreme, CCM is rehabilitating four units but supporting operations at 10: one hospital, two PHCCs and seven PHCUs. The BSF monitoring system does not clearly distinguish between units built, units operated and units built and operated. At the time of writing it is understood that 16 PHCCs and 31 PHCUs are in service, with differing levels of support from BSF. The mix of services being offered varied from basic curative consultations and EPI up to laboratory analysis and minor surgery in the PHCCs, which have small wards for in-patients and a laboratory.

2.2.1 Progress and Forecast Completion

Table 6 summarises the progress with building new health facilities under BSF.

Table 6: Progress with Building/Rehabilitating Health Facilities

NGO	State	PHCCs planned	PHCCs Built/Rehab	PHCCS Forecast	PHCUs planned	PHCUs Built/Rehab	PHCUs Forecast
Amref	C. Equatoria	1	1	1	9	1	8
Caritas	E. Equatoria	1	1	1	1	0	0
CCM	Warrap	2	1	1	2	1	1
SC-US	Upper Nile	2	1	1	7	0	5
Goal	Upper Nile	1	1	1	4	0	4
Merlin	E. Equatoria	1	0	1	3	0	2
OVC	C. Equatoria	4	2	4	0	0	0
Tearfund & Medair	Upper Nile	4	3	4	14	6	12
TOTAL		16	10	14	40	8	33

It can readily be seen that there is still a large amount of construction work to do, and that the final tally achieved will depend on the progress made in the current dry season. The forecast column is no more than an indicative prediction based on information received from the BSF secretariat and the

NGOs themselves. However, it is important to note that health services are already being offered in most of the planned locations for new or rehabilitated facilities, with health staff working from traditional or unimproved buildings.

The contribution of BSF projects to meeting overall primary health care needs may be assessed in two ways: on the basis of the overall number of PHCCs and PHCUs needed, and on the basis of the target population served by each facility. Table 7 sets out the BSF contribution on the former basis, using GOSS estimates of the total number of facilities needed and comparing them with BSF-funded facilities currently operating.

Table 7: BSF Health Capacity Related to Need

Type of facility	No. in service under BSF projects	Total Needed by 2011*	Percentage met by BSF projects.
PHCC	16	240	6.7%
PHCU	31	800	3.9%

Source: GOSS Health Sector Recovery Strategy, quoted in the BPHS.

The BSF contribution to primary health care can also be calculated on the basis of the target population that the GOSS expects to be served by each facility. BPHS expects a PHCU to serve a population of 15,000, with PHCCs as referral centres for a network of PHCUs and a population of 50,000. Assuming a PHCC also has 15,000 direct (i.e. not referred) clients, it can be estimated that 705,000 people benefit from BSF support. This is equivalent to some 8.5% of the population of S. Sudan, indicating the importance of carrying out an evaluation study to check the true population served at BSF facilities. The total budget for BSF NGOs working in health is £8 million or US\$15 million for 18-24 months. Using this crude measure, the annual cost per person is double the JAM estimate of US\$7 per person, even if the population served is 100% of the BPHS target.

2.2.2 Health Personnel Salaries and Skills

The BPHS recommends that each PHCU should have two Community Health Workers (CHW), a Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA) and three support staff. These standards are rarely met. At one PHCU visited, the CHW was working out of his sleeping hut and supported by a community-based TBA. Few PHCCs have the team of 16 led by a Clinical Officer laid down in the BPHS. The shortage of trained midwives to support TBAs is a particular concern given South Sudan's high rate of maternal mortality.

NGOs funded by international donors currently provide 75% of all health staff in S. Sudan, at pay rates higher than the GOSS scale. A significant proportion of the qualified staff are from Uganda, Kenya and, for the more specialist skills, even further. BSF NGOs follow a variety of policies. Some use seconded MoH staff, paying them incentives, but one, working in Juba,

gives no incentive. Others employ their staff directly. These variations depend more on local circumstance than on the NGO's policy. In Juba and Malakal, health personnel are available and state ministries are able to pay salaries. In rural areas, it is more difficult to find Sudanese staff and incentives are required. As health staff look for the best opportunities, turnover is high.

NGOs have done much to support in-service training and see it as a key part of their sustainability strategy. BSF training has covered all primary health care roles: TBAs, CHWs, nurses, lab technicians, clinical officers and PHCC managers. The reviewers cannot comment on the technical quality of this training.

Health staffing is perhaps the most critical policy challenge S. Sudan faces in basic services; with difficult choices between a low-key approach based on CHWs, TBAs and inexpensive buildings and a much more expensive attempt to raise standards rapidly towards international levels. The latter could only be achieved by importing even more qualified staff, to fill the current gap, side by side with a major investment in training. S. Sudan has an acute shortage of secondary school graduates, so it will be a matter of years before national staff are available in sufficient numbers to take over all aspects of the service. Even the low-key approach will need much more intense in-service training and supervision, if it is to succeed.

Under these circumstances it is difficult to be sure how sustainable BSF interventions in health will prove to be.

2.2.3 Drug Supplies

Most service providers draw drugs from Ministry stocks, and vaccines through a UNICEF cold chain. Other sources include ECHO-funded drugs from Lokichokio. NGOs also buy supplementary supplies, especially to cover periodic gaps in the pipeline.

Most are assuming that supplies through the MoH and UNICEF will continue. However, this assumption may prove shaky, especially as emergency funds like ECHO and CHF run down their drugs procurement and given that Ministry supplies are partly donor-funded. This is a second key sustainability issue.

2.2.4 Health Information Systems

Most of the health facilities visited under this review were reporting to the MoH's health information system. Some use their own forms to do this, but the Ministry has confirmed that the formats are compatible with the Ministry database.

2.2.5 Cost Recovery

In most of the clinics visited, services are free at the point of delivery. MoH policy leaves open the possibility of charging, which is the subject of debate. In some areas, especially where charging is an established tradition, it is

routine. In poorer rural areas, it does not exist and is considered difficult to introduce; although some NGOs favoured it as way to give life to Community Health Committees. Where charging has been introduced, there are exclusions for identified vulnerable groups such as pregnant women. Some NGOs intend to introduce charges as part of their exit strategy, but have not yet done so. This is an area where the comparative experience of BSF partners could be fed into the broader policy debate.

2.3 Water and Sanitation

2.3.1 Water Supply

South Sudan is well adapted to borehole water supply, which is the standard option, although Oxfam and Medair do shallow wells in areas of Upper Nile. Most NGOs refer to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation's guideline: 15 litres per capita per day for not more than 500 persons per safe water point, within not more than 1.5km. However, there was no evidence they are using the guideline to assess the need and plan the number of boreholes or the siting. They work to the number they are committed to do under their BSF proposal, and siting is agreed in discussions with the state authorities and the communities. Table 8 summarises progress in providing waterpoints under BSF.

Table 8: Progress with installing Waterpoints

NGO	State	Planned	Completed	Forecast
Amref	Central Equatoria	30	24	30
Caritas	Eastern Equatoria	20	11	20
Medair	Upper Nile	10	10	10
	Northern BEG	5	0	5
Oxfam	Upper Nile	40	35	40
	Unity	40	25	40
SC-US	Northern BEG	20	0	10
IRC	Northern BEG	35	11	35
Merlin	Eastern Equatoria	10	0	5
TOTAL		210	116	200

Source: BSF secretariat database and latest implementation update

At 500 users per waterpoint, BSF has 58,000 beneficiaries to date. The JAM target is 3,600 new waterpoints to raise access to safe water to 50-60% by 2011. Waterpoints already completed under BSF therefore constitute 3.2% of the JAM target, and the forecast of 200 is equivalent to 5.5%

Construction Issues

Drilling costs vary widely. Table 9 shows the budgeted costs for each NGO.

Table 9: Waterpoint Costs

Organisation	Waterpoints Budget - £	Number of Waterpoints	Cost per Waterpoint - £
Caritas	125,715	20	6,286
IRC	95,278	20	4,764
Medair	46,557	15	3,104
Merlin	58,900	10	5,890
SC-US	171,930	20	8,596
AVERAGE			5,728

Note: AMREF and Oxfam not included.

Costs do vary according to geology and other factors. Nevertheless, the BSF Water Engineer's reports indicate room for greater efficiency and also some concern about quality. Better use of geo-physical survey, closer supervision of contractors, especially where the contractor has a near monopoly, and better pump-testing are among his recommendations.

The review team saw 11 functioning boreholes, one non-functioning, and spoke to two Water Management Committees. Most pumps appeared to be well-mounted and to have the correct cement apron and run-off, although one brand-new apron was observed to be cracking badly. The non-functioning borehole was a dry well, where the contractor had committed to drilling a replacement. The main observed difference between wells was a fence to keep out livestock. The Water Management Committees had put in place rules about no washing or livestock watering at the pump and no banging of the pump handle. They were confident they could maintain the well, as pump mechanics had been trained and provided with spares.

The BSF pumps are new and that confidence has yet to be tested, as has the community's willingness pay for spares once the free starter kit is exhausted. It might be revealing, therefore, to investigate what has happened at the many wells installed under earlier programmes. Nevertheless, the review team saw reason to believe that most pumps will stay in service for a good time. NGOs have played to their strengths in setting up accompanying "software" systems.

Women interviewed at borehole sites confirmed that they had received accompanying information on health education about improved water transportation, storage and use.

The JAM identified the lack of commercial supplies of spares and materials as the weak point in existing systems of management. This applies with especial force in water supply. At present S. Sudan is entirely dependent on free spares supplied by UNICEF and others. Robust and sustainable networks of boreholes depend on active markets in spares and a cadre of private sector mechanics. There is no sign of that in S. Sudan and none of the BSF NGOs appear to have considered the matter.

Water Quality Testing

Water quality testing showed acceptable results for rural boreholes, but uneven results for urban ones. In Torit town, some boreholes were reportedly contaminated, as was one heavy-use borehole sited too close to the latrines outside a Juba clinic. One NGO has taken water testing down to the household level, as the only way to assess whether end-user water quality is satisfactory. The results often showed that water with a coliform count of zero when drawn from the borehole was contaminated by the time it was used. These findings emphasise the importance of the BSF work described in the next section: Hygiene and Sanitation.

2.4 Hygiene and Sanitation

Five BSF NGOs are working on hygiene and sanitation. This ranges from the construction of latrines at schools to training Village Hygiene Motivators and establishing School Sanitation and Hygiene Clubs.

For community or private latrines, the BSF NGO typically supplies the slab and the ventilation pipe, while the household or community digs the pit and makes the superstructure. However, the number of pit latrines reported as having collapsed in the wet season before they could be completed is a concern, because it suggests that in some cases the slabs and other materials were not in place at the right time. Nothing demoralises volunteer labour faster than seeing effort go to waste because the right support is absent.

CHWs and hygiene motivators interviewed explained that they accompanied the installation of latrines with hygiene and sanitation messages, usually peer-to-peer. Staff working in this area are usually women, since it is primarily women who are responsible for water use within the household. The methodology draws on the successful PHAST approach widely used in Uganda and Kenya.

3. Ownership and Participation

The reviewers considered ownership and participation at two levels: GOSS and the community, i.e. the beneficiaries of BSF services. GOSS has little ability to participate actively in the implementation of BSF-funded projects, apart from seconding some staff in the health sector. However, it does have the right to seek ownership in the programme and be involved in its planning and direction. For the community, on the other hand, participation is the bigger issue.

3.1 Government of South Sudan Ownership in BSF

Many of the NGO proposals submitted to BSF were written outside Sudan, in Nairobi or a distant head office. In most cases, they were not written by the

people now doing the work, which has weakened the sense of ownership of project staff currently working on BSF projects. More seriously, there was only patchy structural engagement with GOSS, especially at the State level, where the capacity to engage does, in most cases, exist. Contact was at the level of information-sharing and consultation rather than co-planning, with the result that there was little sense of government ownership. BSF required applicants to show evidence of GOSS approval, but this was usually a formality. An exception, perhaps, was a proposal from SC-UK which reflected their previous engagement with the MoEST and offered significant capacity building support to the ministry.

BSF NGOs have specific competence in only one or two of the three service sectors, which has limited the scope for cross-sectoral approaches. Only in Torit is a BSF partner providing services across the three sectors. Otherwise, the only cross-sectoral aspect is where water and latrines are provided at schools and clinics built under BSF.

Image is an important part of ownership. It was noticeable that on the boards outside schools and clinics the logos of the NGO, the donor and the GOSS Ministry jostle for position. Inside PHCC/Us, the patient registers typically come from both the Ministry and from the sponsoring NGO, as do health cards and morbidity report forms. Ownership is at best joint, at worst simply confused.

In judging BSF's approach to ownership, a comparison can be drawn with the Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme, which did seek to form a consortium of service providers using a 'cross-disciplinary approach' in each local government area and did make specific provision to strengthen local government capacity. Even so progress has been slow and the *"programme has struggled to manage the trade off between its pursuit of capacity building objectives and contributing to the urgent filling of service delivery shortfalls."* It could be argued from this that BSF could not, at the time, have done more to build ownership. While this may be true, the reviewers believe that much more should be done in the future, especially at the level of State government.

State Ministries interviewed by the reviewers were well aware of BSF activities, appreciative of the reports they received, and in one case keen for more support to capacity building. Ministries have often been asked by NGOs to second staff and some NGOs have also assisted Ministry staff with transport for supervision visits to their facilities. Although the BSF secretariat did report earlier complaints about NGOs not informing State Government of their activities, the balance between NGOs and Ministries is steadily becoming more equal, as the latter become better-established and better-resourced and NGOs and BSF make a greater effort.

"In the period of relief and emergency, it was the NGOs who made the law. With BSF there has been more Government involvement". – Ministry official on the SC.

Most NGO exit strategies assume a handover to GOSS State Ministries but there are almost no instances where this has happened. The exception is in Melut town where county authorities have taken over a chlorinated town water supply installed by Medair.

Overall, the reviewers felt that GOSS – NGO relationships are still contingent not structural. The local authorities are something to be worked around or through, not partners in the longer-term sustainability of project outputs. But this was to some extent built into the BSF structure, which does not lay down any clear framework for NGO relations with government outside the Steering Committee.

3.2 Community Participation in BSF

Some BSF partners have sought to involve the community in needs assessment and the siting of facilities at the planning stage and seek to involve them later on, through the establishment of PTAs, school management committees, community health committees and water management committees. To take one example, Tearfund’s “community empowerment” activity aims to build community health-management structures. They explained this was a response to previous collapse in services after organisations had pulled out.

The reviewers did not have time to assess the quality of this community mobilisation work, which is only just starting in most cases. Overall, it appears to be intended as a sustainability strategy, to enable the community to take over and run the facility when outside support ends. There was little indication that it was also intended as a way to make the NGO more accountable to the community.

Community contributions are an important indicator of ownership. In most cases the community was involved in supplying sand and gravel for building and food and accommodation for workers. However, the reviewers heard differing accounts as to whether or not they were paid for this. One NGO reported that communities negotiated hard and expected to be paid in full. Others said they were making a significant contribution, unpaid. Fully paid contributions would raise serious questions about the community’s ownership and willingness to pay for the upkeep of the BSF facility.

“The Community is willing to support. They are used to doing this in terms of collecting things like sand and stones” – SRRC official

4. Strategic Issues

The reviewers identified three cross-cutting strategic issues that will affect the sustainability of the services provided by BSF in all sectors and the extent to which it can contribute to GOSS capacity to expand service delivery in the long term: infrastructure, standards and staff. All three are linked by questions of cost, affordability and sustainability.

4.1 Infrastructure

A substantial part of BSF is being spent on infrastructure: schools, clinics and boreholes; what the reviewers would call a Building Bias. In almost all cases, NGOs have underestimated the cost, and the minimum cost for a BSF classroom is expected to be at least 70% higher than the JAM estimate (see Table 5). The BSF schools meet MoEST requirement for permanent structures but the reviewers understand that there is now an active debate in the education sector about whether that standard can be afforded.

Construction in S. Sudan currently presents enormous difficulties: transport links are bad and materials, contractors and skilled labour are all in short supply. For that reason, the next few years will be the most expensive possible for building work. Once good road links to Kampala and, possibly, Port Sudan are completed, and once S. Sudan acquires some basic industries, such as quarries, aggregate crushing and, ideally a cement factory, the cost of building will fall dramatically. Delaying major building work until then would save S. Sudan very large sums.

Most BSF NGOs have sought to meet GOSS construction standards in full, as they are asked to do. This partly reflects the insistence by local Ministry personnel, for whom a lower-specification school was reportedly considered “zero”. It was also argued that a permanent building will cost less to maintain than the alternative, semi-permanent structure built from traditional materials.

“I told them that they should build clinics as permanent buildings, not as semi-permanent structures” – State Ministry official

S. Sudan faces some key strategic decisions about the timing of infrastructure investments and what standards to set. This applies even for simple basic service facilities. With hindsight, it can be seen that the BSF emphasis on building may have been a mistake when such key policy questions were undecided. On the other hand, GOSS wishes at the time were clear.

4.2 Standards

GOSS has issued outline standards for basic services: the Basic Package of Health Services, the Water Policy drafted by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, and the GOSS 2005-2011 Educational Support Programme. Standard treatment protocols are available in health and large parts of the primary education curriculum are now defined. Some argue that standards have now been set and that BSF’s task is merely to ensure that service providers follow them.

There are two problems with this:

- The standards represent an ideal. In many situations they may not be achievable or affordable. In some cases they just be inappropriate: an 8 classroom school in a small community, for example.
- The standards are input driven: so many classrooms, nurses, etc. There is a wide range of operational matters where there are no standards:

acceptable design alternatives for buildings, guide cost levels, procurement procedures, and many more.

There is uncertainty about how flexible the current standards are. One BSF NGO is constructing schools without boreholes, while another is building them with a borehole, a chain-link fence and teachers' accommodation. In health, one NGO feels strongly that permanent clinics are essential and another, equally strongly, that traditional structures are more appropriate. There is a balance to be struck between standards and the flexibility needed to deal with the complex needs of S. Sudan. But flexibility will bring its own problems unless there are clear guidelines on how choices are to be made.

4.3 Staff

Recruitment and retention of skilled staff is the most serious constraint for most BSF partners, especially those providing operational support. Most clinics visited were missing medical staff. In Terekeka County, a Clinical Officer and Medical Assistant had been recruited for a PHCC but were still in the local centre waiting for accommodation to be built, with the result that the ward had beds but no patients. Even in Juba town, there are shortages of Medical Officers, Lab Technicians and Midwives.

"Technical assistance must be based on needs ... identified by .. Government. Too often, technical assistance is supply-driven" - GOSS Aid Strategy 2006-2011.

Almost all the medical projects rely on expatriate medical personnel, either Kenyans/Ugandans or Europeans/Americans. The former group earned between 2 and 4 times more than their Sudanese counterparts – and more than they would have earned in their own countries. The latter earned more variable salaries, higher than Sudanese but generally less than in their countries.

"Where there are no Sudanese equipped to take a particular job, we welcome expatriates." – Ministry Human Resources Official

Financial incentives are often not enough to keep staff in post. One BSF-funded health programme lost four Clinical Officers in eight months, as a result of boredom, isolation and insecurity. The state Ministry said they would not be able to persuade any of their staff to the area either. Even the ten local Health Promoters trained under the programme demanded work in the centre, not their own villages.

The heavy training component of the BSF proposals is a necessary response to South Sudan's pressing skills gaps. But it is not sufficient. Training alone is an input not an output (which is why the BSF database should not consider "number of training days" as a meaningful target). Greater effort needs to be made to integrate skills learnt into everyday work; to build capacity rather than simply to impart skills; to identify and tackle the constraints that typically frustrate trainees when they return to the workplace; to supplement training with mentoring and other forms of in-service support; and to view training within the context of staff development.

5. BSF's Contribution to GOSS' Capacity

BSF is not just about supporting service delivery. It is also intended to strengthen S. Sudan's capacity to manage and develop services in the longer term and this is a central focus of the Mid-Term Review. It considered, under four headings, the BSF contribution to:

- GOSS capacity to manage basic service delivery.
- The accountability of non-state service providers.
- Common service standards.
- Piloting new service delivery approaches.

A fifth section looks at the wider context, in particular the policy issues which will determine the shape of basic services in South Sudan and the real-world evidence which informs that policy debate.

5.1 Building GOSS Capacity to Manage Service Delivery

S. Sudan's decentralised system places the main responsibility for service delivery on the State and local governments. Central government retains responsibility for policy and standards and for allocating central grant funds to the lower tiers. The reviewers were informed that central government structures are now largely in place and that the same is true for some, but not all states. Below state-level, there remain enormous gaps. At all three levels government is short of skilled staff and budgets are constrained.

Given GOSS' limited capacity to deliver basic services directly, the BSF objective of enabling GOSS to 'plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery' through non-state service providers is of prime importance, because they are likely to remain the principal agents of service delivery for a considerable period.

So far, BSF has only made a limited contribution to this objective. A GOSS Steering Committee (SC) has been established to direct and oversee the programme, supported by a BSF Secretariat. This is potentially the kernel of a scalable model whereby GOSS can delegate service provision to non-state providers and yet still manage their performance. However, the BSF programme has not yet created effective procedures for GOSS to 'plan, monitor and coordinate' service delivery. The reviewers consider, however, that BSF has the potential to do just that. Some suggestions as to how this might be done are presented in what follows.

5.2 Accountability and Transparency

BSF accountability to GOSS is built around the Steering Committee. Each NGO prepares a quarterly report, to a standard format. These are summarised by the Secretariat and presented as a BSF Quarterly Report to the SC. This also includes a summary of expenditure against budget for each NGO.

The reviewers have studied one complete set of quarterly reports, that for July-September 2007. On balance they feel that there is considerable scope to improve this process:

- The standard format for the NGO reports includes a lot of tables in which most of the data is just repeated from quarter to quarter: 20 pages of report for five which discuss progress. A shorter, clearer format would be more useful.
- The BSF Quarterly report is more concise but aggregates the information to a level which obscures key issues. To take one example, two second round NGOs are identified as seriously behind on disbursement: less than 10% spent with more than 50% time elapsed. The report does not discuss why this is or what action the SC might take to address it.
- The report focuses on disbursement and construction. There is no reporting on the NGO's other activities: training, capacity building and support to day-to-day service operations. Presumably because it only does training, one NGO's activities are not reported at all.
- The BSF Secretariat has set up clear and robust accounting spreadsheets to track NGO expenditure and control invoicing and payment. These contain information which the SC could use to hold the NGOs to account much more closely. Examples include analysis of how BSF pays for NGO staff time, as a percentage of the total cost; which NGOs have purchased vehicles under BSF; and the ratio between NGO overhead and direct service expenditure. Presenting this kind of management accounting information to the SC would be another step towards giving it ownership of the management side of BSF.

In short, the quarterly report does not bring many strategic issues or decisions to the attention of the SC.

The second aspect of accountability is accountability to users. But what form should this take? Given the weakness of government, especially local government, and the nature of local social structures it is quite unrealistic to expect a framework of patients' charters and ombudsmen. Some NGOs survey levels of satisfaction among service users. This is to be encouraged, and the results should be reported to the SC. Accountability could also be promoted by providing local government and local leaders, and through them the wider community, with accessible but complete information about what the NGOs are supposed to be doing. This would help to ensure that people at least know what they are entitled to expect. Most of the publicity material the reviewers saw was designed for the NGOs' first world stakeholders, not for the client communities.

5.3 Common Standards

BSF has now established a solid body of experience in basic service delivery. Thanks to its reporting and accounting systems, that experience is available for review and analysis. If the effort was made, that real-world experience

could be made available to inform policy debates over standards. To give an idea of how this might be done, the reviewers offer the following examples:

- BSF sectoral meetings, facilitated by experienced specialists, to bring together all the NGOs working in, for example, education to discuss their experiences in school building, PTA formation etc.
- A review of NGO budgets and expenditures to assess the efficiency of their operations and outline standard contract packages that GOSS could use to benchmark future programmes.
- A comparative review of NGO sub-contracting arrangements.
- A comparative review of distinctive approaches in health or education, funded under BSF, that would attempt to draw out policy conclusions and present them in accessible form to a GOSS and donor audience.

The SC provides a natural “hinge” by which such best-practice recommendations could be linked to wider GOSS policy discussions.

5.4 Service Delivery Approaches

BSF has piloted service delivery approaches at two levels. As a funding mechanism, BSF itself is something of a pilot in outsourcing services to NGOs. This is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.1. At the lower level, each NGO is piloting its own approach to service delivery.

As with common standards, BSF has not, so far, sought to learn lessons from the NGOs’ experience or to assess their models as potential pilots for future application. Once again, examples of what could be done are the quickest way to make the point that there is a clear potential to use the BSF experience to develop new approaches to service delivery:

- The combination of trained Kenyan or Ugandan health workers with Sudanese CHWs and TBAs.
- Cost recovery for health services.
- Fast track training for volunteer teachers.

In each case, there is scope to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the approach, ideally across more than one BSF NGO, as an input to policy formation. Formulating such analysis – and implementing the suggestions given above on common standards – would require resources. However, the reviewers understand that there is some space in the BSF Managing Agent’s budget that might be used for this. If that is not sufficient, it might be worth letting a separate assessment contract.

5.5 BSF as a Learning Organisation

The last two sections have identified the potential to use the BSF experience as an input to policy formation. But GOSS already has an established framework for policy input, in terms of its Sector Working Groups, and the NGO sector fora which support them. Through the budget sector working groups, policy formation is also linked to the budget process. It could be

argued, therefore, that if BSF took up the suggestions above it would just be duplicating what is already in place.

The reviewers sought to check this in discussions with the BSF NGOs. Opinions were divided. Some felt that it would be a duplication, others that the current system does not adequately channel lessons from the field up to policymakers. There are two reasons for believing that BSF might add value in this area. First, it is independent of any particular NGO. GOSS may appreciate a well-informed but independent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of NGO service delivery. Second, no other organisation currently holds a brief, or has the resources, to do such an analysis.

6. BSF as a Funding Mechanism

The Mid Term Review is asked to *"assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the BSF as a funding mechanism"* both in the way it operates and in comparison with other funding arrangements (*"aid instruments"*) in S. Sudan. This is addressed under four headings: An Assessment of BSF Operations; The Replicability and Scalability of BSF; Service Provision Models; and Comparison with other Funding Mechanisms.

6.1 BSF Operations

Sections 1.1 and 1.2 in the Introduction summarise the objectives and structure of BSF. The sections that follow review how they have worked in practice.

6.1.1 The Steering Committee

The BSF Steering Committee is chaired by the Director of Foreign Aid Coordination from the Ministry of Finance, with a representative of the Local Government Board as Deputy Chairman. GOSS sectoral Ministries of Health, Education, and Water are also represented, as are international and national NGOs and the international community. The last of these is non-voting. The Committee works to Terms of Reference which give most emphasis to setting priorities for funding and to the selection of service-provider proposals to meet those priorities. It is also responsible for approving *"processes for project reporting, monitoring and evaluation and lesson learning"*; for reviewing monitoring reports; for disseminating lessons learned; and participating in training.

What the SC Terms of Reference do not do is give the Committee any role in the direction and management of BSF implementation. If, for example, a monitoring report identifies delays or other problems, the SC has not been given the task of reviewing the causes or directing that corrective action be taken. This is an important gap, one which limits quite strongly any really accountability between the service-providers and GOSS. The decline in the level of attendees at the meetings, noted in the Inception Report and commented on more than once by the Chairman, has not been reversed. The reviewers see various possible causes for this:

- A lack of GOSS capacity and the pressure on staff time.

- Irregular sequencing of meetings, with long gaps in between. After two in autumn 2006, there was a seven month gap before the sixth and seventh meetings in quick succession, and then another six month gap to the eighth and ninth.
- The pattern of holding SC meetings in the BSF Secretariat. With all due allowance made for the special circumstances of S. Sudan, the Secretariat building does not reflect the status of a high-level GOSS institution. If there is a suitable conference room in the Ministry of Finance, that might be a more appropriate environment. It would also signal more firmly that authority in BSF rests with GOSS.

However, the reviewers believe that the biggest reason for any lack of engagement is the fact that the SC's job is not, at present, sufficiently interesting or significant. The only real decision the SC takes is to select which NGOs to fund. This drew active interest but it only had to be done twice. Since then, no policy issues have been presented to the Committee and only one implementation issue: the matter of advance payments. There are no proposals for any further training for the Committee. Its expressed interest in undertaking more project monitoring has not been taken forward. Little is left apart from noting what is reported to it.

The approaching end of the BSF contracts could, potentially, give the SC some more weighty matters to consider: not only the issues of lesson-learning discussed below, but also some significant contractual matters such as the disposal of the capital assets purchased by NGOs with BSF funds.

It is recommended, therefore, that:

- The SC's mandate and ToR be revised to give it a clear role in directing implementation and in calling service providers to account for delays, overspends and non-performance.
- Committee members be offered training in how service provider budgets are structured and how expenditure is accounted for and monitored.
- As outlined in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, a programme is started to develop lessons learnt and present them to the SC.
- Ways are sought to reflect more strongly the status of the SC as a high-level institution within GOSS.
- The BSF Secretariat be asked to review whether or not funds remain, or can be released, to carry out these recommendations

6.1.2 The Secretariat

As for the Steering Committee, BMB Mott MacDonald's ToR concentrate on the management of the selection of service-providers, with the added responsibility of issuing their contracts and paying them, as Managing Agent. However, the consultant has these additional responsibilities:

- Design of a BSF exit strategy linked to the MDTF and other key funds
- Service delivery lessons learnt and disseminated

- SC members trained in key sector and service delivery issues
- SC Members helped to incorporate lessons learnt into GOSS overall planning and technical approaches
- SC supported to monitor and evaluate BSF projects.

At the time of the Review, the BSF Secretariat had three senior staff: the Team Leader, and two M&E Specialists. Apart from drivers, there were no support staff, although efforts are being made to recruit a Project Controller. Of the proposed technical support, BSF has had substantial inputs from a Financial Management Specialist (136 days at September 2007) and a Water & Sanitation Engineer (74 days). A GIS/Database Specialist has also been used. Specialist advisers in Health and Education have not been used.

The Secretariat was only established in October 2006 and not fully staffed until January 2007. Since then it has had to devote considerable efforts to establishing robust financial management and reporting systems and to supporting the NGO service providers. As discussed below, the NGOs as a group have had less capacity than expected and the Secretariat has had to give them more guidance. The difficulties of operating in S. Sudan have also absorbed a lot of time. The lack of support staff in the Secretariat seems also to have been a factor.

For all these reasons, the Secretariat seems to have been focussed on programme management and on developing a framework for monitoring and evaluation. It has not made a start on the more strategic lesson learning aspects of the BSF assignment.

6.1.3 NGO Performance and Capacity

Most BSF partner NGOs are veterans of Operation Lifeline Sudan. On paper, they had all the experience needed to manage effective programmes. In reality, the NGOs have been slow to move to Juba, slow to complete their staffing and slow to start work. This experience is common to most funding agencies. Rapid staff turnover after the CPA, especially international staff, seems to have weakened NGO capacity, although HASS, BSF's only local NGO, seemed less affected.

There were some factors outside the NGOs' control, in particular problems over advance payments. Nevertheless, the BSF Secretariat has had to make a determined effort to help NGOs to begin implementation. Even quite late in the day, the Secretariat was still having to recommend that Programme Managers must be based in Sudan and that key posts needed to be filled with capable managers. The review found that these efforts were bearing fruit, although the Secretariat still considers that five NGOs need additional support and monitoring. There is no identifiable pattern for these laggards. Two were from the first call for proposals and three from the second. Two are primarily relief NGOs, and three are more development-oriented.

Once programmes started in earnest, the situation improved. All NGOs, even the local HASS, have used their knowledge of international best practice to BSF's benefit. The reviewers were impressed by the NGO staff in the field, some of them exceptional professionals with high motivation and the capacity to make things happen. However, retention of staff is a problem for almost all, and progress is dependent on a few key individuals. Short-term contracts combined with unaccompanied status make it difficult to build a stable team.

Another strength has been some NGOs' partnership with S. Sudanese civil society organisations – the Catholic Church in Juba and Torit, the Episcopal Church of Sudan and local NGOs. These have all helped to strengthen local understanding and ownership. In the case of the Catholic Church at least, they add confidence that the services will be sustained in the future.

The strain some NGOs have found managing construction is discussed elsewhere. Exit strategies are the other area for general concern. Most project proposals envisaged hand-over to local authorities or communities, a strategy based on:

- Training local staff to manage and deliver services.
- Establishment of community structures to oversee them (Community Health Committees, PTAs etc).
- Phasing out of NGO incentives and transferring staff to the GOSS payroll.

The review found some instances of successful withdrawal. GOAL has recently handed over three non-BSF clinics in Malakal, which augurs well for GOAL's BSF-funded clinics nearby. SCF-UK cut its incentives to teachers in early 2007.

Nevertheless, all three exit strategies are frail, and the weakest of all is the last one: GOSS Ministries are simply in no condition to take over staff and staffing. BSF Secretariat monitoring reports note laconically in relation to a number of projects: "Government is unlikely to be in a position to take over". In the most difficult sector, health, the 2008 National Budget allows for only 33 paid health staff, per State: far too few to maintain even basic services. The budget for teachers is much more substantial, with 26,000 teacher posts at county level. As discussed there are still substantial problems over teachers' salaries but schools seem likely to be more sustainable than clinics.

Overall, it is clear that in most cases it will not be practical to look for an exit and handover to GOSS at the end of BSF. There are two possible exceptions. One is where civil society is willing to step in, although the Catholic church is seeking to reduce the burden it carries. The other is where MDTF contracts are in place and fully operational by mid 2008. In health this only likely in four states and even there, the MDTF is not expected to cover all the requirement, and contracts have still not been signed.

The reviewers recommend that as a matter of urgency the Steering Committee should commission a full review of what will happen when BSF

funding ends. There is a clear risk of a severe deterioration or even total loss of service if replacement funding is not guaranteed.

6.1.4 The Funder

The DFID Project Memorandum states that BSF will be overseen by DFID Khartoum and *"eventually by the JDO in Juba"*, although the Steering Committee ToR do not mention DFID representation. It does not appear that the handover from DFID-Khartoum to the JDO took place. Both offices have attended the SC at different times. DFID may have intended a relatively hands-off approach but the current arrangement is uncertain, depending mainly on who is available to attend the SC at a particular time. It would be helpful to give the SC, especially the Chairman, a clear statement on who is the Committee's interlocutor within DFID. There is a risk that the default position will be that communication is through the Secretariat and the Managing Agent, which is not as it should be.

The reviewers have argued that BSF has the potential to improve service provider accountability to the SC and to make an important contribution to lesson learning and policy formation within GOSS. There is good reason to believe that DFID and the JDO could also benefit from BSF's direct experience of using non-state service providers in S. Sudan, and could disseminate the same policy lessons within the donor community as the SC does within GOSS.

6.1.5 Programme Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

The BSF Secretariat has established robust and transparent procedures for commissioning NGOs to provide basic services in S. Sudan and for the efficient financial management of such a programme. Although the reviewers did not look at the BSF financial system in detail, spreadsheets showing expenditure to end October 2007 were found to be comprehensive and detailed. The reviewers have three comments:

- Pre-audits have been made on two NGOs. Secretariat staff are continuing to check NGO systems but no formal reports are made. Although the NGOs are required to submit a formal audit at the end of their contract, this may be too late to identify problems. Given the sums involved, an earlier independent check might be useful.
- BSF is spending large sums on construction materials. These are particularly valuable in S. Sudan at present and the high and varying cost of construction is a clear difficulty for GOSS. Stronger control systems are required. In future, proposals with a construction element should include full Bills of Quantities, to be checked by a BSF Quantity Surveyor or Engineer. Once construction has started, there should be periodic physical audits.
- The system of paying for NGO staff by percentages of staff time is simple and effective. However, there is no check on whether BSF is receiving the service it is due. One NGO has charged nearly 60% of a large team's budgeted time, but spent under 10% of the direct services budget: a

considerable imbalance. It would be appropriate to ask NGOs to include a note of what each staff member has done for BSF in the quarterly report.

BSF has established a monitoring and evaluation system, based on the NGOs' quarterly reports and an Access database. The monitoring is input-driven, with an emphasis on facilities constructed. Outcomes, as numbers of beneficiaries, are calculated by using standard utilisation figures, which have not been field-checked and may well be optimistic. The system does not distinguish clearly between the infrastructure, training and operational support aspects of BSF, which makes it difficult to gain an overview of the programme's contribution.

The two M&E Specialists visit NGOs regularly in the field, one focusing on state-level Government relations, and the other on accelerating implementation where it was clearly delayed. They do not report back to the SC as a matter of course.

It would help the SC to understand what the Secretariat is doing if the Quarterly Report included a note on what the team was doing during the period. A brief, two-page monthly report on Issues and Actions would keep the SC informed of what is happening in the long gaps between formal meetings.

6.2 BSF Compared to other Funding Mechanisms

The review was asked to compare BSF to other funding mechanisms on the basis of a review of two documents: Review of the Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds (December 2007) and Evaluation of Common/Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan (October 2007). It is unnecessary to repeat the discussion in those reports. The following seeks to identify only those key design points which go to explain how well each fund has performed and why. Apart from the Multi Donor Trust Fund-South (MDTF-S) and the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), the Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP) is also considered because of its similarities to the BSF.

MDTF Review

- After a slow start, MDTF-S is now reported to be performing better *"as the result of a gradual strengthening capacity by all stakeholders."* However, it is no longer expected to contribute to "recovery" because of the contradiction between *"building the capacity of state institutions while at the same time expecting to deliver services through those institutions."*
- NGOs have had a limited role in MDTF. *"Obstacles to NGOs playing a greater role include the shift to medium-term development initiatives on a sector-wide basis and GOSS reluctance to engage NGOs."*
- Programmes managed by UNDP (which include CHF and RRP) are compared to MDTF. *"While the MDTF presents a coordinated and harmonised response to mid- to long-term objectives, a 'one-stop' shop for decision making and dialogue with key stakeholders, the UNDP has not yet developed a structure that can bring a coordinated dialogue with the*

key stakeholders of its administered programmes. ... Programmes have been implemented without the necessary strategic framework, structures for management and programme implementation and monitoring. ... There should not be a trade-off between speed of implementation and programme quality."

RRP (taken from the MDTF review)

- The essential management structure was "*not fulfilled*".
- NGO implementation was delayed by "*a lack of planning regarding recruitment and an underestimation of the time required for start-up ...*"
- UNDP is monitoring inputs and activities well but "*overall cost effectiveness is doubtful*". The programme has created a perception of constructive effort and hope but has attained low impact to date.
- Local government weakness has meant that the programme struggled to manage the trade-off between capacity building and service delivery.

CHF Evaluation

- Decisions on fund allocation are dependent on decentralised decisions by the UN technical agency given the lead in a particular sector. Sector leader capacity varies widely and "*significant weaknesses are likely to continue in the current system*".
- "*Monitoring and evaluation is very weak, both at a strategic level ... and programmatically*" Structures are ill-equipped and unwieldy.

There has been much discussion about the differences between relief, recovery and development. It is now taken as axiomatic that immediate service delivery and capacity building are incompatible. It is suggested, therefore, that the MDTF should be seen as a development mechanism, focussed more on building capacity than on service delivery. This, it is argued, means that although the time for purely humanitarian programmes like the CHF may be past, there remains a 'recovery gap'. Until the MDTF bears fruit, a mechanism will be needed to ensure service delivery in the short to medium term.

The fact that the MDTF is about to sign four major service delivery contracts, highlights the difficulty with the recovery-development dichotomy. The fund may have moved much slower than expected, but it is still in the business of service delivery as well as capacity building.

The reviewers believe that there are other points drawn out of the documents reviewed which are much more important:

- All agencies have consistently underestimated the scale of the task and failed to provide adequate management and technical teams. Too much attention was paid to the mandate and process of the funding mechanism, and too little to the staffing requirements needed to achieve rapid progress.

- An apparent lack of strategic planning and professional project cycle management.
- Over-estimation of NGO capacity to mobilise rapidly and effectively.
- A tendency to treat weak government capacity either as an absolute constraint or as something to be by-passed, instead of developing sensible strategies to address it.

On all these points, BSF has something to teach the other funds. As discussed in the Introduction, BSF has joint objectives of service delivery and capacity building, implicitly denying the perceived contradiction between them. The BSF Secretariat has been strong enough, and well enough directed from the beginning, to move the programme forward without the need for additional staff. The projects have been managed properly. NGOs have been helped to overcome their capacity problems and encouraged to engage with GOSS. In effect, they have been assisted to make the transition from relief to development. Government at several levels has been involved in allocation decisions. A strong monitoring team is fully integrated into the management of the programme and reporting directly to the GOSS Steering Committee.

As already described, the reviewers see considerable potential to develop the BSF model in two areas: in lesson-learning, i.e. development of approaches, standards and policies; and in giving GOSS a clear role in directing programme implementation. This learning-by-doing approach will assist GOSS, just as much as the NGOs, to make the transition from relief to development.

The key to this has been the fact that BSF is supported by a relatively small but well-qualified Secretariat which fully integrates all aspects of the task: from project management to technical support and M&E.

6.2.1 Service Delivery in the Middle Ground

The relief-recovery-development discussion and the perceived incompatibility between delivery and capacity building have been so dominant that two other important considerations have been obscured.

The first concerns the distinction between investment (or capital costs) and operations (or running costs). As discussed in the introduction, BSF is providing three things: infrastructure; training; and support to operations. The first two of these are investments for the long-term and essentially developmental. Support to operations is different. By paying salaries, providing staff and supplying drugs and other materials, BSF is filling a gap, but it is not creating anything sustainable.

It follows that if there is to be a Sudan Recovery Fund or a BSF 2, it might well be best to focus it on gap-filling support to operations. It is clear that S. Sudan will not have either the staff or the resources to support a substantial

increase in basic services for some years. (In fact, 2008 allocations to some services are reduced from 2007.) This approach would allow GOSS and the donors supporting the new funds to concentrate on defining the gap, and to plan an overall exit strategy, which would match reductions in the recovery support to the planned growth of GOSS capacity and resources.

The reviewers have mentioned a 'building bias' in BSF, a bias that can be seen in many other programmes in S. Sudan. One benefit of concentrating recovery funding on operation support is that it would redress this balance.

The second consideration concerns the model for service provision. Because NGOs have been working on relief programmes in S. Sudan for many years, sub-contracting to NGOs has been the standard model for BSF and for most other funds. In the event, it has been found that many NGOs lost capacity after the CPA and have had to rebuild it. This is one reason for looking again at the current model. There are others:

- Economies of scale. BSF is building 20 schools at a cost of around \$3 million, yet almost all of them are being built as a one-off. Different NGOs are purchasing drugs separately. Gravel pack for boreholes is being flown from Lokichoggio. In these and many other areas, there seems to be considerable scope for cost savings, if at least some aspects of the programme were to be managed as a whole, rather than by 14 different service providers.
- Supply-led. BSF issues a general call for proposals but it is the bidding NGO which decides whether it will offer, for example, school construction or training, infrastructure or operational support. This 'NGO proposes, BSF disposes' model is, inevitably, supply-led. For a planned and coherent programme that fits with GOSS' wider strategies and with the need, a more directed approach is required.
- GOSS Time. As the BSF Secretariat has found, managing 14 separate service providers, each with a different mix of operations, is a demanding task. In the longer-term, GOSS will need to work with fewer, bigger providers.

The points just made lead into questions of replicability and scalability: Can the BSF model be copied and scaled-up to help GOSS expand access to basic services substantially? The reviewers believe that it can, but that doing so will depend on a more structured approach to commissioning work, on separating some aspects of procurement to win economies of scale, and, critically, on finding service-providers who are willing to undertake larger programmes and to work to requirements defined by the programme, rather than by their own specialisms.

There is no reason why NGOs cannot adapt to work in this way. Indeed, the reviewers understand that this is more or less the model that is being used by the MDTF in the health sector, with a lead agent – equivalent to the BSF

Managing Agent – running a programme in consortium with NGOs. In some cases the lead agent is an NGO.

To date, the alternative of contracting commercial firms to provide basic services has been relatively unsuccessful. For example, the MDTF has had poor responses to its calls for tenders. The reviewers do not know why this should be and would hope that an SRF or renewed BSF could help to encourage new providers into the market by opening the bidding to the private sector as well as to NGOs.

7. The BSF Logical Framework

The review was asked to look at the BSF logframe and make recommendations for revisions. A proposed revision is shown in Annex 2. Section 7.1 presents in table form a summary of BSF performance against the original outputs and purpose, while 7.2 summarises the changes in the proposed revision. The logframe shown in the BSF Project Memorandum is taken as the reference point.

7.1 BSF Performance Against the Logical Framework

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OUTCOME	COMMENTS
<p><u>Purpose:</u> Improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in target areas of S. Sudan.</p>	<p>On the way to achieving a useful contribution to S. Sudan's needs</p>	<p>A substantial risk, probability even, that it cannot be sustained.</p>
<p><u>Outputs:</u> 1. Steering Committee established and functioning smoothly, acting as a bridge to the MDTF.</p>	<p>Established and functioning.</p>	<p>Unclear how it will bridge to MDTF or any other fund, although the potential exists to make an important contribution.</p>
<p>2. A body of appropriate and successful projects which support scaling-up of non-state service provision of basic services developed, completed and documented.</p>	<p>Broadly appropriate projects underway and documented.</p>	<p>Unclear how projects will support scaling-up.</p>

3. Project approaches and impacts monitored and evaluated with particular emphasis on lesson learning and dissemination within GOSS.	Project inputs monitored.	Rigorous evaluation is needed in order to assess lessons and put in shape to disseminate.
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7.2 Proposed Revisions to the Logical Framework

In drafting the revision shown in Annex 2, the reviewers have attempted to draw out in a much more specific way the connection between the activities funded under BSF – school building for example – and the broader purpose and goal of the programme. The Goal and Purpose are unchanged but three new Outputs are proposed:

- OUTPUT 1: Expanded provision of basic services.
- OUTPUT 2: GOSS and State Governments enabled to plan, monitor and coordinate basic services using non-state service providers.
- OUTPUT 3: An approach to ‘recovery’ which integrates service delivery with capacity building is adopted by follow-on funding mechanisms.

Objective indicators are identified at every level, fully specified as to Quantity, Quality and Time, to show how BSF activities and outputs will contribute to the purpose and to S. Sudan’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) at the Goal level. Particular attention has been paid to identifying key risks and assumptions which may affect the extent and sustainability of BSF’s impact in the longer term.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Mid Term Review conclusions presented to and endorsed by the Steering Committee were as follows:

- BSF has increased Southern Sudan's basic service infrastructure and human capacity rapidly and efficiently
- BSF has filled a gap in the funding of basic service operations BUT has not solved the long-term problem
- BSF has the potential to contribute to GOSS basic service strategies and implementation capacities, if the effort is made to do it.

The reviewers have since come to a fourth conclusion:

- That BSF offers an integrated approach to service delivery and capacity building in the 'middle ground' between relief and development; an approach has particular relevance to and important lessons for the wider discussion about how best to manage recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict states.

The principal recommendations relate to the second, third and fourth conclusions: how to maintain funding for basic service operations, how to realise the capacity building potential of BSF and how to develop the integrated BSF approach. A last group relates to more straightforward management issues:

Maintaining Operational Support to Basic Service

1. The reviewers recommend that, as a matter of urgency, the Steering Committee should commission a review of how the end of BSF funding will affect services. There is a risk of a severe deterioration or even total loss of service if operational funding is not continued.

Realising BSF's Potential to Strengthen GoSS' Capacity

2. Ways should be sought to draw on BSF experience to support policy formation on standards and strategic policy issues.
3. The SC's mandate should be revised to enable it direct BSF implementation and hold service providers to account.
4. BSF should prepare accessible public information material to help the people of S. Sudan to hold the programme and its service providers to account.
5. The BSF Secretariat should draw up plans to meet its lesson-learning and dissemination tasks.

Developing an Integrated Approach to Recovery

6. BSF experience should be used as the basis for a high-level policy paper setting out how an integrated approach to service delivery and capacity building in the recovery phase might work; the paper to be presented through DFID and JDO to the appropriate donor fora.
7. BSF experience should be used to define a more strategic, directed and demand-led model for basic service delivery through non-state service providers; one which helps both GOSS and NGOs to make the transition from 'relief to development' and ensures professional management and accountability.

Management Issues

8. DFID should provide a clear statement on who is the BSF Steering Committee's interlocutor within DFID.
9. The SC should review the need for independent sample audits of NGO accounts .
10. The Secretariat should arrange for NGO BoQs to be checked and for sample physical audits/quantity surveys.
11. NGOs and the BSF secretariat should report on the use of staff time.
12. The Secretariat Monitoring and Evaluation team should report field visit conclusions to the SC. The Secretariat should provide the SC with a monthly issues & actions report.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference**Background**

The Basic Services Fund was established by DFID in March 2006 to support improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in southern Sudan. It was established in an environment in which non-state service providers deliver most services in southern Sudan, and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future. Through the provision of these basic services the BSF aims to contribute to peace and poverty reduction in the region assist communities to recover from prolonged periods of conflict. It seeks to assist the GOSS role in basic service provision. At its outset it was envisaged that the activities and decision-making processes of the Fund would be rolled into the MDTF-S once this became fully operational

As set out in its Terms of Reference, the BSF seeks to contribute to:

- a) Improved capacity of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and State Governments to plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery;
- b) Improved accountability between non-state service providers and the GoSS and State Governments, and between service providers and their clients;
- c) The development of common standards and shared approaches for service delivery including dissemination of best practice; and
- d) Piloting of service delivery mechanisms for larger scale GoSS led programmes.

Fourteen NGOs have been sub-contracted by the Basic Services Fund Secretariat which took over from initial DFID management of the project. The first round NGOs (AMREF, CARITAS, CCM, MEDAIR, OXFAM and SCF-USA) began their projects between 1 February and 1 July 2006. The second round NGOs contracts were signed in February 2007.

Implementation of a number of the Basic Services Projects has been slow due to poor capacity both in GOSS and shortage of skilled NGO personnel on the ground. Transport and communication infrastructure is very poor, and particularly in the rainy season roads are impassable. Nevertheless, progress is now being made.

In addition, some delays have been incurred due to a dispute over financing. BMB Mott initially required all NGOs to fund their projects, and reimbursed in arrears. This caused particular problems with small and Sudanese NGOs. After intervention by DFID's contracts branch, in August 2007 the BSF acted on this in part by prefinancing three of the 14 NGOs in full, and 1 part in advance.

The Basic Services Fund is in the process of being extended up until end 2008. Any decisions as to donor funding for basic services beyond this point will need to be made as part of a broader assessment of the efficacy the mix of instruments operating in southern Sudan, specifically the CHF an the MDTF-S. To assist in this process, external consultants are required to undertake an independent review of the effectiveness of the Basic Services Fund.

Objective

A review of the BSF is required to:

1. determine the degree to which the BSF has delivered on its objectives and to assess its efficiency and effectiveness. The review should consider the effectiveness of its project selection mechanisms, financing arrangements, administration and monitoring and evaluation, and its ability to allow pooled donor funding.
2. assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the BSF as a funding mechanism in terms of its governance structure, relationship with government, duration of funding etc. and in comparison with other aid instruments in southern Sudan as examined in literature review. From this, to provide some recommendations as to future funding mechanisms for basic services.

Key Tasks

The consultants will:

- Assess performance of the Basic Services Fund against its key objectives. Assessment should include the following areas:

From BSF goal and objectives:

1. The degree to which BSF has expanded coverage, and improved quality and use of basic services.
2. The degree to which BSF has improved capacity of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and State Governments to plan, monitor and coordinate service delivery
3. The degree to which BSF has improved accountability between non-state service providers and the GoSS and State Governments, and between service providers and their clients;
4. The degree to which BSF has developed common standards and shared approaches for service delivery including dissemination of best practice; and
5. The success of programmes in terms of piloting for larger scale GoSS led programmes.

Specific areas requiring attention:

6. The appropriateness of the BSF log frame – the consultants should propose revisions to this as necessary.
7. An assessment of the suitability of the BSF financing mechanisms and administrative procedures for future pooled donor funding
8. The suitability and effectiveness of the Steering Committee, including suggestions regarding its mandate and composition.
9. Effectiveness of community consultation and coordination and alignment with local systems.
10. The effectiveness of the Secretariat's management of the project and the general operation of ARCADIS – including brief comment on the transfer of the contract from management by DFID/Skills for Southern Sudan
11. The management arrangement with DFID and the Joint Donor Office in Juba (JDO).
12. Appropriateness of project time frames for individual funding activities and the sustainability of the project in the longer term.
13. Capacity and development of international NGO and local NGO implementing partners.

Methodology

This assessment will be carried out by:

- Conducting a file/literature review which should include a review of the records of the Basic Services Fund held by DFID Sudan, the JDO and the BSF Secretariat. The reviews of the MDTF and CHF as well of a recent mapping of basic services in Southern Sudan will be provided for reference. No further research on the MDTF or CHF is required.
- Conducting interviews with government, international and national NGOs implementing BSF projects, DFID and JDO staff, beneficiaries and other stakeholders in Khartoum and Juba.
- Project site visits to selected BSF project areas. The choice of project sites will be agreed in conjunction with DFID and the BSF Secretariat.

Skills Required

A two person team is required, both of whom should be experienced development practitioners. The team should have the following skills and experience: the design and/or implementation of post-conflict reconstruction funds; a good understanding of donor aid procedures; and a good understanding of Sudan and its development challenges, including GoSS capacity and administrative operation.

Outputs

- Debrief meetings with DFID and JDO staff in Khartoum and Juba.
- A report of no longer than 20 pages, including an executive summary, which responds to the issues set out above

Duration and Timing

The consultancy is expected to take up to 25 working days and should as soon as possible. The draft report is expected to be submitted to DFID and the JDO within two weeks of the completion of the interviews and site visits. It will be reviewed and comments provided by DFID and JDO staff within two weeks of its receipt. Consultants should be finalised within two weeks of receipt of comments. It is expected that the final report will be submitted no later than the end of January 2008.

Reporting

The consultants will report jointly to Aislin Baker in DFID Sudan and Malfrid Anestad at the JDO in Juba.

DFID/JDO will provide guidance to the consultants in terms of key areas on which to focus. Upon arrival in country, a briefing session will be organised for the consultants with relevant DFID and JDO staff in Khartoum and Juba.

Travel and Logistics

The team will be responsible for making their own travel arrangements and covering other logistical matters, but some assistance in Khartoum will be provided by DFID Sudan and in arranging field visits and meetings in Juba by the Basic Services Fund Secretariat. DFID will also provide support to any consultant requiring a visa for Sudan

Annex 2: Proposed Logical Framework

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
<p>GOAL: Primary education, health and water and sanitation services for all people in South Sudan.</p>	<p>BY 2011</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDG 2, indicator 6: primary school enrolment > x% • MDG 5, indicator 16: Maternal mortality < x/1000 . • MDG 4, Infant mortality < x/1000 • MDG 7, indicator 30: > x% of population with sustainable access to clean water • MDG 7, indicator 31: > x% of population with sustainable access to healthy sanitation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GOSS statistics. • UN system statistics: UNICEF, WHO etc . • National Living Standard Surveys. 	
<p>PURPOSE: Improved coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and health services in South Sudan.</p>	<p>BY 2009</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning spaces created for 6,400 children. • Teaching capacity created for 32,000 children. • Health services for 800,000 provided. • Clean water available for 229,000. • Latrines provided for 7,950. • Optimal GOSS service provision policies and standards adopted. • GOSS capacity to manage service provision established. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BSF evaluation survey • BSF Monitoring • GOSS budgets and reports. 	<p>Purpose to Goal:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPA holds. • Successful BSF exit strategy : GOSS and/or other funds take the services over. • Service levels affordable and sustainable. • Communities take ownership of facilities.
<p>OUTPUT 1: Expanded provision of basic services.</p>	<p>BY 2009</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 schools built and operational. • 800 teachers trained and employed. • 59 health facilities operational. • 229 boreholes installed and operational. • 795 latrines built and in use. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BSF Monitoring • BSF Quarterly Reports • Service Provider Reports 	<p>Output to Purpose:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled staff available. • Facilities sited & designed to match the need. • People can and wish to use the services. • Service providers can deliver.
<p>OUTPUT 2: GOSS and State Governments enabled to plan, monitor and coordinate basic services using non-state service providers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service providers accountable to GOSS through SC and State Governments. • Service providers accountable to individual clients and communities. • BSF projects planned as integral to state budgets. • BSF experience contributes to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SC minutes • BSF reports • Policy papers submitted • Interviews with GOSS and state governments. • BSF Evaluation • User satisfaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GOSS accepts non-state service model • GOSS and State Governments have capacity to engage • Service providers will work within

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
	<p>optimal & affordable policies and standards.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedures for commissioning service provision to fit GOSS defined strategies defined. • Capacity building for SC and State Govts. 	<p>surveys & KAP studies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State budgets/plans 	<p>GOSS strategies and be accountable to GOSS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approach does not duplicate other policy formation activities
<p>OUTPUT 3: An approach to 'recovery' which integrates service delivery with capacity building is adopted by follow-on funding mechanisms.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working paper sets out how service delivery and capacity building can be integrated. • Approach presented to those developing new funding mechanisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design of follow-on funding mechanisms • Interviews with GOSS • BSF Final Evaluation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donors accept more strategic approach and longer planning horizons. • Service providers have capacity for 'development' work. • Managing agencies (UN etc) can provide strong, integrated management.